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The dissertation seeks to increase understanding of electronic warfare (EW) self-
protection (EWSP) of battlefield helicopters by taking a holistic (systems) view on 
EWSP. It also evaluates the methodologies used in the research and their suitability as 
descriptive tools in communication between various EWSP stakeholders. The 
interpretation of the term “holistic view” is a central theme to the dissertation. 
 
The research methodology is bottom-up—which is necessary since no previous work 
exists that could guide the study—and progresses from analysis to synthesis. Initially 
several methods are evaluated for presenting findings on EWSP, including high-level 
system simulation such as Forrester system dynamics (FSD). The analysis is conducted 
by a comprehensive literature review on EW and other areas that are believed to be of 
importance to the holistic view. Combat scenarios, intelligence, EW support, 
validation, training, and delays have major influence on the effectiveness of the EWSP 
suite; while the initial procurement decision on the EWSP suite sets limits to what can 
be achieved later. The need for a vast support structure for EWSP means that countries 
with limited intelligence and other resources become dependent on allies for support; 
that is, the question of EWSP effectiveness becomes political. The synthesis shows 
that a holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters cannot be bounded in the 
temporal or hierarchical (organizational) senses. FSD is found to be helpful as a 
quality assurance tool, but refinements are needed if FSD is to be useful as a general 
discussion tool. The area of survivability is found to be the best match for the holistic 
view—for an EWSP suprasystem. A global survivability paradigm is defined as the 
ultimate holistic view on EWSP.  
 
It is suggested that future research should be top-down and aiming at promoting the 
global survivability paradigm. The survivability paradigm would give EWSP a natural 
framework in which its merits can be assessed objectively. 
 
 
Keywords: electronic warfare, self-protection, battlefield helicopter, survivability, 
susceptibility reduction, systems engineering, systems thinking, system dynamics 
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Avhandlingen söker förbättra förståelsen för varnings- och motmedelssystem (VMS) 
för militära helikoptrar genom en holistisk (system-) syn på VMS-problematiken. Den 
evaluerar också de metoder som används i forskningen jämte deras användbarhet för 
kommunikation mellan olika VMS-intressegrupper. Tolkningen av begreppet 
”holistiskt perspektiv” är ett centralt tema i avhandlingen. 
 
Forskningsmetodiken är bottom-up—vilket är nödvändigt eftersom det inte finns 
tidigare studier som kunde fungera som modell för arbetet—och går från analys till 
syntes. I inledningen evalueras några metoder för presentation av rön om VMS, 
inklusive högnivåsystemsimulation såsom Forresters systemdynamik (FSD). Analysen 
utförs som ett omfattande litteraturstudium inom området telekrig, samt inom andra 
områden som antas vara av betydelse för det holistiska perspektivet. Stridsscenarier, 
underrättelser, telekrigstöd, validering, utbildning, samt fördröjningar har en central 
betydelse för VMS-utrustningens effektivitet; medan de beslut som fattas i 
upphandlingsskedet sätter begränsningar för vad som kan åstadkommas senare. 
Behovet av ett stort stödsystem för VMS betyder att länder med begränsade 
underrättelse- och andra resurser blir beroende av allierade för stöd, vilket leder till att 
VMS-effektivitet får politiska konsekvenser. Syntesen visar att ett holistiskt perspektiv 
av VMS för militära helikoptrar inte kan begränsas i temporal eller hierarkisk 
(organisatorisk) mening. FSD befinnas vara av hjälp som ett kvalitetsredskap, men 
ytterligare utveckling krävs om FSD skall bli användbar som ett generellt 
diskussionsredskap. Överlevnadsförmåga är det område som bäst sammanfaller med 
idén om ett holistiskt perspektiv—ett VMS-suprasystem. Ett globalt överlevnads-
paradigm bedöms vara den definitiva holistiska synen på VMS. 
 
Det rekommenderas att fortsatt forskning skall utföras top-down med strävan att 
vidareutveckla det globala överlevnadsparadigmet. Överlevnadsparadigmet skulle 
utgöra en naturlig hemvist för VMS, där dess meriter kan avvägas objektivt. 
 
 
Nyckelord: telekrig, varnings- och motmedelssystem, militär helikopter, överlevnad, 
reduktion av mottaglighet, systemteknik, systemtänkande, systemdynamik 
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
SYMBOL DESIGNATION 
  
a Attrition rate (coefficient) of enemy forces, Arbitrary (CLD links) 
b Attrition rate (coefficient) of friendly forces 
c Attrition rate (coefficient) of enemy by friendly support fire 
d Attrition rate (coefficient) of friendly forces by enemy support fire 
k Number of nodes 
n Refractive index 
Pfa Probability of false alarm 
Pd Probability of detection 
PH Probability of hit 
PH,m Probability of hit per mission 
Pk Probability of kill 
Pk/H Probability of kill, given a hit 
x Number of enemy forces 
xs Number of enemy support forces 
y Number of friendly forces 
ys Number of friendly support forces 
 Emissivity 
! Reflectivity 
$ Pulse/code element length 
  
 
 
ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 
  
AA Anti-Aircraft 
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery 
AD Analogue-to-Digital 
AEW Airborne Early Warning 
AFV Armored Fighting Vehicle 
AGC Automatic Gain Control 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process 
AL Aft, Left 
AlGaN Aluminum Gallium Nitride 
Al2O3 Sapphire 
AM Amplitude Modulation 
AOA Angle of Arrival 
AOC Association of Old Crows 
AR Aft, Right 
ARM Anti-Radiation Missile 
ASPJ Airborne Self-Protection Jammer 
ATGW Anti-Tank Guided Weapon 
BDR Battle Damage Repair 
BVR Beyond Visual Range 
BW Bandwidth 
CAS Close Air Support 
CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation 
CATWOE Customer, Actor, Transformation, Weltanschauung, Owner, Environmental 
Constraints 
C-band IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 4-8 GHz 
CCD Charge-Coupled Device 
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ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 
  
CCM Counter-Countermeasure 
C/FD Chaff/Flare Dispenser 
CLD Causal Loop Diagram 
CLOS Command-Line-of-Sight 
CM Countermeasure 
CMT Cf. MCT 
CNI Communication, Navigation, and Identification 
COMJAM Communications Jamming 
COSRO Conical Scan on Receive Only (cf. SORO) 
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
CPI Coherent Processing Interval 
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue  
CVR Crystal Video Receiver 
CW Continuous Wave 
C3 Command, control, and communication 
DBF Digital Beamforming 
dBmi Decibel milliwatt (referred to the) isotropic 
DDL Dispersive Delay Line 
DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defense 
DEW Directed Energy Weapon 
DFD Data Flow Diagram 
DHS (US) Department of Homeland Security 
DIRCM Directed Infrared Countermeasure 
Dmnl Dimensionless 
DOD (US) Department of Defense 
DRFM Digital Radio-Frequency Memory 
DTU Data Transfer Unit 
DZ Drop Zone 
DVO Direct Viewing Optics 
EBO Effects-Based Operations 
ECM Electronic Countermeasure 
ECCM Electronic Counter-Countermeasure 
EFP Explosively Forged Penetrator 
ELINT Electronic Intelligence 
EM Electromagnetic 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
EO Electro-Optic 
EOB Electronic Order of Battle 
ESA Electronically Scanned Array 
ESM Electronic Support Measure 
EW Electronic Warfare 
EWC Electronic Warfare Controller 
EWSC Electronic Warfare Support Center 
EWSP Electronic Warfare Self-Protection 
f frequency 
FAE Fuel Air Explosive 
FCS Fire Control System 
FEBA Forward Extension of Battlefield Area, Forward Edge of Battle Area 
FFT Fast Fourier Transform 
FL Forward, Left 
FLIR Forward Looking Infrared 
FM Field Manual, Frequency Modulation 
FMCW Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave 
FOM Figure-of-Merit 
FOV Field-of-View 
FPA Focal Plane Array 
FR Forward, Right 
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ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 
  
FSD Forrester System Dynamics 
GaN Gallium Nitride 
GAO (US) General Accounting Office 
GaP Gallium Phosphide 
Ge Germanium 
HF High Frequency, IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 3-30 
MHz 
HOJ Home-on-Jam 
HPM High-Power Microwave 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
HW Hardware 
HWIL Hardware-in-the-Loop 
Hz Hertz 
H2O Water 
IBW Instantaneous Bandwidth 
ICW Intermittent Continuous Wave 
ID Identification 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
IFM Instantaneous Frequency Measurement 
IFOV Instantaneous Field-of-View 
IMINT Image Intelligence 
InGaAs Indium Gallium Arsenide 
InSb Indium Antimonide 
IR Infrared 
IRST Infrared Search and Track 
ISA Integrated Survivability Assessment 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
ISTF Installed System Test Facility 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
J/S Jamming-to-Signal 
JTCG/AS (US) Joint Technical Coordination Group on Aircraft Survivability 
K-band IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 18-27 GHz 
Ka-band IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 27-40 GHz 
km kilometer 
kt knot 
Ku-band IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 12-18 GHz 
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LBR Laser Beam Rider 
LFM Linear Frequency Modulation 
LLADS Low-Level Air Defense System  
LLTV Low-Light Television 
LNA Low-Noise Amplifier 
LO Low Observable, Local Oscillator 
LORO Lobe-Switching on Receive Only (cf. SORO) 
LOS Line-of-Sight 
LPI Low Probability of Intercept 
LRF Laser Range Finder 
LWIR Long-Wave Infrared, defined as 8-14 m in the present work 
LWR Laser Warning Receiver 
m meter, milli- 
M Mach, Mega 
MANPAD(S) Man-Portable Air Defense (System) 
MASINT Measurement and Signature Intelligence 
MBT Main Battle Tank 
MCT Mercury-Cadmium-Telluride (or: CMT) 
MDF Mission Data File 
Mg Magnesium 
MgF2  Magnesium Fluoride 
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MMI Man-Machine Interface 
MMIC Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit 
MMW Millimeter Wave 
MOD Ministry of Defense (or Defence) 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
Mpps Million pulses per second 
MRTD Minimum Resolvable Temperature Difference 
ms millisecond 
MTF Modulation Transfer Function 
MTI Moving Target Indication 
MTV Magnesium Teflon Viton 
mv meter vertical 
MW Megawatt 
MWIR Medium-Wave Infrared, defined as 3-5 m in the present work 
MWS Missile Warning System 
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC Nuclear, Bacteriological, and Chemical 
Nd:GGG Neodymium doped Gadolinium Gallium Garnet 
Nd:YAG Neodymium doped Yttrium Aluminum Garnet 
NIR Near-Infrared, defined as 0.7-0.92 m in the present work 
nm nautical mile 
NOE Nap-of-the-Earth 
NOTAR No Tail Rotor 
NSHP Nordic Standard Helicopter Program 
NVIS Night Vision 
OAR Open Air Range 
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
OPO Optical Parametric Oscillator  
OR Operational/Operations Research 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
OSINT Open Source Intelligence 
O2 Oxygen 
O3 Ozone 
PBO Post-Burnout 
PbS Lead Sulphide  
PbSe Lead Selenide 
PD Pulse Doppler 
PDW Pulse Descriptor Word 
PLAID Precision Location and Identification 
PN Proportional Navigation, Pseudonoise 
POI Probability of Intercept 
PPLN Periodically-Poled Lithium Niobate 
PRF Pulse Repetition Frequency 
PRI Pulse Repetition Interval 
PSO Peace Support Operation 
PtSi Platinum Silicide 
PW Pulse Width 
PZ Pickup Zone 
QWIP Quantum Well Infrared Photodetectors 
RCS Radar Cross-Section 
RF Radio-Frequency 
RFI Radio-Frequency Interferometer 
RFJ Radio-Frequency Jammer 
RGPO Range Gate Pull-Off 
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs 
RMS Root Mean Square 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
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ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION 
  
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 
rpm revolution per minute 
RTO (NATO) Research and Technology Organization 
RWR Radar Warning Receiver 
SA Situational Awareness 
S/A Semi-Active 
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile 
SAR Search and Rescue, Synthetic Aperture Radar  
SBA Simulation Based Acquisition 
S-band IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 2-4 GHz 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 
Si Silicon 
SIGINT Signal Intelligence 
SLB Sidelobe Blanking 
SLC Sidelobe Cancellation 
SORO Scan on Receive Only (cf. COSRO, LORO) 
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
SPAAG Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun 
sr steradian 
SSM Soft Systems Methodology 
S/T-rdr Search/Track Radar (separated as S-rdr, T-rdr) 
S&T Science and Technology 
SW Software 
SWIR Short-Wave Infrared, defined as 0.92-2.5 m in the present work 
STANAG (NATO) Standardization Agreement 
T&E Test and Evaluation 
TOA Time of Arrival 
TTG Time-to-Go 
TV Television 
TVM Track Via Missile 
TWT Traveling Wave Tube 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UHF Ultra High Frequency, IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency 
band 300-3000 MHz 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 
US United States (of America) 
UV Ultraviolet 
UWB Ultra-Wide Bandwidth 
V-band IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency band 40-75 GHz 
VGPO Velocity Gate Pull-Off 
VHF Very High Frequency, IEEE StdTM 521-2002 designation for the frequency 
band 30-300 MHz 
VIP Very Important Person 
V&V Verification and Validation 
W Watt 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Incentive for the work 
 
This dissertation is an offspring of an involvement in the Nordic Standard Helicopter 
Program (NSHP) in 1999-2001. The procurement stage of the NSHP showed a lack 
of interest for EWSP (electronic warfare self-protection) problems both by engineers 
and officers working on other areas of the program, as well as by NSHP decision-
makers. On the other hand, it was also evident that the EW (electronic warfare) 
community lacks tools to convey its messages to other helicopter stakeholders. 
Despite the abundance of unclassified literature on EW and EWSP, hardly any 
attempts seem to have been made to form a holistic view on EWSP, nor to develop 
tools or methodologies that could be of help in bringing home the central points of 
EWSP to other stakeholders. It was the interest for such questions that acted as an 
incentive for this study.1 
 
1.2 Present deficiencies 
 
1.2.1 Opinions on EWSP 
 
EWSP of airborne platforms has difficulty in gaining appreciation from the 
operational and decision-making communities alike. Haynes et al. [Hay98] points out 
that the selection and implementation of any particular countermeasure technique for 
helicopters has been piecemeal, related to immediate operational needs and perceived 
shortfalls. This contradicts the fact that the EWSP tends to be mission critical, i.e. 
survivability is dependent upon correct operation of the equipment and system failure 
equals aborted mission [Pyw02]. More to the point, in financially constrained 
programs the EWSP suite will either be terminated or inexpensive solutions will be 
selected regardless of the outcome for platform survivability. US Congressman 
Joseph R. Pitts—an EW specialist with war experience—has expressed the following 
view: “EW does suffer from a public-relations problem. There are several reasons for 
this. First, (…) EW programs become hidden under the umbrella of larger programs 
and are often overlooked. Second, EW is a very technical subject that is not easy to 
                                                 
1  EW terminology varies within the English-speaking world. The term “electronic warfare self-
protection” (EWSP), used in the present work, corresponds to aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) 
in NATO and US parlance, whereas the British expression is defensive aids suite (DAS). The rational 
for selecting the term EWSP—which is frequently used by Australian authors—is that it points to the 
discipline of electronic self-protection with a stress on warfare; while it discloses weapons, structural 
protection, and similar survivability measures. 
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understand. It does not have a real tangible quality to it like other military programs. 
Third is the classified nature of EW. This makes it difficult to educate people about 
the importance of EW”. [Anon01a] In addition to the problems pointed out by Pitts 
one should add that EW equipment and operations are too inconspicuous to boost the 
imagination of people. Not only are EWSP systems obscure little boxes joined by 
cables, but there is very little that can be perceived by human senses when EWSP 
systems function optimally. EWSP systems do little to promote their own image.2 
This weakness means that EWSP has difficulty in attracting the attention of decision-
makers, and since attention is a scarce human resource [Ste00 pp.599-600] it will be 
allocated elsewhere. According to Hedelund [Hed00 p.18] “vulnerability concerns 
seem to have been forgotten on traditional battlefields where helicopters are 
employed more routinely [than on urban battlefields]”.3 One might also speculate 
that the regret theory of decision-making could be at work on EWSP: The theory 
predicts that decision-makers will most likely choose the sure thing when they expect 
they will not learn the outcome of the gamble than when they expect they will 
[Lar95]. Therefore, since most military decision-makers are involved in EWSP only 
once in their career they probably never get combat feedback on their decision and 
therefore select traditional solutions in survivability enhancement. A RAND4 study 
on US light forces for rapid reaction missions [Mat00] and earlier NATO RTO 
(Research and Technology Organization) lecture notes on helicopter/weapons system 
integration [Gme97] show that EWSP is not a major subject, neither to military 
thinkers nor to aircraft engineers. The RAND study briefly mentions infrared 
jammers, but the RTO notes do not make any reference to EWSP as a survivability 
asset for helicopters. The notion “interpretive flexibility of objects”—the way in 
which they mean different things to different social groups [Law94 p.42]—is valid 
for EWSP. 
 
Impartiality demands that it be asked if the EW community can make unbiased 
judgement on questions related to EWSP. Pywell and Stubley [Pyw96] argues that 
EW systems have justifiably received bad publicity by appearing to offer substantial 
technical promises which either have not been, or could not have been realized.5 
                                                 
2  A) The little that can be done can be seen in promotional photos of aircraft dispensing flares to both 
sides in a rapid succession. A letter to The Journal of Electronic Defense asks a rhetoric question on 
the state of US EW during the 1990’s: “Did EW become a victim of its own success?” [Sot01]. The 
writer suggests that the successes of EW up to and including the war in the Persian Gulf brought with 
it a diminishing interest for this force multiplier. This view resembles an earlier statement on the 
Israeli intelligence blunders that led to the Yom Kippur war in 1973: “(…) paradoxically a great 
victory [in 1967] assisted by brilliant intelligence can lead to complacency and disaster.” [Hug99 
p.218] Lambeth presents evidence that the success of SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) in the 
Gulf War led to disappointing performance in the Kosovo operation in 1999 [Lam02], but this should 
not be generalized for the entire field of EW. 
B) The importance of visual evidence was shown in the downfall of a US/NATO communications 
project in its third year. Systems engineers working on the project had concentrated on modeling and 
simulation of scenarios, and on embedded software. Dignitaries from prospective customer countries 
were dismayed at the lack of hardware and canceled the project. [Hit92 p.265] 
3  The use of the word “vulnerability” is not consistent in Hedelund [Hed00]. In this particular case its 
usage is similar to that of the term “survivability” in the present work. 
4  Refers to the RAND Corporation (http://www.rand.org) of California, USA. 
5  An example in case is the US-built airborne self-protection jammer (ASPJ) which was developed 
for 10 years, during which time the threats it was designed to counter were replaced by later versions, 
and immature or unproven technologies were used in the design of the system which caused problems 
with effectiveness and suitability of the system [Wri93 p.9]. Another example is the AN/ALQ-211 
SIRFC, as shown through the US General Accounting Office report GAO-01-448 [Lev01]. 
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According to Regev [Reg01] a fundamental weakness of platform self-protection lies 
in the supporting technologies that are reaching the limits of cost-effectiveness. This 
view is supported by the NATO RTO report Land Operations in the Year 2020 
(LO2020), which predicts that EWSP systems are likely to be very expensive, even 
by 2020, and so will only be fitted on the most important ground and army aviation 
assets [Anon99a]. A study of cost-effectiveness of the F/A-18 EWSP suite concludes 
that when the threat level is low, the least expensive suite is the most cost-effective; 
but as the threat level increases the more effective suites become the most cost-
effective [Ken97]. The question of an optimal EWSP solution therefore depends on 
the relevant threat scenario. Psychological factors may also be involved in how the 
situation is perceived by the EW community. Experience shows that anything that 
distorts one’s ability to recall events in a balanced way will distort one’s assessment. 
More generally, this falls under the concept of bounded rationality of human 
behavior. [Sim92 p.3, Con96, Ham01] Since the EW community is emotionally 
involved in its trade, its conclusions on the importance of EWSP may therefore be 
exaggerated.  
 
1.2.2 The position of other stakeholders 
 
EWSP stakeholders represent a heterogeneous group with differing interests. Within 
this group only the aircrews’ lives depend on an effective EWSP suite, but unless 
aircrews have combat experience their priorities are mostly elsewhere. To 
aeronautical engineers and operational officers the EWSP suite presents additional 
weight, space and power demands on an often overburdened platform. Proponents of 
stealth technology have been successful in arguing for funds at the cost of EWSP. 
Mutzelburg and Grieco [Mut99] elaborates on the competition between EW and 
stealth technology: “The budgeters quickly bought into the idea that if you had LO,6 
you would not need money for EW. (….) Consequently EW lost funds.” 7  The 
emphasis on stealth technology by the US Air Force also led to EW expertise 
becoming rare both in the operational and technological arenas [Sco00]. Rentfrow 
[Ren01] presents a critical account of the competition between stealth and EW, 
which also highlights hidden motives in military decision-making. Decision-makers 
on military acquisition programs often favor impressive hardware over the opinion of 
specialists. However, the position of the decision-maker is not as straightforward as 
the EW specialist would like to believe. According to Shulsky and Schmitt [Shu02 
p.129]: “[One set of public administration issues is] the uneasy relationship between 
expertise and policy making. It deals with the problems of determining the 
appropriate weight that the views of the experts (who claim to have special 
knowledge) should be given in governing the actions of policy makers (who have the 
actual authority to make decisions) and of ensuring that the experts’ views receive 
the attention they deserve”. The decision-maker therefore has to weigh the EW 
experts’ views against those of aeronautical and logistics experts, operational 
                                                 
6  LO = Low Observable. 
7  An extreme pro-stealth view is e.g. the following statement from 1993: “To capture fully the impact 
of the stealth revolution, we must renew our efforts to revisit doctrine, revise plans, revise tactics, and 
plan forces in order to employ the F-117, B-2, and F-22 most effectively in the early establishment of 
air superiority” [Pat93]. Cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche program shows that the importance of 
extreme stealth has decreased in the post-Cold War era. 
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officers, pilots, etc., and make decisions in the framework of budget constraints,8 
political considerations and other limiting factors. The futile deployment of 
American AH-64A Apaches to Kosovo has been called “an accident waiting to 
happen” [Hoy02] and has mainly been blamed on bad management [Bra01a], but the 
EWSP suite has also been charged [Anon99b, Cod99, Coo99a]. This has not 
prevented a new, more advanced EWSP suite to face repeated funding problems. 
[Lum02, Riv02].9 A top-level controversy was seen in November 2003, when the US 
Army began rushing helicopter EWSP equipment to Iraq after a CH-47D Chinook 
had been shot down with a Strela 2 (SA-7 Grail) MANPAD (man-portable air 
defense) missile, killing 16 and injuring 20, and lawmakers criticizing the US Army 
for failing to equip helicopters with adequate defensive systems [Erw04, Riv03, 
Riv04a, Scu03a].10 This event supports the earlier mentioned report by Haynes et al. 
[Hay98], according to which the implementation of countermeasure techniques for 
helicopters is related to immediate operational needs and perceived shortfalls. 
 
The question of whether the EW community is capable of unbiased judgment on the 
need for EWSP on battlefield helicopters can be extended to other stakeholders. It 
can therefore be asked whose opinion is the legitimate one and should be heeded 
when decisions are made. Problems of this nature have received some attention in the 
field of risk analysis, where for instance Hatfield and Hipel [Hat02] suggests finding 
solutions by applying concepts from systems theory. 
 
1.2.3 The EWSP communication gap 
 
Pitt’s earlier mentioned opinion on the need for education of non-specialist 
stakeholders brings up the issue of communication among EWSP stakeholders. 
However, searches of both unclassified data bases and other information sources 
have not indicated that any tools would have been developed to promote 
communication between EW specialists and other EWSP stakeholders. Such tools 
could take many forms. Writing is still the backbone of documented communication, 
but written reports on EWSP with the necessary level of detail, and consideration of 
                                                 
8  The controversy behind various decision-makers is contained in a remark by the US House Armed 
Services Committee (May 1966) of the Defense Department, that its “(…) almost obsessional 
dedication with cost-effectiveness raises the specter of a decision-maker who (…) knows the price of 
everything and the value of nothing” [Qua83 p.96]. 
9  A) Despite the EWSP suite having been mentioned as one cause for the Apaches remaining on the 
ground, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) report Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving 
Lessons Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter [Cur01] does not mention the EWSP suite; only 
suggestions regarding EW officers on the ground are given. Puttré [Put02a] reports that at least the 
AN/ALQ-144 omnidirectional lamp jammer worked to satisfaction during the Operation Anaconda in 
Afghanistan in March 2002. 
B) The new EWSP suite for the AH-64 Apache Longbow has had constant problems in mustering 
funding support, and part of the suite was even terminated in early 2002, since the full suite would add 
about 30% to the Longbow upgrade cost [Lum02]. 
10  Ball [Bal03 p.538] states, on the eve of the 2003 Iraq War: “The history of reducing an aircraft’s 
susceptibility to hostile air defense systems is mainly a story of reactions to a changed or 
unanticipated threat situation, most of them conducted on a short-term crash basis in order to keep 
aircraft losses to an ‘acceptable’ level (…) the hard lessons learned in the last half-century have given 
countermeasures proper credentials to make them a major consideration for survivability 
enhancement; and survivability is now given serious attention over the entire life span of aircraft, 
(…)” In view of the experience from Iraq the latter part of the statement is optimistic and there still 
remains work to be done in the field. 
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alternatives and their possible interactions, are typically too long for efficient group 
discussions. Simulation tools are mainly intended for specialized purposes such as 
countermeasures effectiveness studies, as for instance the RJARS engagement 
simulator, presented in Sollfrey [Sol91], the methodology outlined in Hume 
[Hum96], and the ATCOM simulator for attack helicopter team behavior, described 
in Baker [Bak01]. Although such simulators have advanced features the core of their 
message is rooted in detailed understanding of EW, and they are therefore mostly too 
sophisticated to facilitate communication with individuals who have had little 
exposure to EW. Graphics have been used to present various aspects of EWSP, for 
instance block diagrams to depict EW test and evaluation processes [Anon96, Wri93] 
and flow diagrams to describe simulation processes [Arc87, Sol91]. Despite the 
virtue of graphical methods no attempts seem to have been made to apply such tools 
to more holistic problems in EWSP. 
 
Connected to the communication gap is the lack of an overall, holistic, treatise of 
EWSP. Standard literature on EW (e.g. [Gol87, Lot90, Ner01, Sch86,99, Wie91]) is 
mostly content with covering technical aspects of EW. Related factors, such as 
intelligence, research, test and evaluation, mission planning, flight tactics, rules of 
engagement, and situational awareness are left with a brief mention—if mentioned at 
all. Details on these can be found scattered in various journals, books, symposia 
proceedings, academic theses, publications by the US DOD and NATO RTO, etc. 
Even if the information is unclassified and available the details remain disconnected 
and the interaction of contributing factors can only be guessed upon. Since our 
society takes a keen interest in the wider aspects of science and technology—be the 
aspects environmental, economic, ethical, or developmental—the EW community 
should also be able to discuss its trade in a holistic manner. 
 
1.2.4 Change of attitude 
 
Despite an often heated debate on insufficient support of EW in the US, it is the US 
defense services that have the broadest experience of EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters. The gaining of experience started in earnest in 1971 in Laos, when 
helicopters for the first time had to face surface-to-air missiles with infrared (IR) 
seekers [Pri00 p.179], and new lessons are learned in the most recent conflict in Iraq. 
The US conduct a comprehensive program on aircraft survivability, as can be seen in 
numerous Internet sources on the subject and in Ball’s seminal textbooks on the 
subject [Bal85,03]. The American edge in EW prompted US Congressman Mark 
Kirk to point at EW deficiencies of other countries: “(…) I am beginning to wonder 
why other countries have not figured out the ‘EW factor’ in making sure that they, 
like us, have such an unbelievable ability to protect uniformed men and women who 
are flying over the beach and into harm’s way” [Kir01].11 
 
Europe has seen an increasing interest in EWSP suites for helicopters. The 
Netherlands, following deployment of AH-64D Apache attack helicopters as a 
                                                 
11  A) Kirk’s comment is strongly connected to his experience of the EA-6B Prowler support aircraft, 
and against this background his opinions are valid. 
B) Although the US is leading in the field of EW and in research on platform survivability, the US 
military also faces financial constraints and is prone to wishful thinking, as shown in Rentfrow 
[Ren01]. 
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backup to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), decided that an 
integrated EWSP suite together with a new generation forward-looking infra-red 
(FLIR) cameras had first priority for improving the Apache [Jan01].12  The four 
Nordic countries that participated in the NSHP project all decided to outfit their 
transport helicopters with an EWSP suite. The UK has equipped both its Apache 
attack helicopters and Merlin transport helicopters with an indigenous EWSP suite. 
The European NH-90 and Tiger helicopters are both offered with integrated EWSP 
suites. A major obstacle, however, is the patchwork of European countries that lack a 
joint approach to EWSP. Efforts by individual countries, e.g. in simulation, test and 
validation, and mission data file generation are repeated by other countries, and there 
are few indications of a systematic approach to EWSP of battlefield helicopters. The 
attitude on defense issues has been changing in Europe; particularly after the NATO-
led Kosovo operation in 1999 which highlighted European dependence on US 
military assistance.13 
 
1.3 Objective of work 
 
1.3.1 The problem and the need for a solution 
 
The previous discussion indicates that a main concern of the EW community is the 
low propensity of decision-makers to invest in EWSP, and when investments are 
made they are made in a haphazard way, without real appreciation for conditions that 
would make EWSP an efficient contributor to platform survivability. On the other 
hand, the discussion also reveals that the EW community has problems in 
communicating its message to other interest groups and in understanding the position 
of other stakeholders in helicopter survivability. As a first cornerstone for the present 
work the following claims are made: 
 
Claims: 
 
 
It should be noted that the claims refer to the unclassified and freely available body 
of scientific information. The discussion in Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 indicates that 
some classified work has been done within this field, and it must also be assumed 
that various EW and combat simulation facilities take a holistic view on 
survivability. 
                                                 
12  Despite this, it is obvious that only the Dutch decision to deploy the Apaches to Afghanistan 
trigged a crash-program for outfitting the helicopters with an EWSP suite [Jan04a, Jan04b, Fis04a]. 
13  The weakness of Europe is expressed in the following statement: “Kosovo underlined the bad 
news. First, we lack sufficient strategic and tactical intelligence assets (….) Second, we lack sufficient 
strategic and tactical sea and air lift (….) Third, we lack enough hi-tech weapons (….) In effect, 
without the US today we cannot see very far, we cannot go very far, and when there, we cannot do 
very much and we are unlikely to be able to stay very long if we are not welcome” [Lin00]. 
1) There exists today no treatise on EWSP and its relation to 
battlefield helicopter survivability in general. 
2) The tools that exist today for communicating issues of EWSP 
with disparate stakeholders are insufficient. 
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The second cornerstone for the present work is formed by the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2: 
 
 
The third cornerstone is presented in Figure 1, which summarizes the opening 
discussion in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 as factors working for or against investments in 
EWSP—the embodiment of the EW community’s claimed lack of understanding by 
other interest groups.  
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Figure 1: Factors working for (+) or against (-) investment in EWSP and factors targeted by the 
present work in order of importance. Target factors 1-3 are main objectives of the study. 
Factors 4-6 are secondary objectives, improvements gained by achieving the prime objectives. 
Factor 3 is a partial reason for deficiencies in factor 1.  
 
1.3.2 Objectives of work 
 
The main objectives of the present work follow from the previous discussion and are 
indicated in Figure 1; in addition the imprecise notion “holistic view” will have to be 
resolved. 
 
 
 
 
The field of battlefield helicopter survivability, including EWSP, will 
benefit 
1) from an investigation that unifies EWSP and other 
survivability issues, and 
2) from tools or a tool that facilitate(s) communication on EWSP 
issues without prerequisite of specialized technical or 
scientific knowledge. 
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Objectives: 
 
 
The first two objectives are closely related, and both are related to Claim 1 and 
Hypothesis 1. Objective 3 is related to Claim 2 and Hypothesis 2. Objective 4 calls 
for a clarification to the title of the dissertation.  
 
Proving that the objectives have been met is problematic, as is normal in the case of 
qualitative research. Objective 1 has a specific dilemma in that the term 
“understanding” cannot be defined in absolute terms [Gol78 p.6]—although Figure 2 
contributes with the view on understanding promoted by the systems thinking school. 
For that reason Hypothesis 3 is taken as the measure of fulfillment of Objective 1. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 puts the burden on Objectives 2 and 3. These objectives are somewhat 
more manageable since there is a wealth of tools, methodologies, and information 
sources with which the present work can be compared. In the end, however, the final 
verdict on the objectives having been met is a question of judgement. 
 
Figure 1 indicates three secondary objectives for the study. If the main objectives are 
satisfied, the following secondary objectives can be expected to be met: 
 
• Influence of EW experts on decision-makers: Better tools for communicating 
with non-specialist decision-makers improve the EW specialist’s chances of 
arguing his case. A fuller picture of factors related to EWSP reduces 
misunderstanding on resource requirements, life-cycle costs, etc. 
• Obscuration of EWSP by umbrella programs: Ability to argue for EWSP in a 
manner that can be understood by all stakeholders is of importance when 
limited resources are shared. However, no benefit is achieved if there are 
political strings or hidden agendas in the decision-making process. 
• Intangible benefits: Improved tools for demonstrating the benefits of EWSP 
systems—whether in the form of graphs, simulations, or other forms—can 
mitigate the basic EWSP problem of being too inconspicuous and 
Objective 1 is satisfied if Objectives 2 and 3 are met and the work 
towards meeting them is performed systematically, and is documented 
in a consistent and unambiguous manner. 
The objective of the present work is to 
1) generate improved understanding of EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters; 
2) unite disconnected information on and factors contributing to 
EWSP of battlefield helicopters; 
3) develop or identify tools or methodologies that can be used for 
communication on EWSP with disparate interest groups; and 
4) resolve on the notion “holistic view on EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters “. 
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uninteresting to the layman. It is believed that much can be done in this area 
without violating security requirements. 
 
1.3.3 Methodology 
 
The following passage in Cook et al. [Coo99b] had a major influence on the present 
work, by mobilizing interest in systems thinking: “Systems thinking is concerned 
with the conscious use of the concept of wholeness when considering an entity 
(system) that exhibits properties that are greater than the sum of its components. It is 
the antithesis of Descartes’ reductionism. (….) It is important to appreciate that 
systems thinking is generic and far broader than traditional military systems 
engineering.” According to this definition systems thinking embraces traditional 
systems engineering. The quotation above gives the ideology behind the present 
work, and is portrayed graphically in Figure 2: To gain understanding on the 
suprasystem of EWSP for battlefield helicopters by synthesizing knowledge on 
systems that is gained through analysis of underlying subsystems (factors). 
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Figure 2: Central concepts and ideas in systems thinking: Understanding is generated by 
synthetic thinking whereas knowledge is gained by analytic thinking [Ack01]. Figure adapted 
from Barnes et al. [Bar99]. 
 
 
The practical research method of this study is discussed in detail in Chapter 2, 
questions of general interest are given in Section 1.4, with a concluding summary in 
Figure 4. 
 
1.3.4 Comments to the objectives 
 
There is a slight discrepancy between Objective 1 and the discussion in Section 1.2. 
The earlier discussion talks about EW as “(...) a very technical subject that is not 
easy to understand”. Objective 1, however, generalizes the question and can be seen 
to be valid also for EW specialists. The reason behind this generalization lies in the 
motivation for Objective 3, and the discussion in Section 1.2.3: With the exception of 
basic textbooks the information related to EWSP is scattered in a vast number of 
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sources, which the EW specialist is likely to meet only if working on specialized 
subjects. Building the whole picture of factors contributing to EWSP is therefore a 
major effort also for the EW specialist. 
 
The term “holistic view” in the title of this study emerged from the original idea of 
conducting a systems thinking study on EWSP of battlefield helicopters. Since the 
expression “a systems view” may be confusing—particularly to engineers—the latter 
part of the title was changed to the less ambiguous “a holistic view”. The term 
“systems thinking” is controversial.14 Systems thinking can be practiced in more than 
one way [Cau01]. It is partly a reaction to the inability of traditional “hard” 
operational research (OR) methods to deal with complex, unstructured problems. 
Forrester [For 94] states that “’systems thinking’ has no clear definition or usage 
(….) [it] is coming to mean little more than thinking about systems, talking about 
systems, and acknowledge that systems are important.” This view is challenged in 
Sterman [Ste00 p.38], and in Caulfield and Maj [Cau01], where Forrester system 
dynamics (FSD)15 is seen as a subgroup of systems thinking. Espejo [Esp94] defines 
the related term “systemic thinking” as “learning how to manage situational 
complexity”.16 The statement “The bottom line of systems thinking is leverage—
seeing where actions and changes can lead to significant, enduring improvements” 
[Sen90 p.114] is intriguing, since finding a leverage point in EWSP is in line with the 
objectives of the present work. 
 
The term “emergence” is used in connection with complex systems [Con02]. 
According to one definition “(…) the idea of emergence is used to indicate the 
arising of patterns, structures, or properties that do not seem adequately explained by 
referring only to the system’s pre-existing components and their interactions.” 
[Anon03] This definition can be rewritten into a guideline for the present study: “To 
indicate patterns, structures, or properties in the field of EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters, which do not seem adequately explained by referring only to the pre-
existing EWSP components and their interactions.” 
 
The conclusion is that the present work is a multidisciplinary enterprise. Its emphasis 
is on EWSP but within the realm of engineering it is most appropriately classified as 
belonging to systems engineering, given that the following definition is accepted: 
“Systems engineering is a branch of engineering which concentrates on the design 
                                                 
14  Indeed, the term “system” is controversial because it has both a common everyday usage and a 
wider meaning. Checkland [Che99 pp.306-307] traces this problem back to Ludwig von Bertalanffy, a 
biologist who in the late 1940s suggested that ideas about organisms as whole entities could be 
generalized to refer to wholes of any kind called “systems”. 
15  A) Forrester system dynamics (FSD) is termed ”system dynamics” by its practitioners—embodied 
by its inventor, Prof. Jay W Forrester, the System Dynamics Society, the journal System Dynamics 
Review, and a vast body of literature on the subject [For61,95]. The conventional term has been 
modified in the present work in order to avoid confusion with ordinary engineering system dynamics: 
dynamical phenomena in power lines, vibrating mechanical structures, oscillating control systems, etc. 
B) Dangerfield and Roberts [Dan96] claims that Forrester was influenced by Tustin who had applied 
the ideas of the control engineer to economic systems already in the early 1950s. Tustin’s name does 
not appear on Forrester’s seminal Industrial Dynamics, A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers 
[For58]. 
16  The terms “systems thinking” and “systemic thinking” are regarded interchangeable in the present 
work. This is in accordance with Checkland and Scholes [Che99 p.18], which regards the word 
systemic a legitimate adjective of the word system, with the meaning “of or concerning a system as a 
whole”. 
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and application of the whole as distinct from parts (…) looking at a problem in its 
entirety, taking into account all the facets and all the variables and linking the social 
to the technological” [Ste98 p.344].17 In the philosophical sense the present work is 
divided between ontology and epistemology. It has ontological aspects in its effort to 
understand the holistic being of EWSP; and epistemological features in its attempt to 
improve, and to find ways to improve, knowledge on EWSP. 
 
1.4 Overview of the present work 
 
1.4.1 Information types, classification, and reliability 
 
Huo and Wang [Huo91] distinguishes between four types of information: (1) verbal 
information; (2) physical information (products, prototypes, etc.); (3) documentary 
information; and (4) database information. In addition, the military field 
acknowledges e.g. (5) signal information (intercepted and processed transmissions, 
emissions and reflected signals of any kind); and (6) visual information (human 
observation).18 All six types of information are important in EW, particularly through 
the significance of intelligence.  
 
The present work mainly draws from documentary and database information, and is 
based exclusively on unclassified sources. Because of the risk of misappropriation an 
extensive list of references is provided, even including some references that 
ordinarily would not be made in a doctoral dissertation. No part of the work reflects 
opinions of the Finnish Defence Forces or of the Nordic countries involved in the 
NSHP program. In drawing the line between classified and unclassified information 
the following guideline in Hudson and Hudson [Hud75] has been used: “Our criteria 
is that publication of an item in the readily available open literature of the world is a 
clear indication that the item is not, or, perhaps, is no longer, classified”. Material 
with unrestricted access on the Internet has been regarded unclassified, even when 
marked classified (a few “for official use only” have emerged). NATO material 
labeled “unclassified” has been regarded as de-facto classified; only 
“unclassified/unlimited distribution” material has been freely quoted (typically 
NATO RTO publications available on the Internet without password). 
 
It is generally accepted that information on military operations and defense 
technology can be obsolete, partial, speculative and sometimes even intentionally 
misleading.19 To this can be added overoptimistic promises by manufacturers who 
                                                 
17  The definition originates with Ramo, but the original text has not been available for the present 
work.  
18   Additional types are information contained in acoustic, haptic, chemical, biological, and 
radiological phenomena. 
19  Keeler and Steiner [Kee89] maintains that “dezinformatsia” and “maskirovka” are of limited use in 
the scientific community and is therefore seldom attempted. However, examples of these techniques 
in the military community abound: Lambeth [Lam86] distrusts information provided by Israel on the 
Beka’a air operation in 1982. US authorities have put out a smokescreen on a number of occasions, 
e.g. in connection with the first announcement of the F-117A stealth fighter [Anon91a p.165]. Browne 
and Thurbon [Bro98] does not even mention the Falklands/Malvinas War although it is generally 
agreed that the war gave some prime lessons in EW [Bon82, Spe93]. One can also recall enthusiastic 
reports on anti-stealth properties of UWB radars in the early 1990s, and denials of combat UAVs 
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market developmental equipment as fielded systems.20 A major risk in analyzing 
information lies in “circular intelligence”, with information of questionable origin 
being repeated by more reliable sources and therefore becoming more credible 
[Hug99 pp.250-251]. An example of this behavior was quantitative data produced by 
the Ansbach trials (discussed later) that was commonly used by Soviet writers to 
support their own conclusions, and which caused Western writers to imagine that 
these figures had come from Soviet experiments [All93 p.249]. For the present work 
this highlights the need to ferret out relevant information from the offered lot by 
critical analysis and by cross-checking one’s sources to any possible extent.21  
 
1.4.2 Tentative idea on information for the present work 
 
Information searches for this study have not turned up a single comprehensive 
treatment of the discipline of EWSP of battlefield helicopters. There is a hint at such 
a study from the 1990s, which the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) sponsored and 
which has been briefly reported in Haynes et al. [Hay98], and some results of a 
Russian study on helicopter survivability which are given in Platunov [Pla01]. 
Swedish studies “HKP99352S(F), VMS för helikopter” have also been reported, but 
are on a more detailed level than the present work [Ros03]. Useful contributions are 
Zanker’s [Zan99] treatise on EWSP integration and Carpers’ [Car84] recapitulation 
of aircraft survivability. Some hints at holistic thinking in EW are given in Pywell et 
al. [Pyw02]. Pywell et al. is in fact most closely related to the present work. Doctoral 
dissertations in the field of EW with some interest to this study have been presented 
by Albegami [Alb93] and Santoso [San84]. As the amount of unclassified 
information on helicopter EWSP is limited, most examples quoted in the present 
work are on fixed-wing aircraft. This introduces a bias, but the assumption is that 
despite differences the rotary-wing community can learn by analyzing experiences of 
fixed-wing counterparts. 
 
The lack of earlier work that could have acted as a model for a research approach to 
this study led to form a tentative idea of information that possibly could be of 
                                                                                                                                          
being developed in the late 1990s. The Soviet Union was notoriously reluctant to publish any 
information, and Russia still does not publish information on systems and technologies that have been 
thoroughly investigated by NATO countries. Similarly the US has not published detailed information 
e.g. on the track-via missile system of the Patriot surface-to-air missile system, which is claimed to 
have been copied into the Soviet/Russian S-300P (SA-10 Grumble) [Fis02a]. Such examples 
notwithstanding, military and other government agencies are making increasing use of open source 
intelligence [Tur99]. 
20  There is also a positive side to information coming from manufacturers. Suitably filtered the 
message from the industry is a fairly reliable source on development trends in EWSP; particularly if 
several companies can be heard on the same subject. 
21  An example is shown in the series of speculations on the downing of the F-117A stealth fighter 
over Serbia in 1999. The first guess was that the aircraft was targeted with an electro-optical (EO) fire 
control system of an S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) battery [Sco99]. A later report suggested that it was 
detected by the radar blip of an S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa) battery and downed by a lucky salvo of 
missiles, fired in the general direction of the aircraft [Ful99]. A still later report proposed either an S-
125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa) or Kub/Kvadrant (SA-6 Gainful) missile system, to which the Serbs had 
been offering upgrade packages including optical fire control [Zal00]. The last report agrees with 
Russian claims that the honor of the first stealth kill goes to two Kub (SA-6 Gainful) missiles 
[Anon03]. According to Pitts [Pit00], inadequate stand-off jamming directly contributed to the loss, 
while Lambeth [Lam02] mentions failed ELINT (electronic intelligence) and weaknesses in 
operational procedures. 
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relevance to the holistic view. This supposition is depicted in Figure 3. The question 
of how to synthesize the holistic view from the analyzed literature information has 
been a major issue for the present work and will be discussed later. 
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Figure 3: Tentative idea of information contributing to the holistic view on EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters. A central issue will be to define the scope and level of the holistic view,22 meaning 
that analyzed “raw” information has to be synthesized and reduced. The eventual synthesis and 
reduction will be done in Chapter 6, although the preceding analysis will include some 
reduction. The figure can be interpreted as an embodiment of block 3 in Figure 1 
(“disconnected information on factors contributing to EWSP”), or as a description of the most 
basic “subsystems” in Figure 2.  Legend: C3=command, control, and communication. 
 
                                                 
22 Here the terms ”scope” and ”level” are defined by paraphrasing Robinson: “Scope is the range or 
the breadth of the holistic view, what to include in the view. Level is the amount of detail to include in 
the view.” [Rob94 p.74] 
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1.4.3 Specific and generic threat scenarios 
 
During the Cold War the two blocks could declare the other part its potential enemy, 
and the weapon systems of that enemy as the threat that would be encountered in an 
armed conflict (cf. [Peo87]). This straightforward scene changed at the latest in 1991 
with the Persian Gulf War, when the US lead coalition had to face weapon systems 
manufactured by its member countries.23 Earlier the British had to face the threat 
from French Exocet missiles in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982 and the Soviet 
Union had to face its own MANPAD (man-portable air defense) missiles in 
Afghanistan. More recently Swedish search radars were found to be a threat to the 
NATO-led Bosnia campaign, and since 2001 the US had to worry about FIM-92A 
Stinger missiles, which had been delivered to the Mudjahedeen guerilla in 
Afghanistan for the fight against the Soviet Union and now were in the hands of 
Taliban and al Qaeda fighters.24  A single threat scenario may still exist on the 
national level for small countries, but in international operations the “rainbow threat” 
of almost any possible weapon system is reality. [Pri00 pp.556-557] 25  An 
intermediate construct is so-called generic threats, which are exemplified in 
Canadian Generic Enemy documents [Anon02a]. 26  The Finnish Army has used 
generic threats in simulator studies on attack helicopters in the Finnish environment 
[Hei01a]. The limitation with available generic threat documents is that they focus on 
traditional Soviet/Russian weapon systems.  
 
As no EWSP system can cope with all eventualities, specifying EWSP systems 
becomes guesswork and the use of generic data is both realistic and necessary.27 The 
opinion stated in Wright [Wri93 p.72], that the design of EWSP systems should be 
based on complete intelligence on threat systems, is not realistic. Schlecher [Sch86 
pp.28-29] reports that design approaches stemming from intelligence-based EOB 
(electronic order of battle) tend to underestimate the threat, whereas generic design 
approaches tend to overestimate the threat. Working on generic threats or scenarios 
therefore should leave a margin for the unexpected and for future modifications. 
                                                 
23  In 1990 the US Joint Chief of Staff required capabilities-based planning instead of the threat-based 
analysis that had governed the Cold War [Bon02, Loc99]. 
24  It has been suggested that the missiles delivered to the Mudjahedeen in the 1980’s were unusable 
by 2001. Hunter, however, maintains that it is a popular misconception that MANPAD missiles 
become unusable after several years due to battery or other systems failures. Often the batteries can be 
replaced with commercially purchased batteries available on the open market. Technically proficient 
terrorist groups might also be able to construct hybrid batteries to replace used ones. The shelf life of 
missiles can be 22 years or longer if stored properly (the SA-7B missiles used in the attack on the 
Israeli commercial aircraft in Kenya in 2002 are believed to have been 28 years old [Kuh03]), and in 
any case most missiles have been hermetically sealed in launchers designed for rough handling by 
soldiers in the field. [Hun01] A software defined life time seems more likely to be expected in 
weapons of this type. Thus, since the failed attack on an Israeli civil airliner in Kenya on 28 
November 2002 was conducted by the comparatively ineffective Strela-2/2M, it is believed that the 
Mudjahedeen Stinger missiles are not operational any more [Hug02]. In any case, engagement of US 
military aircraft with Stinger missiles requires that the missile’s IFF (identification friend or foe) 
system has been bypassed. 
25  The second edition of Ball’s The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and 
Design, published in late 2003, is an example of the fixation on threats being equal to equipment of 
Soviet/Russian origin [Bal03]. 
26 The Canadian B-SJ-100-002 Generic Enemy model is claimed to be similar to US Army and British 
counterparts. 
27  This view is underscored through generic countermeasures being frequently used. Noise jamming, 
preemptive manual triggering of expendables, and generic infrared jamming codes are examples. 
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1.4.4 Organization of the present work 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the layout of the study, seen as a bottom-up approach.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION (Chapter 1)
Introduction to the subject: incentive for the work, present deficiencies,
objective of work, overview.
METHODOLOGY (Chapter 2)
Discussion of research methods that might be of use to the present work, and
motivation for selecting certain ones. Review of methods that are less known to
the EW community.
C
O
LL
E
C
TI
O
N
 A
N
D
 A
N
A
LY
S
IS
THE OPERATIONAL SETTING (Chapter 3)
Analysis of the operational setting: helicopters and warfare, survivability, and
phenomenology. Conclusions and implications for EWSP.
THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES (Chapter 4)
Analysis of threat systems, threat technology, and countermeasures technology,
as well as their development trends. Conclusions.
EWSP SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS (Chapter 5)
Analysis of the EWSP support factors: support functions, aircrew factors,
decision-making; EWSP systems factors: architecture and aircraft installation,
validation and verification; interactions and quantification. Conclusions.
SYNTHESIS OF THE HOLISTIC VIEW (Chapter 6)
Synthesis: review of preceding chapters; holism in the EWSP context; a top-
down view of EWSP; FSD models on the capability, campaign, and mission
levels. The holistic view.
DISCUSSION (Chapter 7)
Discussion of results, importance of the results, generality of results, author’s
contribution to scientific thinking, conclusion and suggestion for further
research.
 
 
Figure 4: Organization of the present work seen as a bottom-up approach. The collection and 
analysis part (Chapters 3-5) is mainly a critical literature review, although conclusions 
synthesize central thoughts of each chapter and graphical models in Chapter 5 add to the 
synthesis. The bulk of new thinking, however, is concentrated to Chapter 6 and to the 
conclusions in Chapter 7. 
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The methodology of research has been a major issue for this study. Different ideas 
have been tried, and a few methods have been investigated in more detail. The search 
for methods has not been exhaustive, since this would have shifted the emphasis of 
the work from EWSP to methodology. It is important to note that two different 
methodologies are of concern: the methodology to be used for producing the 
dissertation, and the methodology which eventually should be recommended for 
presenting a holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters—assuming that 
individual methodologies are feasible. These are discussed in parallel below, the 
terms “method” and “tool” are used synonymously. Since systems thinking is mostly 
unfamiliar in the EW community, a more detailed review will be provided on causal 
loop diagrams and on Forrester system dynamics (FSD). 
 
 
2.2 Research method 
 
The approach taken in this study is governed by the stated objective of work. An 
initial attempt towards the first objective “generate improved understanding of 
EWSP of battlefield helicopters” was made by defining the tentative idea of the need 
for information, as presented in Figure 3. The tentative idea indicates that a 
considerable amount of information has to be collected and analyzed before a 
synthesis can be attempted.  
 
The second objective, to “unite disconnected information on and factors contributing 
to EWSP of battlefield helicopters”, is expected to be met through the systematic 
bottom-up analysis and synthesis shown in Figure 4. Assessments based on 
experience gained through the progression of the work will support the task.  
 
An initial attempt towards the third objective, to “develop or identify tools or 
methodologies that can be used for communication on EWSP with disparate interest 
groups” will be made in Section 2.3. It is worth noting that the original idea of 
“conducting a systems thinking study on EWSP of battlefield helicopters” (cf. 
Section 1.3.4) also brought in some existing tools for systems thinking (causal loop 
diagrams and FSD). The objective of identifying tools therefore partly comes from 
the need to make recommendations for future research, based on experiences gained 
through the present work, and to assess to what extent the tools satisfy 
communications needs.  
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The last objective, to “resolve the notion ‘holistic view (…)”, will be addressed only 
at the end, as a conclusion of the entire discussion. 
 
It was stated in Section 1.3.2 that the final verdict on objectives having been met will 
remain a question of judgement. The discussion below on validation of simulations 
(cf. Section 2.3.7) shows that no objective validation method exists. Thus, as this 
study in its entirety is more extensive than a simulation, and the problem set more 
unstructured, it must be concluded that only future research will reveal the true value 
of the presented ideas. 
 
 
2.3 Tools for analysis and synthesis 
 
2.3.1 Quantitative vs. qualitative approaches 
 
A decision has to be made whether to use quantitative or qualitative research 
methods. Quantitative methods are attractive to engineers, who are trained to process 
and present numerical information. Similarly, mathematical methods are used in the 
military sciences: The Lanchester equations28 that were born during World War I, are 
examples of this. Operational research (OR)29 was born prior to World War II as a 
method for investigating military operational problems [Kje03 p.131]. Richardson 
[Ric99] cautions that the pressure to use qualitative work will lead to some flawed 
analyses and spurious insights that would not stand up under quantitative analyses. 
As for the usefulness of quantitative methods Glasow [Gla00] claims that a major 
lesson learned is that they are most useful during the early stages of problem 
definition and analysis, to “understand the problem”. The claim is similar to a critical 
view of Lanchester’s equations [Lep87]: “Lanchester’s laws provide a framework for 
thinking about combat processes, (…)”. 
 
There is also skepticism on the reliability of quantitative methods. The policy of the 
US Secretary of Defense, McNamara, to apply such methods in the management of 
the Vietnam War, has been criticized. It caused the US to lose the war at the strategic 
level although it prevailed at the operational and tactical level. [Gra72, Owe98]30 
More recently, the quest for analytical tools for effects-based operations (EBO) also 
show limitations of quantitative tools [Sau02]. Roche and Watts [Roc91] states: “In 
military affairs, the most obvious or readily quantifiable measures may not 
necessarily be the right ones at all” (original emphasis). 31  Similar views are 
                                                 
28   “Lanchester equation” refers to the mathematical analysis of air combat which the British 
aeronautical engineer Frederic Lanchester published in 1916. The basic Lanchester equation is a pair 
of differential equations of the type dx/dt = -ay, dy/dt = -bx for modern warfare, but the equations 
vary with the type of combat [Doc93 p.21, Hom87, Lep87]. See also Figures 67 and 79. 
29  The present work does not distinguish between the terms “operational research”, “operations 
research”, and “system(s) analysis”. 
30  Secretary McNamara’s approach, which was based on the systems analysis methodology developed 
by the RAND Corporation, was in 1967 hailed as “a revolution” which only faced some “remaining 
difficulties” [Che81 p.136]. 
31  Roche and Watts points out Galbraith’s simplified criticism of the Allied bombing of Germany in 
WW II, according to which the influence of the massive bombing campaign on German war 
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expressed in Hughes-Wilson [Hug99 p.196] and Hoeber [Hoe81 p.205]. More 
generally Platt [Pla64] affirms: “Many—perhaps most—of the great issues of science 
are qualitative, not quantitative, even in physics and chemistry. Equations and 
measurements are useful when and only when they are related to proof; but proof or 
disproof comes first and is in fact strongest when it is absolutely convincing without 
quantitative measurement”.  
 
2.3.2 Modeling vs. simulation 
 
A part of the systems school sees qualitative modeling as a satisfactory way to 
approach problems; while others see (quantitative) simulation necessary to achieve 
the rigorousness of scientific work. One view is that modeling can be useful in its 
own right and that quantification may be unwise if it is pushed beyond reasonable 
limits [Coy00a]. A more restraining view on modeling warns of the possibility that 
the attractiveness of qualitative approaches will lead toward their overuse; but at the 
same time writer accepts their increasing use: “It is clear that the growing trend to 
use qualitative mapping without quantitative modeling to back up the analyses is 
here to stay” [Ric99]. Meredith [Mer67 p.225] points to the difference between static 
and dynamic phenomena: “(…) the static phenomenon is simply an effect (….) The 
dynamic phenomenon, on the other hand, is actively producing changes and is 
therefore a cause” (original emphasis). According to this view dynamic simulation 
therefore should provide more information than static models. A problem arises with 
simulation if no quantitative data exist. It has been claimed that qualitative factors 
such as motivation, commitment, confidence, and perceptions can be included in 
simulation models [Cau02]. Claims on successful quantification of such factors as 
morale, shock and surprise in military modeling are called “absurd” by its opponents 
[Coy00a].32 For the present work the following assertion will function as a guideline: 
“Even when there is too little information to reach firm conclusions from a 
simulation model, it is still not more misleading to simulate than to map without 
simulation” (original emphasis) [Hom01].33  
 
2.3.3 Alternatives for further study 
 
It is claimed that the debate within the OR community on various problem solving 
methods is rooted on which method is best rather than the best use of methods 
[Flo95]. In the present work methodological issues are involved only in one objective 
out of four (cf. page 22). Intricacies of relative OR methodologies should therefore 
not be given superiority over EWSP problems. The undertaking of identifying 
suitable methodologies is therefore limited to two tasks: First, identifying methods 
that are best from the EWSP perspective and, second, identifying how to make best 
use of the method(s). Several methods were selected for a more thorough evaluation 
                                                                                                                                          
production was minimal. The real influences are revealed only by analyzing direct and indirect effects, 
as well as first-order and second-order consequences. [Roc91] 
32  Despite this statement the same author, in a paper titled A system dynamics model of aircraft 
carrier survivability [Coy92], circumvents the problem of unquantifiable variables by naming them 
“factor X” and “factor Y” and investigating the behavior of the model for different values of these 
variables. 
33  The verbs “to map” and “to model” are used interchangeably in the present work. 
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of their usability (Table 1). However, the freedom to choose has limits due to 
requirements on academic theses. 
 
 
Alternative Reason for being considered Comment 
Textual information  Traditional and retains a strong 
position in communication. 
Used in all areas of life. 
Tabulated information Concise way of communicating 
information whenever applicable. 
Commonly in combination with 
written and/or oral information. 
Graphical information Attracts human cognition better than 
writing. 
Usually in combination with 
written and/or oral information. 
Flow and block 
diagrams 
Allow graphical presentation of the 
structure of control and processes. 
Common tool in systems and 
computer engineering. 
Word-and-arrow 
diagrams 
Allow graphical presentation of 
causal processes. 
Used chiefly in social sciences, but 
little known in engineering. 
Checkland’s soft system 
methodology 
Allows analysis of unstructured 
problems. 
Applied to social problems, but not 
to engineering problems. 
Forrester system 
dynamics 
Allows modeling and simulation of 
causal processes. 
Applied mostly to management 
problems, rare in engineering. 
Tools for mathematical 
computation 
Allow computation of physical 
processes. 
Used mostly in engineering and 
mathematical sciences, but not to 
study unstructured problems. 
Table 1: Alternative methods considered for generating the holistic view on EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters. 
 
 
Table 1 includes methods which, inserted into the continuum of OR methods (Figure 
5), would represent anything from the “softest” (no quantification) to the “hardest” 
(quantitative only). The important message of Figure 5 is that available methods do 
not form a dichotomy of soft and hard—or black and white—alternatives, but come 
in all shades of gray. The difference between hard and soft OR methods is often seen 
as one between quantitative and qualitative approaches. Another view is that hard 
methods are concerned with reaching a predefined end, or “How should we do it?” 
whereas soft methods accept the notion of plurality of possible viewpoints, or “What 
should be done?” (original emphasis) [Flo91 p.169]. 
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Figure 5: Continuum of selected OR methods, located along the scale ranging from "soft" to 
"hard".  Adapted from Glasow [Gla00]; influence diagrams and project management are 
deemed “softer” than in Glasow’s presentation. 
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2.3.4 Traditional methods 
 
The expression “traditional methods” refers to the four first methods in Table 1. 
Together they are the backbone of analyses and communication in most areas of 
science and engineering. It has been claimed that qualitative methodologies generally 
produce narrative outputs that are open to a wide array of interpretations by readers 
and are difficult to represent graphically. The insights produced by qualitative means 
are therefore often difficult to communicate. [Sau02] This view is extreme but not 
altogether incorrect, since precise textual information is often long and demanding 
on the reader. However, completed with tables and graphs the written text becomes 
more attractive to an audience. One of the strengths of block and flow diagrams is 
the easy way of presenting interrelated data and processes. 
 
The only block and flow diagram that has been considered for this study is the 
modified data flow diagram (DFD); modified according to the notations in Figure 6. 
An example was shown already in Figure 3. The attractiveness of this approach is 
explained by the fact that data flow diagrams are well known in the engineering 
community, they can be used outside their original field of software systems 
engineering, and although the philosophy behind them requires some effort the 
diagrams can be understood without training. 
 
 
Processing
task
Miscellaneous
objects
Triggering
 flow
External
interactor or
resource
Flow
Store
Delayed
flow D
Flow with
special
attributes
D
Processing delay
TEMPLATE
Comment:
Templates are used to
highlight entities
within the diagram.
 
Figure 6: Notations of the modified data flow diagram considered for use in the present work. 
Whereas the original DFD concentrates on data processes, the modified diagram allows other 
factors be modeled as well, and uses annotations for clarity. 
 
2.3.5 Word-and-arrow diagrams 
 
There exists a wealth of modeling tools that can be grouped under the heading 
“word-and-arrow diagrams”. Word-and-arrow diagrams can be subdivided into 
influence diagrams and cognitive maps, although the division is somewhat artificial. 
Examples of acyclic influence diagrams are the “laundry list” diagram (cf. [Hit92 
p.173]) shown in Figure 1, tree diagrams, Ishikawa’s “fish-bone” diagram, and 
Bayesian belief networks. The best known cyclic influence diagram is the causal 
loop diagram (CLD). A common trait with acyclic influence diagrams is that they 
qualitatively depict the influence that various factors (variables, issues, parts, etc.) 
have on each other. Cognitive maps show outwardly great similarity with CLDs, and 
they have been applied to similar types of unstructured problems. Two categories of 
cognitive maps are the Kelly type and the Axelrod type [Axe76, Ede88]. Cognitive 
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maps of the Axelrod type are used in Garigue to visualize belief systems about 
information warfare. Garigue presents both a static and a dynamic case, where the 
static map, in fact, is a hierarchic tree structure that could be visualized e.g. by an 
Ishikawa “fishbone’” diagram.34 The dynamic map is similar to a CLD diagram but 
the software package in case allows some quantitative manipulation of causalities. 
[Gar94]  
 
The advantage of CLDs is their close relation to FSD, which eases a shift from 
qualitative to quantitative methods. Superficially CLDs show similarities with data 
flow diagrams (DFDs), both shown in Figure 6, but there is a basic difference: CLD 
variables are defined by nouns or noun phrases; the links (arrows) are indicated by 
“+” (“increases”) and “-” (“decreases”) signs, i.e. by verbs. The processes in DFDs, 
on the other hand, are defined by verbs or verb phrases and information flows 
(arrows) are defined by nouns or noun phrases. The practical difference is that DFDs 
are suited for process-oriented thinking, whereas CLDs support problem-oriented 
thinking. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of a simple information process/system in (a) data flow and (b) CLD 
notation. The link from new information can be positive or negative; negative e.g. in the case of 
deceptive communication. The positive feedback loop is present in both diagrams.   
 
 
Construction of CLD diagrams is governed by recommended practices, but 
particularly the +/- notation has been altered by some modelers to “s” for “same” and 
“o” for “opposite”, a practice of which traditionalists warn [Ric97]. A hidden 
problem with CLDs is that the model only provides hints at the temporal behavior of 
the system. Forrester [For94] cautions against the erroneous impression the reader 
may get from Senge [Sen90]: that one can look at real life, draw a CLD, and then 
carry through a penetrating description of dynamic behavior. Practitioners of FSD 
advocate CLDs chiefly as simplified explanation tools, after models have been 
created and simulated in FSD [Ric86]. 
                                                 
34  Visually the figures in Garigue [Gar94] are similar to Bayesian belief networks [Sta04], but no 
reference is made to the similarity and no probability tables are given. 
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2.3.6 Checkland’s soft system methodology 
 
Among the various soft systems methodologies (SSMs) Checkland’s methodology 
appears to be the one that is best known and which has been most widely applied 
[Sta99]. Flood and Jackson sees the transfer of the notion of systemicity of the world 
to the process of enquiry into the world as Checkland’s main contribution to 
scientific thinking [Flo91 p.170]. Checkland’s SSM is generally seen as a mature 
paradigm, although it has evolved in several versions, from the original one 
published in Systems Thinking, Systems Practices [Che81] to the more recent one 
published in Soft Systems Methodology in Action [Che99]. SSM was developed as a 
reaction to the failure of the “hard” engineering tradition in unstructured problem 
situations [Che81 p.189, 35  Che99 p.18]. The “Root definition” and “CATWOE” 
mnemonic form the base of Checkland’s methodology. Any conceptual models must 
be developed from their relevant root definitions, and nothing else [Flo91 p.176]. For 
the present work these can be defined according to Table 2, which indicates that 
SSM could be applied to the EWSP case. However, the root definition below is not 
exclusively “a human activity system” as required by Checkland [Che81 p.167].  
 
 
Root definition: 
A system for survivability enhancement of battlefield helicopters, including an EWSP suite. 
Components of the system are complementary and interactive. Realistic combat scenarios, 
intelligence and other support functions are required for the system to be effective. 
C customer battlefield helicopter fleet and aircrews 
A actor military forces 
T transformation battlefield helicopters Æ survivable battlefield helicopters 
W Weltanschauung EWSP is of value to the survivability system 
O owner military decision-makers 
E environmental constraints costs, resources, technology, intelligence, knowledge, dynamics 
Table 2: Root and CATWOE definitions for a holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters. 
The transformation and Weltanschauung—world view—are restricted to the platform. 
 
 
Employing Checkland’s SSM requires awareness of four main principles: learning, 
culture, participation and two modes of thought (abstract systems thinking vs. 
context-related “real world” thinking). Participation of those involved is necessary if 
there is any chance of bringing about successful results. [Flo91 p.171] Defense 
applications of Checkland’s SSM are limited, although it has been applied to a study 
on military information operations. In that study the lack of alternatives was seen as a 
weakness of Checkland’s methodology, and the use of more formal graphical 
representations, e.g. colored Petri nets, was discussed as a possible replacement or 
supplement to Checkland’s diagrams. [Sta99] It has also been claimed that FSD 
shares all steps with SSM, in addition to providing the opportunity to simulate the 
model [For94]. The last claims are based only on a comparison with figure 5 in 
Systems Thinking, Systems Practice [Che81 p.147]. The SSM paradigm has 
developed considerably over the past two decades.  
 
                                                 
35  The terms “structured” and “unstructured” problems are used in Checkland [Che81]. The former is 
typical for hard, the latter for soft systems thinking (answering the questions “How?” and “What?” as 
discussed earlier). [Che81 pp.144,154-155]  
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2.3.7 Forrester system dynamics 
 
Simulations provide numerous advantages when experience is to be conveyed to 
other individuals in an organization [Ber96]. Forrester system dynamics (FSD) is the 
only simulation method that was considered for this study. FSD is a natural choice if 
simulation is to be used in a systems thinking study of EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters (cf. Section 1.3.3). FSD has several attractive features for the present 
work: First, feedback is a major aspect of FSD modeling. Simulation of interactions 
between threats and countermeasures should hence be natural in FSD. Second, FSD 
can be applied to modeling human, organizational and social interactions, which 
according to Figure 3 can be expected in a holistic approach to EWSP. Third, data 
are not of utmost concern in FSD modeling, since the models can help reveal which 
data might be most important [Edw00]. This indicates the possibility to gain 
understanding of systems without a repressive burden of numerical data. Fourth, FSD 
models tend to be fairly small and transparent [Mea80 p.34]. The advantages of 
reduced model complexity are recognized generally within the field of modeling and 
simulation [War89, Chw00].36 Fifth, FSD is claimed to be suitable for providing a 
compromise between the systemic ideals of holism and practical necessities of real 
world problem solving [Ran80 p.121, Wol88]. Sixth, a fundamental principle of FSD 
is that the structure of the system gives rise to its behavior [Ste02]; which allows 
simultaneous investigation of two fundamental characteristics of systems (structure 
and behavior). Seventh, FSD has been applied to a vide range of problems, ranging 
from the business world to the military, from environment concerns to physical 
processes; but as its roots are in control engineering and computer science [For95] its 
ideas should be readily grasped with an engineering background.37 
 
As mentioned, FSD facilitates investigation into the influence that structure has on 
behavior. Tools for modeling and simulating problems in control engineering do the 
same; the attractiveness of FSD lies in the simplified mathematical approach that 
allows easy experimentation with structures, variables, and input parameters, as well 
as Monte Carlo simulation for sensitivity analysis. Figure 8 presents, as an 
illustrative example, the CLD diagram of Figure 7, remodeled in the usual rate-and-
level notation of FSD, and simulated results based on hypothetical data. 
 
                                                 
36  A) The view that small models are sufficient to support management decisions is contested in Weil 
[Wei80 p.287], which states that 1,000 to 2,000 significant variables are routinely needed to achieve 
the desired degree of historical and near-term predictive accuracy, and to produce findings of 
sufficient detail to be implementable (sic). The opposite view is presented in Lee [Lee73], which gives 
examples of large models that have gone wrong (the paper is from 1973 and deals with urban 
planning, but the views are of interest even three decades later) and gives the Keynesian model of 
fiscal policy as an example of a simple and robust model. The latter view is in line with common ideas 
on modeling, where inclusion of too many details is seen as a beginner’s mistake [Kle98]. 
B) Ward [War89] defines model simplicity with regard to the concepts of “transparency” and 
“constructive simplicity”, whereas Chwif et al. [Chw00] defines complexity in terms of “level of 
detail” and “scope”. 
37  A) An illuminating example of how control engineering can reveal redundancies and common 
paths in FSD models is given in Towill. The paper concludes that “system dynamicists in the Forrester 
tradition would all benefit from a basic knowledge of feedback theory.” [Tow93] 
B)  There are numerous examples of military applications of FSD (e.g. [Coy91,92,96,00b; Doc93; 
Haz00; Jan00; Lav98; Luc00; Mof96, San84]. An early application of FSD to helicopter problems is 
given in Swanson [Swa67]). Examples of decision support modeling using FSD are given in a series 
of reports by the Norwegian Defense Research Institute, e.g. [Bak03, Gil03]. 
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Figure 8: FSD model of the information process/system in Figure 7, with dynamic behavior for 
hypothetical parameter values. FSD simulation requires additional parameters (exogenous 
variables) that clutter the model compared with the qualitative models in Figure 7. Assumed 
parameter values are given in Appendix 2, Table 2-1. 
 
 
There are aspects that negate the advantages of FSD. First, FSD is a controversial 
method with a small group of practitioners, primarily at some business schools. For 
the present work the obscurity of FSD introduces the risk of having ideas rejected as 
being too enigmatic.38 This risk is pointed out in LeFèvre, which claims that because 
of the unnatural appearance of FSD models they fail to capture the interest of the 
people who have the real knowledge of the system. Thus, knowledge extraction 
becomes a bottleneck and the credibility of the result is seen as quite dubious by the 
end-users. [Fev97]39 Second come weaknesses in the FSD paradigm that may limit 
                                                 
38  An example of the criticism against FSD is the claim that the treatise Limits to Growth, by 
Meadows et al., substitutes elaborate causal structures for missing data, and that the models lack 
empirical validity [And01]. A critical review of Forrester’s Urban Dynamics claims that the 
conclusions of the book are outright wrong (including its “counterintuitive” results), that there is a 
gulf between what the urban model is and what Forrester claims it to be, and that Forrester’s 
knowledge of cities is limited to what he has learned from the former mayor of Boston [Lee73]. A true 
dialogue between the differing views does not seem to have emerged, and thus in 1999 Meadows 
[Mea99] claims that “Forrester was right”. A systems engineering view on FSD is that it is “(…) a 
technique viewed with the gravest suspicion in some industrial circles, owing to its potentially 
imprecise approach to modelling—although it is that very imprecision which makes system dynamics 
potentially useful for addressing softer issues” [Hit92 p.22]. 
39  A)  The comment in LeFèvre [Fev97] points to different usages in the traditional FSD community, 
which consists mainly of individuals with background in sociology and management, and in the 
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its usefulness to the present work. Stacey indirectly questions if FSD lives up to the 
definition of emergence (cf. Section 1.3.4). Negative feedback loops work to 
stabilize a system and therefore do not promote the creativity and change. Creativity 
requires behavior at the edge of instability: “Disorder is not simply the result of 
inertia, incompetence or ignorance—it is a fundamental property of creative systems 
and it plays a vital role in that creativity.” [Sta95] A review of FSD soon after 
Forrester’s World Dynamics was published pointed to a limitation that may be an 
obstacle to the present work: FSD modeling is global and disregards local variations 
in existing systems [Las73 pp.4-5]. A related limitation is that changes often take 
place in sub-systems—exactly those that FSD consciously avoids dealing with 
[Bat78]. More detailed points of criticism are: the use of qualitative variables, for 
which data have been generated by the modeler and thereby making validation of the 
model impossible [Leo73]; the deliberate design of models to generate the results 
that the modeler wants [Mea80 p.52]; and the lack of scientific rigor [Sus02]. A list 
of critical opinions from the hard and soft OR communities is given in Flood and 
Jackson [Flo91 pp.78-83].  
 
Validation plays a central role for all types of simulations, but there is no general 
agreement on how validation should be performed. The procedure for validation in 
Naylor and Finger [Nay67] has been criticized for not giving any advice on what to 
do in the common situation in which the real system does not exist [Kle98]. It has 
been said that “any ‘objective’ model-validation procedure rests eventually at some 
lower level on a judgment or faith that either the procedure or its goals are acceptable 
without objective proof” [For61 p.123]. In essence, this means that a model can 
never be completely validated and a lesser degree of perfection has to be accepted. 
Some sources regard the use of qualitative information as a strength of the FSD 
paradigm and strive for utility of a model rather than for validity [Mea80 p.36].40 
Oliva proposes to capture the spirit of scientific methods through the experimentation 
ethos: strive to reject the dynamic hypothesis. Thus, the testing process should be 
based on experiments that can yield a false outcome. [Oli03] A list of practical tests 
for assessment of dynamic models is provided in Sterman [Ste00 pp.859-889].  
 
2.3.8 Tools for mathematical computation 
 
Commonly available tools for mathematical computing—e.g. MathCad® and 
Matlab®; and in a simpler form included in spreadsheet packages—are natural 
candidates for computing and presenting results graphically to an engineering 
audience. The results produced by these tools can be visualized in a manner that is 
understandable to people with different backgrounds, which is an advantage. The 
                                                                                                                                          
engineering community. The traditional FSD community feels that the straight lines and square-
shaped blocks preferred by engineers are “hard”, and favors rounded shapes. If engineering-like 
models are needed, software packages like Vensim® <http://www.vensim.com> are capable of 
providing polylines. 
B) Some of the claims in LeFèvre [Fév97] are linked to the software package used, e.g. the statement 
that FSD is limited to flows between two and only two levels. Similarly, the opinion that FSD can be 
learned in a couple of days cannot be supported. Learning FSD by self-instruction for this study 
delayed the work by a year. FSD is more intricate than what is revealed by a brief introduction. 
40  Sterman [Ste00 p.846] points out that the origin of the definition of the word “valid” is “to establish 
the truth, accuracy, or reality of”, and concludes that since all models are wrong they cannot be 
validated. 
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disadvantage is that understanding of the factors that have contributed to the result 
requires detailed mathematical insight into the problem. In order to make the 
problem more understandable, mathematical tools have to be supported either by 
drawings or by models that explain intricacies and alternatives. 
 
 
2.4 Conclusions on methods 
 
Conclusions of the discussion in Section 2.3 are summed up in Table 3. One 
conclusion drawn from the table is not to use Checkland’s SSM in the present work. 
Further, mathematical tools will be used, if needed, only in a supportive role. 
Qualitative methods will be preferred over quantitative methods, but simulation will 
be used if a specific advantage can be expected from it. As mentioned in Section 
2.3.7, FSD is the only simulation tool that has been considered. The main reason for 
this choice is that the results of the present work are intended for use in a multitude 
of situations, and for communication with people of different backgrounds, and the 
methods should be kept at the simplest possible level. Figure 7 shows that data flow 
diagrams and CLDs can be used to model similar processes or systems. Since CLDs 
are less well known in the engineering community the decision is mainly to build 
qualitative models using DFDs. The bulk of the information in this study will be 
presented through the “traditional methods”, but the extent to which they are useful 
for presenting the holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters must be judged 
when discussing the entire work. 
 
 
Section Conclusion 
2.3.1 
and 
2.3.2 
Quantitative methods (simulations) are preferable when access to numerical data is 
painless and the data is reliable, qualitative methods (modeling) are to be preferred for 
unstructured problems and when data is not available. In equivocal cases the continuum of 
OR methods (Figure 5) can be a guide. 
2.3.3 No single alternative presented in Table 1 can be assessed to satisfy the requirements alone 
for forming a holistic view on EWSP. 
2.3.4 The “traditional methods” are “traditional” because of their inherent strengths; hence they 
maintain their position in many forms of communication. The major weakness is the 
demand that textual information puts on participants. 
2.3.5 Despite differences both DFDs and CLDs are possible modeling tools for the present 
work. The resemblance between the DFD and CLD raises the question of what changes are 
needed to use DFDs in connection with FSD models instead of CLDs. 
2.3.6 Checkland’s SSM has merits in facilitating group discussions on unstructured problems, 
but application of Checkland’s SSM to the present work would shift the focus from EWSP 
to SSM methodology. 
2.3.7 FSD is intended for simulation of general systems, and is as such applicable to a wide 
range of problems. It has inherent limitations that could be a problem for the present work, 
but these do not seem serious enough to discourage from using the methodology. 
Validation of simulations—regardless of the type of simulation—cannot be carried out to 
objective completeness, but will ultimately rest on faith. 
2.3.8 Understanding of factors governing the results of mathematical tools requires familiarity 
with governing physical principles, which is an obstacle in many situations. Mathematical 
tools can, however, be useful in an auxiliary role. 
Table 3: Conclusions drawn from the discussion in Section 2.3. 
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When judging the models and simulations presented above, they can be seen to share 
features of all three modes mentioned in Robinson [Rob01], and shown in Figure 9, 
but with an emphasis on facilitation. The stress on facilitation is underscored by the 
abundant use of graphical models without simulation.  
 
 
Software
engineering
Process of
social change Facilitation
Business simulations
Military simulations
Simulations in the present work
 
Figure 9: Modes of simulation in business and the military  compared with targeted modes of 
simulation in the present work. The emphasis in the present work is on facilitating discussions 
between stakeholders. Adapted from Robinson [Rob01]. 
 
 
The present study is “soft” in the sense that it mainly uses qualitative methods, and 
that the question it seeks to answer is “What should be done?”. It is “hard” in its 
belief that EWSP plays a role in the survivability of battlefield helicopters (“How?”). 
Paraphrasing Checkland [Che81], this study mainly deals with unstructured 
problems. 
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3 THE OPERATIONAL SETTING 
 
 
3.1 Helicopters and armed conflicts 
 
3.1.1 Development of battlefield helicopters 
 
Helicopters have been used for military purposes since WW II. Knowingly the first 
attempt to arm helicopters was made by the Germans in 1944, when a machine gun 
was mounted in the nose of Fa-223 “Drache” helicopters [Eve83a]. Helicopters were 
used in counterinsurgency operations by the British in Malaya from 1950 onwards 
[All93 p.129, Dun88 p.12]. In the Korean War helicopters were used largely for 
search and rescue (SAR), combat SAR (CSAR), and casualty evacuation 
(CASEVAC); but also for transporting men and matériel [Dun88 p.10]. The French 
routinely armed helicopters during the 1954-1962 conflict in Algeria, and the 
dedicated attack helicopter made its debut when the AH-1G Huey Cobra entered 
service in Vietnam in 1967. [Koc00a, Thi00 pp.6-10, Tol73 p.144] The Vietnam War 
taught many valuable lessons, but at a cost of over 2,500 helicopters lost to enemy 
action [Gun98 p.170, Hal00 p.32].  Since the RAH-66 Comanche program was 
canceled early in 2004 the most original rotorcraft program today is the American 
V22 tilt-wing aircraft, which also is surrounded by controversy and delays. Another 
unique solution is the Russian Ka-50/52 coaxial-rotor helicopter, which has been 
delayed due to funding problems. 
 
3.1.2 Strengths of helicopters 
 
Both transport and attack helicopters have characteristics that set them apart from 
fixed-wing aircraft. Howze [How79] argues for battlefield helicopters using 
experience from World War II: “As has been said a thousand times, there are two 
main elements of military strength in the land battle: mobility and firepower. We 
cannot be deficient in either, and nothing else—absolutely nothing else—affords the 
battlefield mobility of the helicopter”. Helicopters open more fully the third 
dimension—air—to army operations. The ability to self-deploy to a conflict area is 
also an advantage over e.g. the main battle tank (MBT). Attack helicopters cost less 
than fixed wing counterparts, they can operate without the infrastructure of an 
airfield, they can deploy forward with ground forces, and being dedicated to 
combined-arms ground battle mission they can be counted upon to provide support to 
ground troops whenever and wherever required [Kha99]. A strength of attack 
helicopters on the urban battlefield lies in their ability to use precision engagements 
to destroy selective targets with minimal collateral damages [Jon96]. In the 
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reconnaissance role rotorcraft have the ability to provide near real-time tactical 
situation data with the added advantage of human assessments of that data [Boi95]. 
 
3.1.3 Weaknesses of helicopters 
 
The main weakness of helicopters compared to fixed-wing aircraft is inefficiency, 
which is reflected in a limited range. Helicopters are inherently unstable and difficult 
to fly, and helicopters with tail rotor are sensitive to cross wind. Also, the maximum 
speed of helicopters is only some 330 km/h (180 kts),41 and the acceleration limit 
some 3g [Gun98 p.172, Spa99]; but as the acceleration occurs at low speed the 
helicopter nevertheless has excellent maneuverability [Con00]. Helicopters are 
sensitive to additional weight, which strictly limits armor and protective equipment, 
and the rotors are particularly susceptible and almost impossible to protect. At night 
or under poor-visibility conditions helicopters may have to increase flight altitude 
[Anon92a p.2-3], which increases susceptibility to radar threats and direct fire.42 The 
speed of helicopter transportation can be severely restricted: If the situation forces 
the helicopter to nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight a speed of 90 km/h (50 kts) or less is 
likely [Gun98 p.176, Mul80].43 Extended NOE flight can also provoke an excessive 
workload for the pilot [Ama00]. Since fuel consumption does not depend on speed, 
the range of NOE flights will be severely restricted. Concerns have be raised about 
the protection provided by NOE flight in the future: Increased redundancy in 
networked air-defense systems, and improved processors that allow more complex 
computing tasks to be performed, will allow detection and engagement of low flying 
aircraft [Wal00]. During the major combat phase of the 2003 Iraq War the US lost 
seven aircraft, six of which were attack helicopters [Mos03],44 by April 2004 nine 
US Army helicopters had been shot down with the loss of 32 lives [Riv04b]. 
According to one statement on the Iraq experience “(…) when you compromise on 
survivability for the sake of mobility, you have a lot of formidable firepower that is 
of limited used, since it simply can’t survive”. According to this source the attack 
helicopter is conceptionally flawed by putting the firepower in the air, where it is 
most vulnerable. [Opa03] 
 
3.1.4 Development trends 
 
Major future helicopter design issues are speed, agility, signatures, and true 24-hour 
capability [Thi00 pp.139-153]. Compound helicopters would provide increased 
speed and agility, but have not had any success either in the military or civil market 
although development continues [Bal94, Lop03, Orc99]. The tilt-wing rotorcraft, 
however, is approaching maturity with the US-built V22 aircraft. Tilt-wing 
                                                 
41  The maximum speed primarily has it origins in the imbalance of forces acting on the advancing and 
retreating blades of the main rotor.  
42  There is room for interpretation in this statement: Armed helicopters were often operated in 
Vietnam under low ceilings and weather conditions that restricted or precluded use of tactical air in 
close support of ground units or airmobile operations [Tol73 p.248]. 
43   These are generally claimed figures for speed. During the 2003 Iraq War AH-64 Apaches 
frequently fought at higher speeds, sometimes as high as 100 knots, although most engagements were 
below that [Har03]. 
44  The USCENTAF report from which this information is taken avoids presenting information on the 
AH-64D Apache Longbow in a way that only raises still more questions on its true combat value. 
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rotorcrafts have distinct advantages over helicopters, particularly in being faster and 
less noisy in vertical flight. On the other hand, “flying around threats” is equivalent 
to loss in useful combat radius, the flight profile in landing zones is not unlike that of 
a helicopter and therefore introduces similar susceptibility concerns, and the acoustic 
signature of tilt-wing aircraft increases significantly when transiting to hover profile. 
[Hed00 pp.51-54, Kan97] The future may see cooperation between unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) and attack helicopters [Col99], where UAVs provide real-time 
surveillance information and perform high risk reconnaissance and jamming 
support.45 Despite the advantages of attack helicopters, they should not be expected 
to replace main battle tanks (MBTs) in the near future [Blu99]. MBTs have 
advantage over helicopters in being able to take and hold objectives. For instance, the 
Danish experience from deploying six MBTs to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1998 showed 
that the Danish force received respect from opposing forces in the conflict [Lak01].46  
 
3.1.5 Conclusions on helicopters 
 
Battlefield helicopters have advantages that make them attractive for use on the 
battlefield in various tasks. From the survivability standpoint their strength lies in 
their ability to utilize terrain masking; simultaneously this advantage makes them 
prone to encounter ground fire. Helicopter technology will not see any major changes 
in the foreseeable future; this conclusion is evident also in a RAND study on heavy 
transport rotorcraft [Gro03].  Helicopters face competition from other types of 
platforms, but it can be expected that present platform types will coexist on the 
battlefield during the time frame of interest for the present work although the number 
of UAVs increases.  
 
 
3.2 The battlefield 
 
3.2.1 Conflicts and threats 
 
Security thinking prior to the demise of the Soviet Union was dominated by ideas of 
a major war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Local wars—e.g. the Yom Kippur 
War in 1973, the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, and the Grenada invasion in 
1983—were short but saw intensive fighting. UN mandated peace support operations 
(PSOs) were mostly guard duties aimed at separating antagonists, and carried out 
with their consent.  Western military thinking was focused on Clausewitz’s theories 
that had become fashionable in the aftermath of the US defeat in Vietnam. In the 
1990s the risk of a major global conflict was replaced by a surge of ethnic and civil 
wars. The interest of theoreticians shifted to the latest revolution in military affairs 
(RMA) and to information warfare [Fit87, Fit94, Mur97]. Sun Tzu’s thinking gained 
                                                 
45  A partial reason for canceling the RAH-66 Comanche armed scout helicopter program was to free 
funds for development of UAVs [Scu03b, Way04]. 
46  Redman [Red98] argues strongly in favor of the attack helicopter and does not accept the idea that 
tanks are needed to hold objectives, but accepts that tanks will be needed in the future since fiscal 
realities do not allow an all-out helicopter combat force.  
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popularity over Clausewitz’, given modern form through Warden’s strategic rings 
and Boyd’s OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act). Warden has been credited as 
the originator of the allied strategy in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, but the swiftness of 
the campaign can also be seen as an application of the OODA loop. [Fad95 p.25, 
Pol00, War95] Following the terrorist attack on World Trade Center in New York in 
2001 the attention has shifted to terrorism and—in the US—to homeland defense. 
 
 
Conflict type Scenario Note 
Major war (Cold 
War scenario) 
Intensive fighting day and night. Multitude of threats 
ranging from traditional ballistic weapons to systems with 
advanced electronic guidance. Use of NBC weapons 
likely. Threats come from air, ground and sea. Severe 
environment for RF, EO, and laser systems. Helicopter 
EWSP would encounter all types of threats. 
Present attack 
helicopters 
were designed 
for the anti-
tank role. 
Finnish defense 
whitepaper 1997 
[Anon97a pp.57-58] 
Three scenarios are identified: the military pressure stage, 
a strategic strike,47 and large-scale attack. The strategic 
strike has since been in the focus of Finnish military 
planning. A large-scale attack is expected if the strategic 
strike fails to meet its objectives, or if a strike is assessed 
insufficient. 
WP’97 led to 
a decision to 
acquire 
transport 
helicopters.48 
Recent conflicts (I):  
Iraq (1991), Kosovo 
(1999) 
Massive air-to-ground operations and helicopters used for 
CSAR missions. Iraq: Ground attack phase with 
helicopters used for troop transport and precision attack 
on static and mobile high-value targets, no helicopter 
killed [But91 p.240, Cla99]. Kosovo: Attack helicopters 
deployed to theater but withheld for fear of losses. 
No helicopter 
killed by 
hostile fire. 
Recent conflicts (II): 
Grenada (1983), 
Somalia (1993), 
Chechnya (12/94-8/96, 
10/99-), Afghanistan 
(2001-), Iraq (2003-) 
Offensive forces superior in number and equipment. 
Grenada operation successful, Somalia ended in defeat for 
offensive forces; Chechnya and Afghanistan persist and 
Iraq has transformed into underground resistance (July 
2004). Helicopters used extensively and found vulnerable 
to fire from unsophisticated weapons, particularly RPGs. 
Numerous 
helicopters 
killed and 
damaged by 
hostile fire. 
Guerilla warfare and 
terrorism 
Guerilla warfare and terrorism are examples of asym-
metric warfare, typified by the Chechnya situation. Attack 
helicopters are used e.g. for assassination operations in 
urban environment [Opa01]. Ambushes on helicopters 
with small arms fire, RPGs and MANPAD missiles are 
typical. Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant, since 
the final victory depends on many factors [Gra95]. 
One-sided use 
of helicopters, 
benign 
electronic 
environment. 
Peace support 
operations (PSO) 
Helicopters used mainly to deliver humanitarian aid, but 
attack helicopters have been used for area surveillance 
[Jan01]. 
Benign 
environment. 
Table 4: Summary of conflict types and scenarios with relevance to the present work. One 
lesson of the Somalia operation was the need for a turreted gun for the Italian A129 Mangusta 
[Val02]. Legend: EO=electro-optic; NBC=nuclear, bacteriological, and chemical; RF=radio-
frequency; RPG=rocket propelled grenade. 
                                                 
47  The Whitepaper does not use the term “strategic attack”, but the description provided in US Army 
Field Manual (FM) 100-5 is close to the Finnish view: “Strategic attacks are carried out against an 
enemy’s center of gravity, which may include national command elements, war production assets, and 
supporting infrastructure (…). Strategic attacks focus on the enemy’s capability and possibly its will 
to wage war. They are designed to affect the entire war effort rather than single campaign or battle 
(…).” [Anon94a p.2-18] 
48  The Finnish plans from 1997 called for both transport and escort (attack) helicopters. In 2004 plans 
for escort helicopters were dropped, which puts the entire acquisition of transport helicopters and 
plans for airmobile units into question. 
 49
 
The analysis above, including Table 4, is strongly influenced by US actions; but it 
must be expected that US domination in military operations and military technology 
will continue in the foreseeable future. Examples of attack helicopter losses in 
military operations are given in Table 5. The Karbala operation was a failed deep 
attack, conducted with AH-64 Apache helicopters. The ongoing Iraq conflict has 
seen numerous helicopter losses, both to accidents and to hostile fire, but official 
information—“lessons learned”—is still scanty (July 2004).  
 
 
Conflict Helicopter losses 
Vietnam (1961-1973) 2,587 helicopters lost to enemy action; 2,282 lost to “operational 
mishaps”. One hit by enemy fire for every 1,147 sorties; one shot 
down per 13,461 sorties; one shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties 
Î PH,m = 0.09 %, Pk/H = 13.7%. 
Grenada 1983 7 killed, 11 damaged Î Pk/H = 38.9 %. 
Panama 1989 4 killed, 45 damaged (out of 170) Î PH = 26.5 %, Pk/H = 8.2 %.49 
Somalia 1993 2 killed, 2 damaged in Mogadishu raid on 3 October (out of 17)  
Î PH = 23.5 %, Pk/H = 50 %. 
Chechnya (December 
1994 to August 1996) 
Unconfirmed estimations claim that 1 helicopter in 10 was lost, 1 in 4 
was damaged Î PH = 35%, Pk/H =  28.6%. 
Afghanistan 2002 Operation “Anaconda” on 2 March: 7 attack helicopters took part in 
the operation; all were damaged, 4 had to withdraw from the fight 
Î PH,m = 100% (Pk/H = 57.1 % if withdrawn are considered killed). 
Iraq 2003 Karbala operation on 23-24 March: 31 helicopters damaged out of 32, 
some seriously (Î PH,m = 96.9 %); 1 crashed on landing, 1 forced to 
land on enemy ground (Î Pk/H = 6.5 % if losses were related to 
hits).50 
Table 5: Most likely data for helicopter losses in some conflicts and missions [Anon84, Bal03 
p.86, Bil02, Col04, Ell02, Hew03, Nay02, Tat00, Tho97, Tol73 p.153]. The “operational mishaps” 
are defined “principally mechanical and electrical failures” in Augustine [Aug72]. The number 
of helicopters killed or damaged by sophisticated weapons is small, but accurate data is not 
available. Legend: PH=probability of hit (in conflict); PH,m=probability of hit per mission;  
Pk/H=probability of kill, given a hit.  
 
 
The increased number of joint international operations in conflicts lesser than war 
has implications for EWSP through rules of engagement (ROE) and “electronic 
fratricide”. ROE may for instance prohibit the use of flares over urban areas.51 
“Electronic fratricide” includes the risk of electromagnetic interference among 
friendly forces, wrong identification leading to attack on friendly units, etc. [Coo99c, 
Spe93]  
                                                 
49  As an example of battle damage repair timelines: 24 out of 25 damaged Black Hawks were 
returned to service within 24 hours [Bal03 p.105]. 
50  A) Apart from being a tactical victory for the Iraqis it was also an intelligence scoop: The Apache 
Longbow that was forced to land on enemy territory did so with its classified radar and was fully 
armed. No attempts are known to have been made to destroy the wreckage. [Hew03] 
B) Of the damaged Apaches all but five were operating the next day; the rest within four days 
[Har03]. Wilson [Wil04] claims that the total number of helicopters was 33. 
51  It has been suggested that a reason for the failed Karbala mission was that ROEs required target 
identification from 1 km; which completely negated the advantages of the Longbow radar and the 
range of Hellfire missiles. Intelligence failure, overconfidence, and hasty planning have also been 
blamed. The true merits of the Apache helicopter have come under scrutiny, and US Army training 
practices have been particularly criticized. [Har03, Hew03, New03] 
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3.2.2 Helicopter operations and tactics 
 
The first battlefield helicopter operations were related to CASEVAC and other 
transport duties, the use of helicopters as dedicated weapon platforms materialized 
later (cf. Section 3.1.1). Accordingly, this study divides helicopters into two major 
groups, transport helicopters and attack helicopters. The term “transport helicopter” 
is used synonymous to “battlefield support helicopter”. Naval helicopters and 
missions are not covered, although this should be only a marginal issue. 
 
The increased use of transport helicopters on the battlefield is closely related to 
Airmobility, a concept founded on the use of helicopters to provide increased 
mobility for ground combat forces on and around the battlefield [Bud99, Cha89 
p.148, Dem94, Dou99, Jar97]. Typically the helicopter mission profile of an air 
assault operation covers three parts: the flight from the base to the pickup zone (PZ), 
where men and equipment are loaded, the flight to the drop zone (DZ) where the 
cargo is unloaded, and the return flight to the base for refueling and maintenance. 
The flight height is varied according to the perceived threat. Figure 10 shows an 
example of a mission profile according to specifications of the Nordic Standard 
Helicopter Program [Wes00]. The approach to and egress from the DZ are along 
different routes, a tactics that became standard in Vietnam to avoid overflying the 
same area more than once. The average unloading time for a twelve-ship formation 
was two minutes. [Tol73 pp.37-38] 
 
 
Base
Pickup zone (PZ)
Drop zone (DZ)
DZ approach
10 nm, NOE
DZ egress
10 nm, NOE
DISEMBARCATION
EMBARCATION
TAKE-OFF
En route flight phase
70 nm. Contour/Low
level
Return flight phase
70 nm. Contour/
Low level
25 nm,
Low level
Comment:
The total distances from PZ to DZ and
DZ to base are not required to exceed 80
nm.  
Figure 10: Mission profile for the tactical troop transport helicopters as specified in the Nordic 
Standard Helicopter Program (NSHP). Adapted from Westin [Wes00].  Ricciardi et al. [Ric94] 
shows that NOE flight is necessary primarily in the area 0-40 km behind enemy lines. Legend: 
nm=nautical miles. 
 
 
Table 6 summarizes the most important roles of transport helicopters, and the 
implications that these roles have. The role of intelligence has been stressed only for 
SEAD missions, but situational awareness is important in all cases. 
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TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS 
Role Mission goal Implication 
Transport Transport of troops to/from combat area, 
also deep attacks behind enemy lines. 
Threat reduction a prime consideration.  
Threat level depends on depth of pene-
tration.52 Threat increases when hovering 
(fast roping) and with increased height/ 
slow speed (underslung cargo). Mission 
planning required for threat avoidance.  
CSAR Typically search and rescue of pilots 
downed behind enemy lines. Stealth, fast 
execution, and local air superiority are 
essential for success. [Whi00]53 
Need for speed of execution prohibits 
accurate planning, support by ownship 
and other weapon assets required for 
protection. 
CASEVAC Evacuation of wounded from combat area 
or its immediate vicinity. 
Threat level depends on evacuation site, 
and can be very high in the immediate 
combat area. Support from weapon 
assets important for protection. 
SEAD Location and identification of enemy air 
defenses, destruction by soft- and hard-
kill on-board assets. 
High-threat role as operation close to 
enemy air defense is required, intelli-
gence is vital for threat avoidance. Other 
weapon assets can increase protection. 
SIGINT Intelligence collection with passive radio 
sensors at some distance from FEBA. 
Intelligence footprint depends on flight 
height, which increases the otherwise 
low to medium risks of SIGINT 
missions. 
Battlefield 
surveillance 
Surveillance with SAR radar or other 
sensors at some distance from enemy 
lines. 
Effectiveness requires sufficient flight 
height, which combined with active 
sensors attract fire from ground and air. 
Table 6: Summary of the most important roles of transport helicopters, relevant mission goals 
and their implications. The SEAD (suppression of enemy air defense) role is presently only 
discussed for transport helicopters. Legend: FEBA=forward extension of battlefield area. 
 
 
Threat types and probability of occurrence depends on the helicopter’s location 
relative to the combat area. Table 7 gives an estimation of how various threats relate 
to different mission stages [Kit02]. Major uncertainties related to this estimation are 
the nature of conflict and, in case of an armed conflict, the fragmented battlefield of 
today with no clear demarcation line between friends and foes [Kan97]. FEBA is 
therefore a diffuse notion. The estimation on threats in various situations can also be 
challenged. For instance, according to the table threat from direct fire is very low 
even at FEBA, but if the enemy has MBTs with advance fire control systems the 
threat from MBT main guns must be taken as high. Table 7 allows quantification of 
risks by applying, for instance, the Delphi technique or the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52  According to one view deep attack task forces should be placed in a cocoon of protecting assets 
(sensors, SEAD aircraft, artillery, etc.) that increases survivability [Jam02]. 
53  Hewish [Hew00], with reference to an unidentified study in 1996, reports that the combined total of 
search parties, anti-aircraft units and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) that would 
probably be deployed by Iraq were expected to rise from virtually zero after 30 minutes to about 13 
within an hour, and approach 25 within 2.5 hours. 
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Weapon Take-off and landing Transit FEBA 
Beyond 
FEBA 
IR MANPAD Very low Medium High High 
LBR MANPAD Very low Medium High High 
LLADS Nil Medium Very high Medium 
Direct fire Nil Nil Very low Very low 
Laser guided anti-tank missiles Nil Nil Low Nil 
Other anti-tank missiles Nil Nil Very low Nil 
Active BVR air-to-air missile Very low Medium Low Medium 
Semi-active air-to-air missile Very low Medium Low Medium 
IR BVR air-to-air missile Very low Low Low Medium 
Short-range IR-guided AA missile Nil Very low Low Medium 
Fixed-wing fighter guns Nil Very low Very low Medium 
Long-range SAM Nil Low Low Low 
Medium range SAM Nil Low Low Medium 
Table 7: Threat assessment for battlefield helicopters according to Kitchner [Kit02]. Legend: 
AA=anti-aircraft, BVR=beyond visual range, LBR=laser beam rider, LLADS=low-level air 
defense system, SAM=surface-to-air missile. 
 
 
Armed helicopters were originally conceived for the CAS (close air support) role, 
and used to effect first by the French in Algeria and later by the US in Vietnam 
[Koc00a]. The perceived threat of a massive Soviet tank attack in central Europe led 
to the development of attack helicopters specialized for the anti-tank role. Recent 
conflicts have revived interest in the CAS role, and the true value of e.g. the 
technically advanced target acquisition radar on the AH-64 Apache Longbow can be 
questioned. Similarly old doctrines have come under scrutiny: The Ansbach trials in 
Germany in 1972, and subsequent TASVAL trials at Fort Ord, California, had a 
major impact in developing attack helicopter tactics. It was through these trials that 
the combined use of scout and anti-tank helicopters evolved, as well as the pop-up 
firing technique for anti-tank helicopters.54 [Har97, Mue74] In the 2003 Iraq War the 
loss rate of US Army Apache helicopters was higher than that of US Marine Corps 
AH-1 Cobras, despite the Apache generally being considered as a more advanced 
platform. A main reason appears to be the Army tactics of firing in hover—a remnant 
of the pop-up tactics of the anti-tank doctrine—versus firing on the move, as 
practiced by Marine Corps pilots.55 [Put03, Sir03] 
 
The Ansbach trials showed considerable individual differences. The average kill ratio 
(armored vehicle per helicopter) for US pilots was 8.6, against 41.7 for their German 
and Canadian counterparts, despite the US pilots having more flight hours as a group. 
The reason was found to be that “The German and Canadian pilots (…) appeared to 
have a better appreciation of the European terrain and of the application of nap-of-
the-earth flight techniques, generally selected better firing positions, and had a better 
                                                 
54  The term “anti-tank” is used here to distinguish attack helicopters with a scout role, and attack 
helicopters delivering the major weapons load on targets. Less sophisticated helicopter may also be 
used for scout tasks. In addition, there was no dedicated attack helicopter in Western Europe before 
the A129 Mangusta; anti-tank missions were conducted by multirole helicopters such as the SA 341 
Gazelle and MBB BO 105.  
55  A difference that has been pointed out is that the US Marine Corps conducts, and trains for, close 
air support (CAS) missions, whereas the US Army does not have a CAS environment. The same 
source also maintains that the usual picture of US Army Apaches, as not training for fire on the move, 
is incorrect. [Har03] 
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grasp of the tactical situation and likely aggressor actions” [How79]. If this 
evaluation is correct a fivefold improvement can be achieved through better tactics, 
situational awareness, and knowledge of local conditions.56 
 
 
ATTACK HELICOPTERS 
Role Mission goal Implication 
Escort Typically armed escort of transport 
helicopters on their way to/from DZ.  
High risk role since the escort helicopter 
is supposed to put itself into harm’s way. 
Success requires meticulous mission 
planning based on accurate intelligence. 
CAS Fire support to ground troops, destruction 
of hard and high-value targets. CAS can 
be part of an escort mission. 
High-threat role due to constant presence 
on the battlefield and exposure to threats 
are required. 
Anti-tank Destruction of enemy MBTs and other 
armored vehicles. 
CLOS ATGWs require lengthy exposure 
to counterfire that can reach the helicop-
ter before missile impact. Situation 
improves with fire-and-forget weapons. 
Scout, 
reconnais-
sance 
Scouting the battlefield in search of 
targets for armed anti-tank helicopters 
(scout) of for other assets (recon). 
Exposure to threats depends on battle-
field conditions and on helicopter agility. 
Deep attack Attacking high-value targets deep in 
enemy territory, possibly with the support 
of other fire assets. 
Potentially high-threat, but en route risks 
alleviated through detailed mission 
planning based on accurate intelligence. 
SEAD Location and identification of enemy air 
defenses, destruction by soft- and hard-
kill on-board assets. 
High-threat role as operation close to 
enemy air defense is required, intelli-
gence is vital for threat avoidance.57 
Table 8: Summary of the most important roles of attack helicopters, relevant mission goals and 
their implications. Scout helicopters are usually armed, but the weapon load is insufficient for 
performing the mission alone. Legend: ATGW=anti-tank guided weapon, CLOS=command-
line-of-sight. 
 
3.2.3 Conclusions and implications for EWSP 
 
When analyzing experiences from recent conflicts it should be recognized that events 
are distorted if compared with conflicts between equal antagonists. In recent conflicts 
one side has enjoyed air superiority (the US, NATO, or Russia). This has limited the 
options available to the other party, but has also given the opposition the possibility 
to regard anything that flies as its enemy, and no time has been wasted on target 
                                                 
56  Caution is necessary in making this interpretation. Combat efficiency variations reported in Dupuy 
[Dup79 p.64] are much smaller. The German combat efficiency advantage over the Allies in WW II 
was generally 20%, whereas the Israeli advantage over the Egyptians has been some 90%. Extensive 
simulations of the armor battle of 73 Easting in the 1991 Persian Gulf War have revealed that 
technology alone cannot explain Iraqi losses. Without a major skill advantage for US troops the 
outcome could have been radically different, but quantitative estimations of the skill difference have 
not been presented. [Bid99] 
57   The best-known SEAD mission with attack helicopters took place on the first night of air 
operations in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when a task force of US attack and transport helicopters flew 
a 1300 km round trip to destroy Iraqi air-defense radars in order to open the attack route for the major 
air assault on Iraq. The attack was performed with ATGW missiles against the radar installations. 
[All93 p.218-219, Cla99 p.284, Gun98 pp.194-195, Mac91] The obsolete AGM-122A Sidearm anti-
radiation missile would have been available on the AH-1W Cobra attack helicopter [Spe93]. 
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identification. Also, as a consequence of air superiority, the RF environment has 
been quite benign to the major power. 
 
The shift of the global scenario from general war to smaller and technologically less 
sophisticated conflicts would indicate that the need for EWSP suites on helicopters 
(or any platform) has diminished. However, proliferation of low-cost high-tech 
weapons, such as MANPAD and ATGW missiles, guarantees that these can be 
encountered in any conflict. The shift has therefore been one from radar to electro-
optical (EO) threats. 58  Furthermore, the likely threat scenario is not the global 
average even to major powers; threats should be analyzed in the most relevant 
setting. Political strings are attached to helicopter operations through restrictive 
ROE. Joint international missions require cooperation in order to avoid fratricide—
caused either by weapons or by electronic interference. The risk of weapons induced 
fratricide demands unhindered communication between coalition partners, the risk of 
electronic fratricide requires the political will to share intelligence and information 
on friendly systems (cf. Section 3.2.1). 
 
Despite the large number of total helicopter losses in Vietnam, the losses per sortie 
were not excessive. The other extreme, the Mogadishu, Anaconda and Karbala 
operations, show that the damage rate on individual missions can be very high 
indeed. The threat matrix of Table 7 must be seen as being valid for a particular 
scenario, and not as a generic tool. For instance, LBR MANPAD missiles are not as 
common as IR missiles. The overall probability of encountering an LBR missile is 
therefore not as high as encountering an IR missile. Experiences of recent conflicts 
have also shown that direct fire, particularly RPGs, are a more serious threat to 
helicopters than Table 7 implies. Tables 6 and 8, in turn, point to the importance of 
intelligence, mission planning and fire support by other weapon assets in securing 
helicopter operations. Some helicopter missions, or part of missions, are performed 
on an ad hoc basis, which returns the issue of real-time situational awareness—both 
on the ground and on armed helicopters—in order to avoid fratricide. 
 
 
3.3 Survivability 
 
3.3.1 Review of survivability concepts 
 
The following passage in Tolson [Tol73 pp.257-258] can be seen as a first guideline 
towards defining the term “holistic view” on EWSP of battlefield helicopters 
(Corollary 2, Section 1.3.1): “Survivability of air vehicles in the land battle is one 
end product of a combination of actions and reactions by two opposing forces (…) 
beginning with intelligence production and planning, and ending with the last shot 
fired. Survivability of aircraft can be appreciated only by examining all of these 
influences in their proper relationship to each other (….) The survivability of Army 
aircraft is enhanced by suppressive ground fire, close air defense support, the proper 
use of intelligence for planning aviation operations, the effect of tactic and 
                                                 
58  The present work uses the designation EO for the entire band that can be covered by electro-optical 
devices. In practical terms it means the wavelength band from approx. 0.2 µm to 14 µm. 
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techniques in increased survivability, the soldier’s desire to accomplish his mission, 
and the effect of personal command attention.” The passage indicates factors that 
need be observed in the present work. The list puts adequate emphasis on 
interactions and dynamic aspects of the scenario. 
 
MIL-HDBK-2069 Aircraft Survivability divides the concept of survivability into 
susceptibility and vulnerability. A common addition is battle damage repair (BDR) 
as the third component of survivability, which MIL-HDBK-2069 refers to as 
reconstitution.59 Susceptibility is defined as “The degree to which a system is open to 
effective attack due to one or more inherent weaknesses.” [Anon97b] Using the 
phrasing of the last sentence, the objective of the EWSP suite is to make the 
helicopter less “open to effective attack” by reducing “inherent weaknesses” of the 
platform. Thus the task of the EWSP suite is to mitigate susceptibility. This leads to 
the next question: how does the EWSP suite relate to other susceptibility reduction 
measures, to vulnerability, and possibly also to BDR? 
 
MIL-HDBK-2069 defines vulnerability reduction as “The characteristics of a system 
which causes it to suffer a definite degradation in its capability of performing the 
designated mission as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in 
a man-made threat environment.” The EWSP suite cannot bring a productive 
contribution to vulnerability reduction. Vulnerability reduction of the platform is 
needed when susceptibility reduction measures fail their objective. Vulnerability 
issues will not be covered further in this study, but Figure 11 gives an overview of 
some vulnerability reduction measures for helicopters. Many of the vulnerability 
reduction measures in the figure have weight and space implications, and therefore 
compete with the EWSP suite for platform resources. There is, therefore, an indirect 
link between vulnerability and susceptibility issues. 
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Figure 11: Some vulnerability reduction features of battlefield helicopters. The design for 
ballistic tolerance is mainly driven by three weapon calibers: the Soviet/Russian 23 mm AA gun, 
the 12.7 mm heavy machine gun, and 7.62 mm small arms. [Bal03 p.140,720-722, Cur99, Yan91] 
A more complete list of vulnerability enhancement techniques is given in [Anon82]. 
                                                 
59  Hall [Hal03] proposes decomposition of survivability into seven factors: (1) susceptibility, (2) 
vulnerability, (3) personnel survivability and recoverability, (4) range and breadth of missions, (5) 
scenarios and threat levels, (6) availability of required support assets, and (7) a definition of what level 
of survivability is “acceptable” for the platform. The present work will stay with the definitions of 
MIL-HDBK-2069, although the other factors in Hall’s paper are discussed. 
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Traditional survivability thinking has been criticized for, among other things, failing 
to take into account the likelihood of encountering a threat, and for not providing 
information on how vulnerability assessment levels were chosen. Instead a merger of 
traditional survivability thinking with classical risk analysis/assessment is proposed, 
and to define survivability factors in probabilistic terms. [Guz00] A short discussion 
along these lines can be found in Ball [Bal03 pp.74-77]. The present work adheres to 
traditional definitions because the risk/hazard approach to survivability would be an 
extension to the work. 
 
 
3.3.2 Susceptibility 
 
According to one definition susceptibility is the intersection of feasibility, 
accessibility, and interceptability. Feasibility, further, is defined as the scientific, 
engineering, and economic capability of an enemy to attack a system, and the intent 
to field and use this capability. Accessibility is the presence of battlefield conditions 
and geometry that permit an enemy to use this capability to successfully attack a 
system, including battlefield areas, engagement geometry, and battlefield dynamics. 
Interceptability, finally, is the target acquisition and C3 (command, control and 
communication)60  capabilities of an enemy that provides him the ability to locate, 
identify, and engage a weapon in the operational environment in a timely manner. 
[Anon92b] 
 
Susceptibility is often presented as a sequential process, depicted by the “onion skin” 
model in Figure 12 [Bur97, Eri01, Hel01, etc.]. 61  Basic steps for achieving 
survivability “in order of least cost and most effective to the most cost and least 
effective” are: tactics, signature reduction, warning, jamming and decoying, and 
aircraft hardening [Anon97b, p.G-2]. The message of this statement is that the deeper 
the threat penetrates into the onion skin model, the more expensive the survivability 
measures become and the more uncertain is the outcome to the helicopter. 
 
Conversely, the onion skin model indicates sequences that a weapon system must 
undergo in order to kill a target: Search for the target, detect the target, engage (fire 
at) the target, allow propagator to fly out, unleash damage mechanism sufficiently 
close to target, and cause sufficient damage to the target. Only when all these six 
steps have been successfully completed will the target be killed. [Bal03 pp.10-12] 
 
Mechanisms of platform survivability are summarized in Figure 13. The final degree 
of survivability is achieved by a combination of diverse mechanisms. Hard-kill 
measures for threat elimination are included in the susceptibility reduction arsenal, 
which requires support by artillery and attack aircraft.  
 
                                                 
60  The term “command, control and communication” (C3) is used throughout the present work for the 
entire set of abbreviations in the field: C2, C3, C3I, C4, C4I, C4ISR etc. The rational is that the 
intelligence (I), surveillance (S) and reconnaissance (R) parts are covered by the sensors mentioned 
elsewhere in the text and computers, the fourth “C”, is a natural component in modern systems. 
61  Another representation is the “kill chain” proposed in Hall [Hal03]. The “kill chain” essentially 
contains the same components as the onion skin model, but presents them in a different way 
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Figure 12: Condensed onion skin model of the sequential process of helicopter threats and 
major countermeasures in each layer. Pre-emptive self-screen jamming by the EWSP suite has 
not been foreseen. The idea of the onion skin model is applicable to all types of military 
platforms. 
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Figure 13: The mechanisms of helicopter survivability. Means and goals in boldface are related 
to EWSP. Note that BDR (4.7) is defined as part of vulnerability reduction. Extension of Pywell 
[Pyw02].62 
                                                 
62  An earlier version of the triad threat avoidance—threat elimination—threat evasion are the air 
defense penetration priorities of the US Strategic Air Command, termed “threat avoidance”, “threat 
suppression”, and “threat countering” [Buc87]. 
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3.3.3 Additional considerations on survivability 
 
The defensive mind-set in traditional platform-centric self-protection has been 
criticized since in reality it starts from the center of the onion-skin model, by 
regarding miss distance of threats as the first priority, instead of concentrating on 
detection avoidance.63 It has been suggested that mission survivability should be put 
in focus, and measures necessary to that effect be taken by concentrating on the outer 
layers of the onion skin model. [Reg01] This observation is supported by the 
statement in Section 3.3.2 on worsening cost-efficiency with increasing penetration 
into the onion skin model. On the other hand, it also raises the question if mission 
survivability is the ultimate goal or should the realm of the analysis be pushed to 
tactical, operational, or even strategic survivability? 
 
The need to lower exposure of a firing platform motivates target handoff by scout 
helicopters and other assets to the firing platform [Jon96] but the probability of 
detection (Pd) is influenced by additional factors during exposure, as evidenced by 
tests with the AH-1 Cobra in the 1970s and summarized in Table 9 [Cob84].64 
 
 
Action Change in Pd Recommendation 
Helicopter makes lateral 
maneuver or movement 
Increased from 0.30 to 0.64. Avoid lateral movement 
while exposed. 
Wide lateral separation  
(> 500m) between the 
aircraft of a section 
Decreased from 0.55 to 0.44 for observing 
either aircraft and from 0.28 to 0.03 for 
both aircraft. 
Maintain good separation 
between aircraft in a 
section. 
Scan sector of the 
observer expanded from 
60o to 120o  
Decreased from 0.42 to 0.33 for observing 
either aircraft and from 0.19 to 0.09 for 
both aircraft. 
As previous. 
Terrain background Decreased from 0.68 to 0.44 for either 
aircraft and from 0.19 to 0.11 for both 
aircraft. 
Maintain terrain 
background. 
Table 9: Influence of various actions and conditions on the probability of the AH-1 Cobra attack 
helicopter being detected, and recommendations based on these observations [Cob84]. The first 
case is for a single aircraft, the other cases with one or two aircraft. 
 
 
Based on a study of the benefits of advanced control technology on helicopters (fly-
by-wire primary flight control, advanced control laws and carefree handling systems) 
Handcock and Howitt [Han00] reports an increase in platform agility by 20%,65 
which translates into a potential 20% reduction in the exposure time for critical NOE 
unmask/remask maneuvers and low-level transit flight with a corresponding impact 
on Pd and probability of hit (PH). 
                                                 
63  The views expressed in Regev [Reg01] concern high-flying fixed-wing aircraft, for which stronger 
emphasis on RF stealth technology is motivated than for rotary-wing aircraft. 
64  A study from the same time concluded that the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter was mainly not 
detected by ground observers at a range of 3000 meters if the helicopter appeared only for 60 seconds 
at a time. The rule of thumb of AH-1 (TOW) pilots in tactical squadrons at that time was: If a target 
has not been acquired and engaged within 20 s, remask and move to another firing position. The rule 
was also to remain masked for 60 s prior to unmasking. [Cob84] The 20 s rule is related to the 
maximum time of flight for the TOW missile. 
65  Agility of a helicopter is defined as forward and lateral acceleration and deceleration, and vertical 
movement from and to hover [Eve83b]. 
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The general observations from a simulation study on an air insertion operation 
(insertion of airmobile troops behind enemy lines) with a large tilt-rotor aircraft are 
collected in Table 10. The low and slow flight path was found to be more 
advantageous than a faster but higher path.66 [Mat00 pp.117-122] In this study the 
value of EWSP to the insertion aircraft was not considered.  
 
 
Survivability mechanism Observation 
SEAD - SEAD is a critical part of the insertion mission 
- With SEAD of high-level enemy air defenses, medium-altitude 
penetration becomes an option for deployment of force. 
Situational awareness 
(SA) 
Greater SA can improve survivability, except when enemy air defense 
systems are not disrupted. 
Flight tactics Slower flight speeds allow lower altitudes to be obtained during 
penetration of enemy airspace. 
Stealth Stealth by itself tends to lose its effect at slow speeds. 
Combinations of above Extreme combinations of stealth, SA, SEAD, and flight tactics may be 
needed to achieve survivability at low altitude. 
Table 10: General observations in a simulated air insertion operation. Note, however, that this 
study deals with a tilt-wing rotor operation against an enemy-occupied island and is therefore 
not of general validity.  
 
 
Survivability 
measure 
Level I 
Flight beyond the reach 
of enemy fire, no 
special protection. 
Level II 
Moderate threat, low 
weight penalty from 
protective measures. 
Level III 
Maximum threat, full 
spectrum of protective 
measures. 
Vulnerability 
reduction 
Normal design and 
configuration measures, 
multiple engines and 
fire extinguish system. 
Armor against 7.62 mm 
bullets for crew and 
vital units, self-sealing 
fuel tanks. 
Crew and vital units are 
armor protected against 
12.7 mm bullets. 
EWSP None. Warning systems that 
can detect threats in 
various spectral bands, 
passive counter-
measures. 
Complete EWSP suite 
with warning systems, as 
well as passive and 
active countermeasures 
in various spectral bands. 
Maneuverability 1.5 g 2.5-3 g 3.5 g 
IR signatures No reduction measures. Exhaust screens. Exhaust baffles with 
cool-air mixing, screens 
on hot engine parts. 
Radar signatures No RCS reduction 
measures. 
Rotor blades in 
composite material, 
radar absorbing fairing 
on main rotor hub. 
In addition to Level II: 
radar absorbing coating 
on the airframe, tail 
boom, and engine pods. 
Table 11: Matrix of platform survivability measures, consistent with the layered survivability 
concept proposed in Platunov [Pla01].67 
 
 
                                                 
66  The study hypothesized that speed can be maintained only at the cost of flight height, it was not a 
finding of the study [Mat00 p.122]. 
67  Due to unfamiliar expressions used in Platunov [Pla01] the correct meaning of details had in some 
cases to be guessed. 
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As a conclusion on the discussion on survivability is the layered methodology for 
platform survivability proposed in Platunov [Pla01], and summarized in Table 11. 
Platunov presents results from calculations of the relative cost to accomplish nominal 
combat missions in four different scenarios. The conclusion reads: “Although 
implementation of numerous survivability techniques [for Levels II and III] 
significantly increases the takeoff weight, the resultant effectiveness is improved 
several times.” 68  
 
3.3.4 Conclusions and implications for EWSP 
 
Section 3.3.1 links EWSP with susceptibility, which is a survivability component. 
Survivability has links outside the platform, and interactions between EWSP and 
survivability factors extrinsic to the platform need to be defined. Connections 
between EWSP and vulnerability measures are indirect and need not be considered. 
The intersection definition of susceptibility (Section 3.3.2) brings on the scene 
scientific, economic, geometric, dynamic factors; as well as C3, space and time 
related topics. The approach to susceptibility suppression has to be outside-in in the 
onion skin model; through this the true benefit of EWSP to threat avoidance and 
threat elimination begin to unravel. Likewise the question of the aircrew’s situational 
awareness and how to support it by the EWSP suite gains interest.  
 
Table 9 indicates that the probability of a helicopter being detected varies strongly 
with flight tactics. Lower Pd (for the enemy observer) usually improves helicopter 
survivability. However, in those cases when the helicopter actually is fired upon, late 
detection due to low Pd could lead to firing ranges so short that neither the pilot nor 
the EWSP suite are able to react properly. In addition, platform agility has direct 
influence on survivability, but the interaction between maneuvers and the EWSP 
suite (e.g. changing geometry of flare ejection) must also be considered. 
 
Table 10 can be summarized as: fly low with a low-signature aircraft, have high 
situational awareness, and be covered by maximum SEAD. Care is needed in this 
interpretation since simulations that produced the result were found on the hypothesis 
that higher speed requires elevated flight height. The result indicates, however, that 
the EWSP suite should be able to operate effectively also at minimum flight height, 
since this is where most threat engagements occur. 
 
Matching the levels in Table 11 with threats in Table 7, and by defining Level I equal 
to Nil-Very Low, Level II equal to Low-Medium, and Level III equal to High-Very 
High, produces the result that all helicopters crossing FEBA should be equipped with 
a complete EWSP suite and with a reduced suite if approaching FEBA. The same 
helicopters also need to have the highest maneuverability. This closes the loop to the 
previous issues of EWSP efficiency at low flight heights and EWSP in highly agile 
helicopters.  
 
 
                                                 
68  Platunov does not define the term “effectiveness”, but from the context one can understand it to 
mean cost-effectiveness. 
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3.4 Phenomenology 
 
3.4.1 Overview 
 
The phenomenology related to helicopter survivability and EWSP is best described 
in terms of signatures; signatures originating from the helicopter and signatures 
originating from the helicopter’s environment. It is signatures originating from the 
helicopter (either emitted or reflected signatures) that allow threat systems to detect, 
identify, and track the helicopter. Signatures originating from the environment 
provide the cluttered background that reduces the contrast between the helicopter and 
its surrounding. In a similar way threat signatures and the background affect sensors 
of the EWSP suite. Figure 14 gives an overview of the most important signatures. 
The following discussion will be divided into helicopter signatures and background 
signatures. Threats fall then into the group background, subgroup man-made 
signatures. Some signatures, for instance moon and starlight, are not important to 
EWSP but are important to night-vision equipment during low-level flight. Moon 
and starlight also increase the probability of being detected visually at night. 
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Figure 14: Overview of signatures of importance to battlefield helicopters on the platform level. 
Included are signatures that are central to EWSP (threats); signatures that can be detected by 
the enemy (platform); and those of the environment (clutter). Some signatures can fall into 
multiple groups; muzzle flashes belong to those.  
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3.4.2 Helicopter signatures 
 
Tables 12 and 13 summarize major helicopter signatures and signature reduction 
techniques. The tables do not go into details on spatial, temporal, or frequency 
distribution of signatures. A typical Doppler spread of radar returns from a helicopter 
is shown in Figure 15 and the horizontal distribution of IR radiant intensity in Figure 
16. Additional information on signatures is given in Appendix 1, Figures 1-3 to 1-5. 
 
 
SIGNATURES 
Signature Manifestation 
Visual Size is the major contributor to detection according to the Johnson criteria [Joh58], 
but distinctive features permit identification at long range. Sun glints from cockpit 
windows and metallic rotor blades highlight the helicopter; as does engine exhaust 
glow and cockpit lighting [Bal03 pp.569-571]. Movement in a static background 
attracts the attention of human vision. 
Infrared Sun reflexes and engine emission are mainly in the 3-5 m transmission band, and 
blackbody radiation from the fuselage in the 8-12 m band. Engine plume emission 
is strong around the CO2 emission line at 4.3 m; the spectrum is broader if the 
plume is contaminated or contains solid particles. See also Appendix 1, Figure 1-1. 
Aural Strong noise is generated by the anti-torque system, engine, and main rotor [Ker99]. 
Rotor noise frequency is the rpm times number of rotor blades, usually 20-40 Hz for 
the primary frequency of a four-blade main rotor. The ratio of the main and tail 
rotor frequencies is type-specific and allows identification of a helicopter. [Car92] 
The particular feature of noise is propagation behind LOS obstacles. Uneven rotor 
blade spacing offers best potential for noise reduction [Edw02]. 
Radar 
backscatter 
Fuselage RCS average some square meters. Both static and rotating flash points. 
Rotor flash duration in the order of 0.25-0.5 ms. [Mis97] See Figure 15. 
Emission Radars, communication radios, IFF systems, obstacle warning systems [Bha96], and 
other on-board transmitters emit signals that can be detected and identified. 
Table 12: Summary of helicopter signatures and their characteristic features. Rotor downwash 
has not been included as a signature although it indirectly can reduce helicopter stealth, e.g. by 
blowing up dust or snow that can be observed from a long distance. Legend: IFF=identification 
friend or foe, LOS=line-of-sight, ms=millisecond, rpm=revolution per minute. 
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Figure 15: Generic spectral plot of radar backscatter from a helicopter. Adapted from fig. 9 in 
[Mac86], fig. 8 in [Mis97], and [Shi97]. See Appendix 1, Figure 1-3, for radar glitter points. 
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SIGNATURE REDUCTION 
Signature Reduction means 
Visual Reduction of airframe size, particularly the frontal view; use of camouflage 
painting, fuselage markings in low-contrast colors, reduction of sun glints or their 
number of directions. Rotor frequencies above 16 Hz, low-level flight in the shadow 
of clouds to avoid revealing shadows on the ground [Bal03 pp.569-571, Gun98]. 
NOE-flight over dusty ground to be avoided. 
Infrared IR suppressors decrease heat signatures at the cost of additional weight on the 
platform [Ear78 p.22-13, Gun98 p.67]. Suppressors are claimed to reduce the 
temperature of AH-64 Apache engine parts from 590 ºC to 150 ºC [Yi95]. 69 
Fuselage emission and solar reflex suppression by IR paint [Bal03 p.569]. Frontal 
aspect of the helicopter is cooled by the rotor downwash. Signature reduction is 
simplified by 5ºC or more temperature differences in the surrounding [Sch91]. 
Aural Reduction of main rotor tip speed lowers noise, but at the cost of lift. Other noise 
reduction methods are rotor blade tip shaping, increased number of blades, active 
blade control, uneven tail rotor blade spacing, “fan-in-fin”, NOTAR [Ker99, Pro00], 
and spectrum shaping to where the human ear is less sensitive [Bal03 p.572]. 
Radar 
backscatter 
Reduction through all-composite rotor blades, “fan-in-fin”, rotor hub fairing, radar 
absorbing structures and paint, conductive windshield coating, fuselage geometrics, 
internal weapon load, impedance control, etc. [Fuh99, Gun98, Lyn04 pp.7-8, Pro00] 
Emission LPI gains through emission control; spread spectrum; power, temporal, and spatial 
emission control; utilization of mm-waves and atmospheric absorption peaks; etc. 
Table 13: Summary of helicopter signature reduction measures. The term “reduction” is a 
misnomer since the goal is not reduction by any means, but to match signatures to the 
background. Terrain masking is beneficial in all but the aural case, avoidance of uncluttered 
background should be observed in the visual and IR bands. Legend: LPI=low probability of 
intercept, NOTAR=no tail rotor. 
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Figure 16: Generic polar plot illustrating effects of IR signature reduction in an arbitrary 
spectral band. Radiant intensity in W/sr. The aft radiant intensity of a large helicopter without 
IR suppressors can reach 1000 W/sr or more. (Cf. [Bal03 p.475] and [Sch93 p.165]). 
                                                 
69  According to the Stefan-Boltzmann law a temperature reduction from 590 ºC to 150 ºC decreases 
the total radiant excitance by a factor of 17, and the peak excitance shifts from 3.4 m to 6.8 m—
well into the 5-8 m absorption band. It is claimed, without giving aspect angle, spectral band or 
suppressor influence, that the radiant intensity of the AH-64 Apache is about 30 W/sr [Tay98]. 
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3.4.3 Background signatures 
 
 
NATURE 
Signature Attributes 
Sky In most practical cases clear sky is uncluttered, but galactic noise gains significance 
below l1 GHz and emission by dry atmosphere above l40 GHz. The sun is a 
l5900 K blackbody emitter, producing l900 W/m2 irradiance at sea level (l10 
W/m2 in the 3-5 m band and l0.5 W/m2 in the 8-12 m band) [Hud69 p.85,254].70 
The moon is a l400 K (≠7.2 m peak) blackbody emitter [Mil96 p.3]. 
Atmosphere Permanent constituents of dry air are N2 (78.1%), O2 (20.9%), H2O (i2% at sea 
level), Ar (0.9%), CO2 (0.03%), and traces of other gases. Ozone exists at sea level 
due to pollution; around urban centers O3 levels can vary by an order of magnitude 
in time and over short distances [Sch98]. Variations in the refractive index n cause 
EM waves to bend according to Snell’s law; vertical variations of n cause ducting in 
the RF and IR bands [Sch98, Sko80 pp.450-456]. Clouds consist of droplets, ice 
crystals, smoke or dust, and in all cases present clutter to sensors. Droplet or particle 
size relates to scattering and attenuation at a particular wavelength; sunlight is 
reflected from clouds. Cf. Appendix 1, Figures 1-1, 1-2 and 1-5. 
Animals Animals are warm, moving bodies that may confuse EO trackers; birds and insects 
also contribute to “radar angels” [Sko80 pp.508-512].  
Earth The ground, with vegetation and topographical irregularities, is a strong clutter 
source to EO and RF sensors. Annual variations in vegetation and snow coverage 
influence the scenery [Mil96 p.60; Wil93a p.39,46; Wol96 p.50]. Diurnal variations 
strongly affect the EO band. Reflection of RF waves causes interferences and a 
lobed radiation pattern in radars [Sko80 pp.442-447] 
Wind Wind brings dust and pollution and is also connected with precipitation, all of which 
contribute to increasing attenuation particularly in the EO band. Wind affects laser 
beams [Wei90 pp.76-81], causes background noise to acoustic detectors, influences 
smoke and chaff CMs, and raises waves that cause sea clutter in radars. 
Table 14: Summary of nature-generated signatures. Legend: EM=electromagnetic. 
 
 
MAN-MADE 
Signature Attributes 
Battlefield Peacetime military RF signals are limited to designated frequency bands, during 
conflicts these restrictions may not be honored. Signal sources are communication, 
navigation, and radar systems; as well as jamming and deception emitters.  Wartime 
signal densities and modulation types increase from peacetime practices. Clutter in 
the EO band is caused by explosions, fires, muzzle flames, rocket artillery, tracer 
bullets, pyrotechnics, etc.; these are mostly also related to noise. Decoys, smoke and 
dust add to the EO clutter.  
Society Frequency allocation by the ITU forms the basis for RF spectrum management. RF 
bands <2 GHz are dense with communication, navigation, broadcasting and other 
emissions of the society. Civilian need for frequencies >2 GHz is increasing, and 
signal modulations become more sophisticated. Urban and industrial areas are rich 
in EO emissions emanating from streetlights, vehicles, houses, smokestacks, 
welding, fires, etc. Air pollution from these areas affects EM propagation. 
Table 15: Summary of man-made signatures, excluding threat signatures. Legend: 
ITU=International Telecommunication Union. 
                                                 
70  Data on the sun depends on the source. According to The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & 
Technology (Vol. 12, p.581) direct sunlight irradiance at sea level varies between 758 and 1123 W/m2 
for clear sky, depending on atmospheric conditions and assuming the space solar constant 1353 W/m2. 
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3.4.4 Threat signatures 
 
THREAT SIGNATURES 
Signature Attributes 
NBC Physical presence of contamination agents (isotopes, molecules, viruses, etc.).  
EO Missile and jet engine plume emission, laser signals, tracer bullets, visual cues. 
Some 95% of current tactical missiles use solid propellants [Fle02]. Aluminum is 
commonly used to increase the specific impulse of the engine, leading to increased 
flame temperature and radiation in the UV band [Sho67 p.142]. Table 17 gives 
generic data for MANPAD missiles. The hydrocarbon fuel of jet engines gives 
strong plume emission around the CO2 spectral/absorption line at 4.3 m. Cf. Figure 
17. Laser signatures will be discussed later. 
Radio Missile guidance links, e.g. the 0.7-0.8 GHz guidance uplink of the S-75 Dvina 
(SA-2 Guideline) system [Zal89 p.76]; hostile radio communication, particularly in 
the VHF and UHF bands; communication and radar jamming signals. Increasing use 
of frequency hopping and other LPI techniques. 
Radar Radar signatures will be discussed later. 
Table 16: Summary of threat signatures.  Legend: UV=ultraviolet. See also Appendix 1, Figure 
1-5, for a pictorial summary of EO factors influencing the combat scenario. 71 
 
 
 IR (W/sr) UV (W/sr) Duration (s) 
Boost 100 10-2 …1.5 
Sustain 10 3x10-3 1.5-7.1 
Post-burnout 0.1 0 …20 (self destruction) 
Table 17: Generic radiant intensities for MANPAD missiles according to Taylor [Tay98]. 
Wavelength band and look angle are not defined. 
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Figure 17: Spectrum of an aluminized composite propellant rocket booster (red) [Ree93] and for 
a tactical missiles (blue) [Dir93]. The former shows similarities with spectral data for composite 
propellants presented in Lawrence [Law93], the latter shows similarities with data for a gas 
turbine presented in Schleijpen [Sch98]. Measurement ranges are not defined. 
 
                                                 
71  The terms “near-IR” (NIR), “short-wave IR” (SWIR), “mid-wave IR” (MWIR) and “long-wave 
IR” (LWIR) have no generally agreed definitions. When needed the present work refers to NIR as the 
wavelength band 0.7-0.92 m; to SWIR as 0.92-2.5 m, to MWIR as 3-5 m, and to LWIR as 8-14 
m. The definition is based in part on convention and in part on attenuation bands. 
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3.4.5 Summary of phenomenology 
 
The phenomenology related to helicopter survivability and EWSP is a multifaceted 
dynamic problem set. A major issue is the clutter environment in which the 
helicopter operates; another is atmospheric attenuation and propagation effects. The 
natural environment changes in annual and diurnal cycles, it has geographical and 
biological variances, and it depends on weather and atmospheric conditions. Man 
made signatures—both intentional and unintentional—add to the clutter 
environment. The frequency spectrum of the environment covers orders of 
magnitude, temporal events range from nanoseconds to years, and power densities 
vary 15 to 20 orders of magnitude. It is into this background that the helicopter 
should blend using technical and tactical means; and it is in this environment that 
threats should be detected and identified, and countermeasures effected. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions on the operational setting 
 
Helicopters provide unique advantages to ground warfare, but operation at an 
elevated height makes them susceptible to attacks. Although modern battlefield 
helicopters are provided with numerous vulnerability reduction features, recent 
conflicts have shown they are still vulnerable to unsophisticated weapons. This 
vulnerability shifts the relative value of susceptibility reduction measures from 
EWSP to maneuverability, aircrew training, situational awareness and tactics. It also 
stresses the importance of battlefield intelligence, mission planning and replanning, 
and SEAD support. Susceptibility reduction through intelligence and planning is 
more cost-effective than EWSP, although the latter is more cost-effective than 
vulnerability reduction means. Contributing to the development is the increased 
threat of conflicts lesser than general war, where the opponent is armed only with 
light weapons. However, due to the proliferation of low-cost MANPAD systems 
these missiles can be encountered in any conflict, and that emphasizes the need for 
effective EO countermeasures as a minimum EWSP requirement. 
 
A missing dimension in the discussion on EWSP is military-technological advances 
requiring improved battlefield intelligence and calling for a multitude of sensors. An 
advanced EWSP suite capable of collecting intelligence data, and distributing it in a 
networked surrounding, can therefore serve the twin goals of providing protection 
and intelligence. The requirements on EWSP suites are accentuated by the 
increasingly difficult electromagnetic environment in which the suite has to operate. 
Not only is battlefield complexity rising (in comparison with Cold War scenarios), 
but due to requirements for military operations in a functioning civilian society the 
number of signals that the EWSP suite must be able to deal with without saturation 
or excessive false alarm rates is ever growing. The increasing demand for military 
operations on a global scale adds to the need for capability to operate in urban, 
tropical, desert, and arctic environments. 
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4 THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
 
 
4.1 Threat systems 
 
4.1.1 Overview 
 
Threats to helicopters in land operations are listed in STANAG 2999 as air defense 
weapons, tank main armament, anti-tank guided missiles, field artillery, tactical 
aircraft, armed helicopters, EW, and NBC warfare [Anon 92a pp.4/1-4/2]. The 
discussion in Chapter 3 shows that the list in STANAG 2999 is limited. Figure 18 
attempts to give a more comprehensive view on the threats. There is a bulk of patents 
outlining helicopter threats (e.g. [Bor89, Fog86, Gau99, Har99a, Roe82, Shi97]). 
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Figure 18: Helicopter threat types. NBC threats are included under the group “contamination”. 
Various ideas in non-lethal research, e.g. metal embrittlements and adhesives, have not been 
considered. Adapted from Ball [Bal85 p.72]. 
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4.1.2 Non-terminal threat systems 
 
Non-terminal threat systems do not constitute a threat to the helicopter per se, but 
they augment the effectiveness of terminal weapon systems by providing advanced 
warning; by identifying and tracking the target and distributing information to 
weapon platforms, and by lowering the helicopter’s efficiency through jamming. 
Table 18 summarizes the most important non-terminal threat systems. 
 
 
System task Systems/methods Features 
Search and 
acquisition 
Active uni- or multistate radar 
systems, passive SIGINT and 
ESM systems, IRST and other 
EO systems, acoustic 
helicopter detectors, human 
observation. Airborne systems 
increasingly used for enhanced 
coverage. 
Radar frequencies from VHF to X-band,72 
multitude of modulations and search schemes, 
transmit powers from sub-Watt to MWs. ESM and 
SIGINT systems covering HF through Ka-band, 
with sensitivities below -100 dBm. EO systems 
covering the visual to 12 m band. Aural detectors 
sensitive in the lower frequency range of 
helicopter rotor noise. 
Identification Cooperative through active 
IFF systems; non-cooperative 
by radar identification, EO 
systems and/or visual 
observation; or identification 
of emissions by ESM systems. 
Encrypted IFF interrogations and responds at 
designated frequencies. Non-cooperative systems 
through signal processing in search/acquisition 
sensors, supported by emitter libraries. Radar ID 
of turbine and rotor modulations or target glint 
pattern. EO ID through pattern recognition.  
Hybrid ID methods for enhanced effectiveness. 
Tracking  Software tracking functions of 
search radars and EO sensors. 
Combined search and track 
with ESA and track mode of 
airborne radars. Dedicated 
track (fire control) by 
mechanically steered antennas. 
Triangulation by SIGINT or 
ESM for rough track. Track by 
human observation. 
Track function in traditional search radar as a 
display feature; in EO sensors tracking is by signal 
processing and pattern recognition or human 
assisted. ESA radars can switch between search 
and track and have no fixed spatial scheme; 
present fighter aircraft radars mechanically lock 
their antenna for tracking, as does dedicated fire 
control radars.73 Monopulse tracking dominates 
modern radars. Triangulation with cooperating or 
airborne systems. 
C3 Mobile ground/air/space 
communication systems; wires 
used for short distances and 
trunk traffic, plus mobile and 
fixed links. Computer assisted, 
manned command centers for 
processing and information 
distribution. 
Radio communication from HF to microwaves, 
with multitude of modulation types. The simplest 
wire bound systems use pair cables, trunk traffic 
increasingly over optical fibers. Human actions 
and decisions are needed for a functioning C3 
system. C3 solutions increasingly networked with 
flexible switching between channels and nodes. 
EW Electronic countermeasures 
against helicopter radar and 
communication systems. 
Saturation and/or deceptive jamming to degrade 
helicopter’s effectiveness as a combat asset.  
Table 18: Summary of most important non-terminal threats to helicopters (cf. Fig. 18). Legend: 
ESM=electronic support measure, ESA=electronically scanned array, ID=identification, 
IFF=identification friend or foe, IRST=infrared search and track. 
 
Evaluating the impact of non-lethal threat systems calls for major considerations as 
to their spatial and temporal coverage—particularly against low-flying helicopters—
                                                 
72  The present work exclusively uses frequency letter designations according to IEEE StdTM-2002.  
73  Scan rates for mechanical tracking radars are hundreds of rpm, in one case as high as 2400 rpm 
[How90a p.18/8] 
 69
and delays in collecting, processing, and distributing the information; as well as 
accuracy of distributed target information. Rules of engagement (ROE) cannot 
tolerate fire to be opened unless the target has been positively identified as the 
enemy, if both antagonists have operational aircraft.74 See Figure 29 for a more 
detailed example of timelines. 
 
4.1.3 Terminal threats: static systems 
 
Any solid static object is a lethal threat to helicopters: smokestacks, hills, 
communication link antennas, bridge pylons, power lines, buildings, broadcast 
antennas, etc. The most noticeable threat to helicopters from static tactical weapon 
systems is that of helicopter mines. A basic precaution for the helicopter is to plan 
the flight path using relevant battlefield intelligence with attention to terrain features 
[Til89]. However, the cost of dedicated helicopter mines—e.g. the American Wide 
Area Munition and its Russian counterpart—is high, 75  and they have remained 
developmental projects. [Ban94, Dit94, Rei92, Sar99, Wal00] 
 
4.1.4 Terminal threats: mobile systems 
Small arms fire and RPGs 
The threat from small arms fire and RPGs has been pointed out in Section 3.2.1. The 
RPG showed its potential already in Vietnam, especially during assault landings 
when helicopters were hovering or on the ground. In 380 incidents involving RPGs 
up to 1971, a total of 128 helicopters were lost [Dun88 p.53]. A skilled RPG gunner 
is able to hit a moving target from 300 m with an RPG [Dun03]. The Mudjahedeen 
guerilla in Afghanistan learned to replace the impact fuze of RPGs with a timed fuze, 
eliminating the need for a direct hit. They also learned to aim at the tail rotor—the 
most vulnerable area and least dangerous to the gunner. These skills have been 
transferred to other non-state groups, and can therefore be expected in any scenario. 
[Bow99, p.167] 
Artillery and MBTs 
Field artillery units are equipped with guns, heavy mortars, rocket launchers, and 
even tactical missiles. Due to reaction times of up to five minutes [Cal91 p.22] field 
artillery is less of a threat to helicopters in flight, but can be a threat to attack 
helicopters in battle positions and transport helicopters in the landing zone [Gun98 
p.192]. Artillery location radars are designed to detect shells rising from behind the 
tree-tops, and can therefore detect helicopters. However, if this information is to be 
utilized effectively the artillery C3 system must be networked with that of air defense 
units. 
 
The Ansbach trials in 1972 showed half of the helicopter attrition to be due to tank 
main guns [Har97]. More recent simulator studies also indicate the main gun of an 
                                                 
74  The shooting down of two US utility helicopters over Iraq in 1994 by friendly fire, and the shooting 
down of friendly aircraft in the 2003 Iraq War are two reminders of the risk of fratricide even in the 
presence of strict ROE. 
75  The Russian helicopter mine may become widely used if the estimated unit price between $4000 
and $6000 [Sar99] materializes. 
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MBT to be the prominent killer of helicopters [Pen98]. The heavy armor, mobility, 
excellent fire control and a turret servo system that allows fire on the move with the 
main gun [Pen97a] makes the MBT a serious opponent even to attack helicopters. 
The response time of a tank is short—just over four seconds to slew the turret 180o 
and fire the gun—and the muzzle velocity can be 1700 m/s or more [Hew95, Geu95]. 
A weakness is that the tank provides the crew poor panoramic view of the 
surrounding; the gunner’s FOV is typically 6-8º [Hew95]). MBTs have therefore 
been upgraded with IR panoramic commander’s sight [Biv96]. Other improvements 
are gun-launched missiles [Bon93] 76  and automatic tracking by the IR imaging 
system of the fire control system (FCS) [Pen97a]. 
Anti-aircraft guns and SPAAGs 
Although there is a trend to exchange AA guns for missiles, the AA gun is a potent 
threat to helicopters. The value of AA guns in a modern scenario was first 
demonstrated in the Yom Kippur war in 1973. The war showed that in order to be 
effective helicopters needed to avoid or neutralize enemy air defenses, in particular 
the ZSU-23-4 Shilka [All93 p.20]. AA guns have better multi-target capability than 
missiles and are effective when defending point targets against approaching aircraft 
at close range. Guns need a good FCS and a very high rate of fire to be effective. 
Therefore, while the gun is cheap the fire control system can be very costly [Lee98 
pp.205-206]. Self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) systems have evolved out of 
the need to provide air protection to armored units. SPAAG vehicles often carry both 
search and track radars, and the gun is gyro stabilized for firing on the move. The 
latest development is to add short-range air-defense missiles to SPAAG systems, 
which increases the range and the number of targets that can be engaged. [Po97]  
Details on some AA guns and SPAAG systems are given in Tables 19 and 20 
respectively. 
 
 
 ZSU-23-2 S-60 Bofors L/70 Skyshield 35 AHEAD 
Country of origin Russia  Russia Sweden Switzerland 
Caliber 2x23 mm 57 mm 40 mm 35 mm 
Muzzle velocity 970 m/s 1000 m/s 1000+ m/s -- 
FCS Optical Radar/Optical Radar/Optical Remote only 
Rate of fire (/barrel) 1000 rds/min 105-120 rds/min 260 rds/min 1000 rds/min 
Elevation/Depression +90°/-10° +87°/-2° +90°/-4° -- 
Traverse 360° 360° 360° -- 
Drive type Manual Servo/Manual Electrohydraulic Electrical 
Effective range 2000+ mv 4000-6000 mv 3000-4000 m --77 
Ammunition Various F/T, AP/T Numerous AHEAD 
Comment Used in over 60 
countries 
Produced from 
1950 to 1957 
Entered service 
in 1951 
Ready for 
production 
Table 19: Specifications for some AA gun systems [Cul01]. Legend: AP/T=Armor Piercing—
Timed, F/T=Fragmented—Timed, mv=meter vertical. AHEAD is a commercial acronym. 
                                                 
76  The gun-launched missile is controversial since the tank interior is a crammed environment, and 
there must be a good motive for adding another type of ammunition. Another reason is the difficulty 
in seeing the target and having a sensor that will alert the crew to the presence of a helicopter. [Lak01] 
77  Skyshield is claimed to track 20 aircraft with its X-band search/track radar and laser range finder, 
engage helicopters at 4 km, air-to-ground missiles at 2 km, and precision-guided bombs at 2 km 
[Wal00]. 
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 Gepard ZSU-23-4 2S6M Tunguska LvKv-90 
Country of origin International Russia Russia Sweden 
Gun caliber 2x35 mm 4x23 mm 2x30 mm 40 mm 
Missiles -- No 9M311 (SA-19) No 
Sensors S/T-rdr, EO, 
LRF 
Ku-band S/T-rdr, 
EO 
S/T-rdr, EO, 
Optical 
T-rdr, EO, 
Optical, LRF 
Gun/missile range 3000 m 2500 m 4000/8000 m -- 
Max. missile speed -- N/A 900 m/s -- 
IFF Yes -- Yes (1RL138) -- 
Max. road speed 65 km/h 50 km/h 65 km/h 70 km/s 
Fording -- 1.07 m 0.8 m -- 
Comment Missile upgrade 
developed 
Modernization 
packages are 
offered78 
Replaces the 
ZSU-23-4, SA-9 
and SA-13 
CV-90 chassis 
Table 20: Specifications for some SPAAG systems [Cul01, Ger01, Put04]. The Tunguska 9M311 
missile is an LBR (laser beam rider); its range has also been given as 10-15 km [Tan00]. Legend: 
LRF=laser range finder, S/T-rdr=search/track radar, T-rdr=tracking radar.  
 
Missiles 
A missile can catch up with a helicopter, if the missile can operate at low altitudes. 
Up to 500,000 MANPAD missiles have been produced worldwide and 25-30 non-
state groups are estimated to possess MANPAD missiles [Bol03, Hun01]. They can 
therefore be encountered in almost any scenario and are the single most important 
missile threat to helicopters. Tables 21 and 22 give specifications for some common 
IR guided MANPAD missiles; LBR and CLOS missiles will be discussed later.  
 
 
 Mistral 1 Strela-2M Igla FIM-92B/C 
Country of origin Europe Russia Russia USA 
Min/Max slant range 300/6,000 m 800/4,200 m 500/5,200 m 200/4,800 m 
Min/Max eff. altitude 5/3,000 m >15/2,300 m 10/3,500 m >0/3,800 m 
Seeker 2-4/3.5-5 µm 1.7-2.8 µm 
uncooled PbS 
1.5-2.5/3-5 µm 
FM tracking 
0.3-0.4/3.5-5 µm, 
Rosette 
Preparation time -- 6 s 6 s -- 
Speed M2.5 max 430 m/s max M2+ M2.2 
Burn-out/Self-
destruct 
2.5 s/14 s 2 s/14-17 s -- -- 
Warhead 1 kg HE 1.17 kg HE 1.27 kg HE 1 kg HE 
Fuze Impact & laser 
proximity 
Impact Impact/delay Time delay 
impact 
Comment ECCM through 
push-up/-down 
9K32M 
(SA-7B) 
9K38 (SA-18), 
FM seeker 
Produced also in 
Europe 
Table 21: Specifications for some IR–guided MANPAD. The data is mainly from [Cul01], with 
additions from [Fis02b, Put04, Zal98]. There are some inconsistencies among the sources: Jane’s 
Land-Based Air Defence 2001-2002 [Cul01] refers to the Igla as the Igla-2; it is also claimed 
[Fis02b] that Igla has a dual IR/UV seeker aimed at defeating the American AN/ALQ-144 
omnidirectional IR jammer. Similarly Stinger missiles are reported to have engaged at more 
than 4,572 m (15,000 ft) altitude [Kuh03].  Legend: FM=frequency modulation. 
                                                 
78  For instance, the Polish ZSU-23-4MP Biala upgrade has only passive EO sensors. Four Grom fire-
and-forget SAM missiles (Polish-made versions of Igla-1 and Igla [Anon04a]) are added to extend the 
fire range up to 5,200 m and 3,000 m altitude [Fos02]. 
 72
Missile 
system 
Spectral 
wavelength 
Boost 
phase 
Sustain 
phase 
Downrange 
burnout Rangemax Speedmax Speedave
Type West 1 IR/UV 2 s 4 s 3 km 7 km 2.3 M 1.5 M 
Type West 2 IR 2.2 s -- 1 km 6.5 km 2.6 M 1.3 M 
SA-7 IR 2.2 s 6.1 s 3.5 km 4 km 1.5 M 1.2 M 
SA-8 RF -- 14 s 7 km 12 km 2 M 1.8 M 
SA-13 IR -- 4.5 s 3 km 10 km 2.4 M 1.5 M 
SA-16 IR -- 8 s 3.5 km 5 km 1.7 M 1.2 M 
Table 22: Specifications for some common SAM missiles according to Schwaetzer [Sch01]. The 
most likely candidate for “Type West 1” is the FIM-92 Stinger, and for “Type West 2” the 
Mistral. The SA-13 Gopher (9K35 Strela 10) is a vehicle-mounted, modernized SA-7 [Put04].79 
The maximum ranges in Schwaetzer are higher than those stated in other sources.80  
 
MANPAD missiles have also been installed on helicopters as short-range air-to-air 
missiles and are therefore relevant in the helicopter-on-helicopter scenario.  
 
Medium and long-range surface to air missiles are a threat if the helicopter has to fly 
at elevated height, or if terrain masking is scarce. These missiles introduce the 
addition of radar and radio guidance. Table 23 gives specifications for some of these 
missiles, Figure 19 provides flight profiles for one missile type. 
 
 
 ADATS Crotale NG S-300V Patriot 
Country of origin Canada France Russia USA 
Max effective range 10,000 m 11,000 m 75,000 m with 
9M83 missiles 
70,000 m 
Min/Max eff. altitude 0/7,000 m --/6,000 m 250/25,000 m 60/>24,000 m 
Sensors X-band PD rdr, 
8-12 µm FLIR 
0.7-0.9 µm TV 
1.064 µm LRF 
2.3-2.4 GHz PD 
S-rdr, 16.0-16.4 
GHz monopulse 
PD T-rdr 
9S15V early 
warning rdr, 
9S19M2 sector 
scanning rdr 
C-band ESA 
S/T-rdr and 
up/down links 
Guidance LBR: CW CO2 Radio command Inertial with S/A 
terminal homing 
S/A TVM 
Max. missile speed 1,027 m/s -- 1,700 m/s 1,700 m/s 
Max maneuver -- 35 g -- 20-30 g 
Burn-out/Self-
destruct 
2.5 s/14 s -- -- 11.5 s/-- 
Warhead 12 kg SC 13 kg HEF 150 kg HEF 91 kg HEB/F 
Fuze Impact & laser 
proximity 
Impact & 
proximity 
Proximity Ka-band 
proximity 
Comment In service  SA-12a 
Gladiator 
PAC-1 
Table 23: Specifications for some medium- and long range surface to air missile systems [Cul01, 
Lyn04, Put04]. Legend: bl=blast, CW=continuous wave, HEF=high-explosive fragmentation, 
HEB/F=high-explosive blast/fragmentation, S/A=semi-active, SC=shaped-charge, TVM=track 
via missile. 
                                                 
79  Some reported kill probabilities (Pk) for MANPAD missiles are: One hit in three on helicopters for 
the Strela-2 in Vietnam [Pri00 p.179]; 10% for the FIM-92 Stinger in use by the Mujahedin against 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan [All93 p.109]; and 1.3% overall for the Strela-2M [Zal98]. 
Manufacturers claim 93% success for the Mistral and 96% for the Starstreak LBR [Fos01a], but these 
claims have not been substantiated under battlefield conditions. 
80  The performance values given for the Russian missiles only roughly match those given in Zaloga 
[Zal89] for the same missile type. There is obviously a mix of maximum and effective ranges for 
Western missiles. 
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Figure 19: Flight profiles of the South-African SAHV-IR missile. The missile’s early history is 
linked to the French Crotale concept. Missing information on the right are assumed target speed 
and maneuverability. Adapted from Fetterly [Fet96]. 
 
 
Anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) are mostly slow (Figure 20) and the long time 
between launch and impact gives the helicopter a chance to seek cover [Fis04b]. The 
slow speed, however, is related to low IR/UV signatures and the helicopter may not 
get ample warning before impact. Guidance is mainly man-in-the-loop CLOS 
through an EO sight and wire command link, but radio guidance and LBR also exist; 
as do semi-active laser designation and lock-after-launch millimeter wave (MMW) 
seekers [Min01, Pen99a, Put04]. The latest development is man-in-the-loop with an 
IR or visual band imaging seeker in the missile and bidirectional fiber-optic 
image/command transfer. The concept allows both lock before launch and lock after 
launch. [Hew96, Koc92, Lau90, Lee98 p.118-123, Put04] An autonomous top-attack 
anti-helicopter missile that resembles an ATGW is proposed in [Har99a]. Top-attack 
capability puts helicopter threats beyond the traditional !45o in elevation into the full 
upper hemisphere. In addition, for ATGWs the emphasis is on the 8-12 µm IR band, 
against the 1-5 µm band for MANPAD missiles. 
 
 
Trigat specifications:
Range: 500-5,000 m
Speed: 290 m/s
Endgame: top attack
Warhead: tandem shaped charge
Propulsion: solid propellant
Trigat guidance:
Target acquisition system: dual band visible through
near IR, combined with approx 10 m band
Seeker: imaging IR seeker operating around 10 m
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Figure 20: Profile for the developmental European Trigat-LR ATGW. 81  A helicopter has 
difficulties in outmaneuvering the missile inside its effective range envelope. The dashed graph 
part is estimated. Inserted specifications are based on [Atk02 pp.477-478]. 
                                                 
81  The figure is adapted from an undated sales-promotion brochure for the Tiger attack helicopter, 
Tiger-HCP: Focus on…. The brochure was handed out at the Eurosatory 2000 exhibition. 
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Aircraft rockets and guns 
Fixed-wing aircraft are not a major threat to helicopters,82 but the helicopter-on-
helicopter threat need be considered. Apart from air-to-air missiles helicopters are 
armed with rockets and guns. Rockets are inaccurate air-to-ground fire suppression 
weapons that constitute a threat only to helicopters on the ground. Thus the gun 
would be the weapon for dogfights. However, due to problems of disengagement and 
other reasons most authors do not foresee true dogfights between helicopters, but 
rather shoot-and-scoot ambush situations [Bea92, Eve83b, Gun98 p.203, Sef99]. The 
duel scenarios showed in Figure 21 are likely only between helicopters lacking 
turreted guns. 
 
 
 
Figure 21: A dogfight of the fixed-wing type is most unlikely between attack helicopters, but 
could possibly occur if the helicopters lack turreted guns, as is the case with the basic A-129 
Mangusta and Ka-50 (Hokum). Both would aim at maneuvering into a firing position behind the 
opponent. Adapted from [Eve83b, Fat93, Gun98 p.203]. 
 
Directed energy weapons 
Directed energy threats will emerge in the form of laser and high-power microwave 
(HPM) weapons. An indication of this development is the terminated German 
MELAS project from the 1980s, which aimed at destroying the canopy of attack 
helicopters and can be classified as a non-lethal weapon (Figure 22). Another 
terminated German concept from the same time is an HPM anti-aircraft vehicle, 
which would have generated a strong microwave pulse by a gun-like magnet flux 
compressor inside the vehicle [Pro97]. Interest in these technologies is growing after 
the failed MANPAD missile attack on an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya in 
November 2002, leading to an increased awareness of the need to protect commercial 
aviation from attacks, and also due to the US focus on “Homeland Security” [Bol03, 
Riv04]. 
                                                 
82   The first simulated dogfights between a fighter aircraft and a helicopter were conducted in 
Germany in 1942 [Gun98 p.51]. In the 1967 Six Day War MANPAD missiles had not yet been 
introduced and Egyptian fighter aircraft harassed Israeli helicopters. Israeli air superiority allowed the 
threat to be neutralized. The Israelis also had devised helicopter flight tactics matched to the Soviet 
aircraft used by Egyptian forces, and to the Egyptian surface-to-air defense in general. [Mar72]  
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Figure 22: Time-range dependence for destroying the canopy of the Mi-24 with the 
experimental German MELAS laser. Adapted from [Sep97a] and Deutsche Aerospace brochure 
MELAS, Mittelenergielaser-Antisensor gegen Luft- und Bodenziele. 
 
4.1.5 Terminal threats: propagators and fuzes 
In addition to the propagators mentioned so far—directly or indirectly—smart 
ammunition and submunitions, and fuel air explosives (FAE), are of interest. Smart 
artillery ammunition, with independent IR or combined IR/MMW seekers, is aimed 
at armored vehicles. A helicopter could trigger the fuze, but the search footprint of 
submunition is quite small and a hit on a helicopter in flight is therefore a chance 
event. The same logic holds for the autonomous, so-called brilliant weapons and 
submunitions; some of which include acoustic sensors. These weapons, however, add 
to the set of helicopter threats in the upper hemisphere. FAE warheads are available 
e.g. on the Russian helicopter-fired 9K114M-1/2 Ataka (AT-9) ATGW [Put04]. 
Since aircraft structures are weak compared with ground vehicles the pressure wave 
caused by an FAE warhead in the vicinity of a helicopter can cause fatal damages. 
 
Electronic fuzes are divided between proximity and time fuzes. A main difference is 
that time fuzes work on preset parameters, whereas proximity fuzes find their trig 
data by interrogating the environment. Traditionally the interrogation has been made 
on the VHF band, but development has brought higher frequencies and today laser 
fuzes are common in missiles. Both Doppler and FMCW (frequency modulated 
continuous wave) solutions are used in RF fuzes. Under development are fuzes that 
provide some course correction. A fuze that directs the warhead blast in the direction 
of the target is reported at least for the AIM-120 AMRAAM. [Anon01b,c, Ilr80, 
Men91, Pen97b, Pen01, Sau90 p.14/20,14/31-14/34] 
 
4.1.6 Threat system development trends 
C3 and sensor technology develop rapidly due to advances in electronics. Networked 
solutions using ground, air, and space based communications assets increase in 
number, and enemy response times decrease (cf. Figure 48). The increasing 
dependence on computerized C3 systems makes computer networks attractive targets 
for hard and soft-kill attacks, which partly offsets the gains of technological progress. 
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Weapons technology relies ever more on electronics to improve precision and speed 
of execution. The need for electronic countermeasures to offset these improvements 
therefore rises. Simultaneously improvements in explosives and ammunition 
technology decrease the quantity of munitions needed for target destruction. DEW 
weapons gradually evolve, but kinetic energy will remain the premier agent for 
weapons effect. Traditional ballistic weapons will remain a threat also on the future 
battlefield due to their simplicity and insensitivity to countermeasures. 
 
Weapons and other combat assets will be increasingly mobile, and airborne 
platforms will play a greater role as carriers of weapons, reconnaissance, and C3 
assets. The number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will increase substantially. 
The development of unmanned ground vehicles is slow due to problems with 
artificial intelligence in guaranteeing safe and reliable operation of such vehicles. 
 
4.1.7 Conclusions and implications for EWSP 
 
The chain of threat systems for a helicopter, together with EWSP and other means 
(support assets) for attacking the threats are shown in Figure 23.  
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Figure 23: Summary of Section 4.1, the chain of threat systems of battlefield helicopters and 
assets for countering the threats. A number of threat systems cannot be attacked by EWSP, but 
need hard- and soft-kill support assets. Due to the growing use of sophisticated weapons the 
importance of EW assets increases. An attack on weapon launchers and fuzes by EWSP means 
is an unlikely theoretical possibility. Legend: COMJAM=communications jamming.  
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The possibility of attacking the weapon launcher by EWSP means, as indicated by 
the dashed box in Figure 23, is primarily a future alternative for countering LBR 
missiles. Deception of proximity fuzes is practiced against artillery ammunition, but 
to aircraft EWSP the narrow endgame engagement geometry has so far precluded 
this technique. In conclusion it can be stated that the EWSP suite has potential to 
counter only a lesser part of threat systems—a fact that is obvious already from 
Figures 12 and 13—but the interaction of various countermeasures and their relative 
cost-benefit merits must be kept in mind. 
 
 
4.2 Threat technology 
 
4.2.1 Overview 
 
Section 4.1 and Figure 23 indicate threat technologies of primary importance to 
EWSP and therefore deserve a more detailed analysis. Figure 24 summarizes these 
technologies. In order to avoid repetition the following discussion is divided into 
technology groups, as marked by the templates in Figure 24. Guidance systems are 
discussed in connection with sensors. 
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Figure 24: Summary of threat technologies of importance to EWSP of battlefield helicopters. 
Visual tracking will not be considered, since countermeasures to visual observation may violate 
the UN Protocol prohibiting Blinding Laser Weapons [Anon95a]; acoustic sensors have no 
effective EWSP countermeasures. 
 
4.2.2 EO sensors 
IR sensor and seeker technology 
The group of imaging technology consists of low-light television (LLTV) cameras, 
image intensifiers, and infrared cameras of various types. LLTV cameras are mostly 
used in naval applications and image intensifiers in short-range systems. IR 
technology is therefore of main interest to the present study. A review of IR detector 
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alternatives is presented in Appendix 1, Table 1-1. The advantages of IR sensors are 
passive operation and high resolution. A weakness of IR sensors is that no range 
information is provided; in FCS applications EO imagers need support by laser range 
finders or other range sensors. Another weakness is the strong dependence on 
atmospheric conditions. When long-range all weather performance is required, RF 
sensors will have to be used. Figure 25 presents a view on requirements on IR 
systems in various applications. Appendix 1, Figure 1-1, indicates the wavelength 
band of common IR sensors. Table 24 reviews the evolution of IR missile seekers. 
Additional information on seekers is given in Appendix 1, Figures 1-6 to1-11. 
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Figure 25: Infrared system technology requirements for four generic military application areas. 
Adapted from Balcerak [Bal95]. The requirements for resolution and sensitivity go hand in 
hand. 
 
 
Seeker type Typical performance features Represented by 
Spin-scan 
(Gen I) 
1960s 
AM output signal representative of input FOV. No particular 
CCM features. Locks to hottest source in FOV, therefore  
deceived by flares. Uncooled PbS or PtSi detectors lock only 
on hot engine tailpipe; missile in effect a retribution weapon. 
FIM-43 Redeye, 
HN-5, Strela-
2/2M (SA-7). 
Con-scan 
(Gen II) 
1970s 
FM output signal representative of input FOV. Locks to 
centroid of heat sources in FOV. Cooled detectors allow head-
on attack and improved flare rejection.  
FIM-92A Stinger, 
FN-6, Strela-3, 
Igla-1 (SA-16).  
Rosette scan 
(Gen III) 
1980/90s 
Semi-imaging with small IFOV that intermittently scans over 
target. Location of target can be anticipated on a rosette petal, 
and information used to reject decoys. Multicolor capability 
gives improved flare rejection. Digital signal processing. 
Anza Mk II, FIM-
92B-E, Igla (SA-
18), Mistral 
FPA  
(Gen IV) 
Present 
FPAs are being introduced in missiles three decades after the 
first IR FPAs became available. Target tracking by a great 
number of discriminants; seeker modified via software. 
Kin-SAM (Type 
91), Stinger RPM 
Block II 
Multi-color 
FPA 
Under development, expected in operation around 2010. 
Improved clutter/decoy rejection through spectral filtering. 
-- 
Table 24: Approximate evolution of IR missile seekers [Bol03, Gla99, Gro03, Put01a]. Legend: 
AM=amplitude modulation, CCM=counter-countermeasure, Con-scan=conical scanning, 
IFOV=instantaneous field-of-view, Spin-scan=spinning reticle. 
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Figure 26 shows the typical two-color missile seeker optical layout with Cassegrain 
mirror arrangement. The figure is of interest for the later discussion on 
countermeasures. 
 
 
The dome:
Aerodynamic heating of the
dome is a major source of noise
in IR seekers, particularly at sea
level. At Mach 3 the dome
temperature rises above 500 oC.
Improvements are the
aerodynamic spike on the Iglas
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Figure 26: Typical two-color seeker optical layout [Gla99] and requirements on IR missile 
domes. Motivations for longer wavelength detectors (3.2-4.8 µm or more) are to achieve lower 
dome emission and to escape solar radiation reflected from sunlit clouds [Har99b p.74, Hud69 
p.238].83 According to Doo et al. [Doo02] the most favorable UV band in a combined UV/IR 
seeker is 0.37-0.43 µm; i.e., on the border between the visual and UV regions. 
 
 
Table 25 summarizes typical flare countermeasure techniques, but the information 
cannot be related to particular missile types since unclassified sources disclose only 
the most basic ECCMs (electronic counter-countermeasures) of specific missile 
types. Even the seeker type may not be revealed. For instance, information on the 
Igla (SA-18 Grouse) claims it to have both an FM (con-scan) and rosette scanned 
seeker (cf. inconsistency in Tables 21 and 24).  
 
 
Aim Method 
Kinematic and spatial recognition of flare separation rate and position. 
Effective for high separation rate between flare and aircraft. 
Spectral recognition, including dual band recognition. 
Flare detection and 
identification 
Flare ignition time (rise time) recognition. 
Detector shutting until flare has passed. Effective if only a single flare is 
ejected and the target is sufficiently distant. 
Seeker push-forward or push-up. Effective if the flare is not ejected in front 
of, alternatively above, the aircraft. 
Blanking of the lower-rear FOV quadrant. Effective if the flare drops below-
behind the aircraft. 
Rejection of hot objects with multi-color discrimination. Effective if multi-
color discrimination is possible and object separation is sufficient. 
Flare rejection 
Rejection of spatially irrelevant objects. Effective if seeker is capable of 
image processing. 
Table 25: Missile seeker flare ECCM methods, grouped into flare detection/identification and 
flare rejection actions. [Dey94, Gla99, Phe98a, Phe98b, Sch99 p.449, Tay98, Vol95]. 
                                                 
83  Solutions for rosette scanned seekers can be found e.g. in Andersson [And03], Knight [Kni01], and 
Voigt and Gordon [Voi00]. 
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Laser technology and guidance 
Lasers are part of helicopter threat systems in the form of laser range finders, semi-
active target designators, guidance beams for LBR missiles, and laser fuzes. Table 26 
gives an overview of typical LRF and designator lasers; these can be categorized as 
medium-energy, low PRF (pulse repetition frequency) lasers. LBR lasers are low-
energy, high PRF (up to some 10 kHz) devices.  
 
 
PLATFORM 
Portable Land vehicle Airborne Requirement 
Artillery 
observation 
Tank/AFV 
FCS 
Air defense 
(AAA/Missile) 
Helico missile 
guidance 
Fixed wing 
targeting 
Maximum range 4-10 km 4-10 km 10-20 km 4-10 km 10-20 km 
Pulse energy 5-40 mJ 5-40 mJ 25-125 mJ 5-40 mJ 25-150 mJ 
Beam divergence 1-2 mrad 0.4-1 mrad 0.5-2.5 mrad 0.4-1 mrad 0.1-0.5 
mrad 
Pulse rate Single Shot 0.1-8 Hz 6-20 Hz 4 Hz 5-20 Hz 
Duty factor > 10 s 
interpulse 
Burst 10-100 
pulses 
100% 25-100% 100% 
Range accuracy ! 10 m !5-10 m !2.5-5 m !5-10 m !1-10 m 
Atmospheric 
penetration 
Compatible 
with DVO 
Compatible 
with DVO, 
TV, FLIR 
Clear to hazy 
weather 
Clear to hazy 
weather 
Clear to 
hazy 
weather 
Table 26: Typical parameters of LRFs and designators [Byr93 p.83, Hew95]. Legend: 
DVO=direct viewing optics, FLIR=forward looking infrared, Helico=helicopter. 
 
 
Figure 27 shows important wavelengths used by military systems. Of the numerous 
wavelengths possible for different lasers, only a few are used in practice. For 
instance, CO2 lasers usually operate at 10.6 µm but CO2 lasing has been 
demonstrated at least for the 8.9-12.4 µm band [Fre95 p.65]. Nd:YAG laser at 1.064 
µm are the backbone of military lasers, but requirements on eye safety see increased 
use of Raman-shifted Nd:YAG or Erbium:glass lasers at 1.54 µm.  
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Figure 27: Graphical presentation of the most frequently mentioned military laser wavelengths. 
The range 0.9-1.8 µm for beamriders covers semiconductor lasers in optical communication. 
[Fre95 p.65, Web99] Holmium YAG lasers at 2.06 µm have are also a possibility [Bro98 p.216]. 
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The FOV of LBR missile receivers is directed to the rear, towards the laser beam 
source at the launcher. The receivers are therefore generally assumed immune to 
jamming. In addition, in order to keep the missile within the beam just after launch 
the beam has to be broadened, which lowers the beam power density at the target and 
delays detection by the target’s sensors.84 
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Figure 28: LBR guidance solution proposed in Higgins et al. [Hig84]. The figure gives an 
indication of the frame rate needed for accurate guidance, considering speed and 
maneuverability of missile and target. Other proposed LBR solutions are given in e.g. [Die87a, 
Die87b, Jam00, Mil74, Pit94, Sog80, Ton84, Ton95].85 
 
4.2.3 RF sensors 
 
Passive ESM and SIGINT assets are an indirect threat to helicopters and have to be 
dealt with by LPI techniques, emission control and other procedural means. Radio 
receiver technology will not be covered in more detail, but a review of EW receivers 
is provided in Appendix 1, Table 1-2(a-d). It can be noted, however, that South-
Africa shot down six helicopters in the Angola War by interceptions based purely on 
ESM information [Rad02]. 
 
It has been claimed that “(…) every ECM system should be designed to counter the 
threat to the specific craft to be protected, not every radar in the general area” 
[Wie91 p.122]. According to this, a central question to helicopter EWSP is which 
radars or radar types are important enough to be of concern. The success of the 2K12 
Kub/Kvadrant (SA-6 Gainful) and the ZSU-23-4 in the 1973 Yom Kippur War led 
Western militaries for a long time to focus on the emitters of those systems.86 Earlier 
                                                 
84  According to Pengelley the guidance beam energy level of the UK-built Starstreak LBR system is 
some 60 dB lower than that of an Nd:YAG laser range finder [Pen99b]. Since the peak power density 
of a Nd:YAG laser range finder is approximately 106…108 W/m2 at normal detection ranges 
(atmospheric attenuation not considered), detection of Starstreak’s guidance beam should require 
sensitivities better than 10-6 W/cm2 if Pengelley’s claims are correct. 
85  It is of interest to note that the Starstreak is reported to be guided by two laser beams, one of which 
is scanned horizontally and the other vertically to create a grid [Cul99 p.29, Pen99b]. 
86  The mobile Straight Flush search radar of the SA-6 reportedly operates in the C-band (5-6 GHz), 
and its CW (continuous wave) tracking radar and illuminator in the low X-band (8-9 GHz) [Lyn04 
p.270, Put04]. The Gun Dish radar associated with the ZSU-23-4 reportedly operates in the Ku-band 
(14.6-15.6 GHz) [Lyn04 p.269] 
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the attention had been on the S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)—and its 700-800 MHz 
guidance uplink [Zal89 p.76] still influences EW specifications. 87  The previous 
discussion is contradicted by views on generic threats (cf. Section 1.4.3), according 
to which a modern EWSP suite cannot intrinsically be tied to one specific scenario. 
Also, the discussion in Section 3.3.3 on mission survivability opens a broad spectrum 
of threats that need be considered. Table 27 gives a general review of radar 
parameters of importance to helicopter EWSP.  
 
 
Parameter Importance Parameter range 
Carrier 
frequency 
Single most important parameter 
for radar identification. 
The 2-18 GHz band most important to EWSP. 
Tracking radars increasingly use Ka-band, and 
weapon seekers the W-band. Frequencies <2 GHz 
increasingly cluttered by civil emitters. X-band 
contains e.g. the bulk of civil navigation radars. 
PRI (PRF) PRI ranks second most important 
parameter for radar 
identification. 
PRF from <1 kHz (search radars) to 1 MHz (PD 
missile seekers). Fixed, staggered, or completely 
random (in MTI radars). 
Pulse width Third most important parameter 
for radar identification. Related 
to BW and PRI. 
Pulse lengths from <0.1 µs to >10 µs. Duty cycles 
from 0.1%, and up to 50% for ICW operation.88 
Risk for PW corruption by multipath propagation. 
Scan type Mechanical scan: Indicates 
threat’s intension and is a target 
for deception. ESA antennas 
complicate the situation. 
Circular or sector scan (0.2…2 Hz) for search 
radars. Intermittent for tracking radars in 
acquisition phase, and virtually constant when 
locked. Random looks by ESA radars. 
Power Determines power density at the 
receiver, which is a main issue to 
detection.  
Transmit powers from <1 W (FMCW) to the MW 
class (high-power pulsed search radars). EWSP 
receivers can see any power density depending on 
the range to the radar. 
Bandwidth 
(BW) 
Puts similar requirements on the 
EWSP receiver. 
Pulses shorter than 0.1 µs require > 10 MHz IBW. 
Frequency agility up to 10% of carrier frequency. 
(BW i 1/$) 
DBF Digital beamforming (DBF) 
allows beam nulls to be placed in 
the direction of a jammer. 
True DBF by ESA antenna, pseudo-DBF (SLB/ 
SLC) by added auxiliary antenna(s). Jamming 
suppression -20…-30 dB, with potential for more. 
Polarization Influences antenna losses and is 
needed as a jamming parameter. 
Any polarization must be expected. Antenna cross 
polarization (-25…<-40 dB of main polarization 
direction) is an avenue for jamming. 
Coherence Introduces requirements on 
jamming coherence. 
Depends on victim radar’s CPI and stability of its 
local oscillator. 
Coverage Determines whether a target will 
be detected or not. 
Detection requires that spatial and temporal search 
conditions are satisfied; frequency domain 
influences lobe properties and hence the space. 
Table 27: Radar parameter considerations of importance to helicopter EWSP and survivability 
[Bog90 p.75, 84; Far90 p.9/8; Mor96 p.17; Ner91 p.178; Sch90, Sch99; Sko80,87].89 Legend: 
CPI=coherent processing interval, IBW=instantaneous BW, ICW=intermittent CW, 
LFM=linear frequency modulation, MTI=moving target indication, PD=pulse Doppler, 
SLB=sidelobe blanking, SLC=sidelobe cancellation, $=pulse/code element length.  
                                                 
87   The family of S75 systems includes the Soviet/Russian type designations Dvina, Desna and 
Volkhov, but the US/NATO designation for all is SA-2 Guideline [Fis02a].  
88 Pulse compression ratios vary from <13 to 100-300 and more [Sko80 p.422]. Binary pseudorandom 
sequences are preferred, because they have desirable autocorrelation properties and are relatively easy 
to generate.  However, polyphase codes make the radar susceptible to Doppler-induced phase shifts. 
[Vac93 p.28, 38] 
89  Fighter aircraft radars have a multitude of modes for different applications. The AN/APG-73 radar 
on the F/A-18, for instance, is reported to have 14 operational modes [Bro98 p.297]. 
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Ground-based long-range search radars are generally not a threat to helicopters, and 
have not been considered in Table 27. Major radar ECCM techniques are methods 
for increasing parameter selectivity. Appendix 1, Table 1-3, reviews important radar 
selectivity methods and also points out LPI factors.90  
 
4.2.4 Threat timelines 
 
Threat timelines include reaction times, deployment times and development times. 
Reaction times are the time delays between target detection and effector impact on 
the target. Reaction delays are counted in seconds and are due to technical as well as 
human and organizational reasons (cf. [Bal98 p.113]). Deployment delays are 
primarily due to delays in logistics and take anything from minutes to months. 
Development time is the time between the decision to develop a threat (or threat 
system) until its operational readiness, and may run from months to years, even 
decades. The timelines are exemplified by Figure 29, where the MANPAD case 
exemplifies reaction times.91 Development timelines in Figure 29 underline a basic 
problem of sensors: Sensor systems live for a decade or two, while the gestation 
period for countermeasures can be very short particularly in time of war. [Rad78] 
Software configurability is increasingly important for threat systems and CMs alike. 
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Figure 29: Typical threat timelines. The MANPAD reaction time budget (bottom) is adapted 
from [Anon00a, Hew98, Kre97] and should be seen as an idealized case with the gunner having 
accurate advance informtaion on the incoming threat. 
                                                 
90  It is worth noting that spread-spectrum techniques are not equivalent to LPI techniques. LPI 
designers must consider ELINT capability. For instance, chirp modulation may be classified as a 
spread-spectrum technique but an ELINT processor only need an approximation to the phase slope to 
recapture the chirp processing gain. [Car88] 
91  Another example of system reaction time is reported for the Russian ZSU-23-4 without its radar 
operational: The shortest time recorded is 32 seconds to open fire after the appearance of a helicopter, 
with the average time being around two minutes [Cob84, Mul80]. 
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4.2.5 Threat technology development trends 
 
Recent years have seen rapid progress in IR technology, and cooled staring array 
detectors with a minimum resolvable temperature difference (MRTD) of 10 mK will 
abound. QWIP technology (quantum well infrared photodetectors) is a likely 
candidate for multispectral FPAs. However, the time lag between an FPA matrix 
being commercially available and its incorporation into missile seekers has been over 
a decade. Based on this 2048x2048 FPA matrixes can be expected in missiles within 
a decade, and 4096x4096 matrixes around the year 2020. [Gla99] Suggested 
solutions for home-on-jam (HOJ) capability in IR guided missiles promises a 
countermeasure to DIRCMs (directed infrared countermeasures) [Lan98, Put01a]. 
Dome structures will improve and dome-induced noise be reduced—in part due to 
use of longer wavelength seekers. Alternatives to the bulky and costly 
electromechanical gimbals are actively sought [Hår99]; one candidate is FOV-
multiplexer technology [Tho98]. FPA seekers are software reconfigurable and will 
therefore shorten the race time between threats and countermeasures. 
 
LBR missiles do not challenge the quantity of fire-and-forget IR missiles in the 
future, but their immunity to countermeasures and relative stealth will remain a 
problem to EWSP. Fiber-optic guidance will eventually replace wire-guided ATGWs 
and they will—as the first systems today do—also have fire-and-forget capability. 
Although fiber-optic ATGWs are comparatively slow their elevated flight path and 
top-attack capability make them a threat to helicopters; target speed, however, 
decreases missile hit probability [Kra92]. High-energy lasers will eventually be a 
threat to slow ATGWs. One research goal is to achieve 100 kW laser output by 2007 
with an 0.808 µm Nd:GGG system that can operate from a terrain vehicle, which 
allows small-size threats to be defeated in a few seconds [Jon03, Sco04]. 
 
Radar technology is a mature field but its progress shows no end, primarily due to 
progress in digital signal processing. The long-awaited breakthrough of ESA radars 
has been delayed by the slow emergence of low-cost MMIC (monolithic microwave 
integrated circuit) transmit/receive modules. The ESA radar is, however, less 
attractive for long-range air-surveillance applications [Sko02]. Optical beamforming 
promises true time delay beam steering, which is required for wideband operation 
with large scan angles [Cha03]. The reliability of traveling-wave tubes (TWTs) has 
improved, thereby retaining the attractiveness of TWTs when wide bandwidth is 
required. Emerging competitors are the so-called clustered-cavity klystrons and high-
power gyrotrons [Gra99, Sko01,02]. Further improvements to clutter rejection and 
other long-standing radar problems need be found in signal processing theory and 
software algorithms. HF-UHF radars have seen renewed interest due to their anti-
stealth properties, with digital signal processing improving their inherently poor 
resolution [Gru04; Kus97,98; Yat97]. The interest of the telecommunication industry 
in pseudonoise (PN) spread-spectrum technology will give a push to PN radar 
technology. PN transmissions are innately difficult to detect, and also provide means 
to disguise radar emissions as civilian signals. Another potential method is passive 
radar technology; that is, to detect reflected target signals originating from civil 
transmitters. If no suitable transmitter is available the radar can shift to an active PN 
mode. [Kus95] Finally, networks of combined radar, SIGINT, EO and other sensors 
will increase as a result of the present interest in network centric warfare. 
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4.2.6 Opportunities for electronic countermeasures 
 
The performance of electronic systems can be influenced by electronic 
countermeasures (ECMs) in four main ways: by decreasing the sensor’s signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR), by deceiving the sensor, by disrupting or destroying the sensor or 
a part of it, and by influencing the feedback loops of the receiver. Table 28 
summarizes the chances for these countermeasures against each threat technology or 
factor discussed above. It can be noted that IR tracking sensors are particularly 
susceptible to countermeasures during the acquisition phase, before a solid track is 
being established and thresholds are set [Tay00]. 
 
 
Technology ECM type ECM goal 
Noise or SNR 
reduction 
Introduce IR radiating or absorbing medium between target and 
sensor, or introduce noise into the sensor’s detector. 
Deception Introduce decoys in the sensor’s FOV, or introduce deceptive 
signals into the detector. 
IR sensors 
Disrupt/destroy Induce disruptive or destructive high-power signal to lenses, 
detector elements or sensor electronics. 
Noise or SNR 
reduction 
Introduce IR radiating or absorbing medium in the seeker’s 
FOV, or introduce noise into the seeker’s detector. 
Deception Introduce decoys in the seeker’s FOV, or introduce deceptive 
signals into the detector. 
IR seekers 
Disrupt/destroy Induce disruptive or destructive high-power signal into 
window, detector elements or seeker electronics. 
Noise or SNR 
reduction 
Introduce radiating or reflecting medium in the laser path, or 
introduce noise into the laser receiver. 
Deception Introduce decoys in the laser path, or introduce deceptive 
signals into the detector. 
Laser 
technology 
Disrupt/destroy Induce disruptive or destructive high-power signal into detector 
elements of laser receiver or seeker electronics. 
Noise or SNR 
reduction 
Introduce radar reflecting or absorbing medium between target 
and radar receiver, introduce noise into the receiver. 
Deception Introduce decoys in the radar’s search volume, introduce 
deceptive signals into the receiver, introduce false targets that 
overload signal processing capacity. 
Radars 
Disrupt/destroy Induce disruptive or destructive high-power signal into the 
radar receiver’s front end or into receiver electronics. 
Noise or SNR 
reduction 
Degrade SNR of sensors that form a part of the servo feedback 
loop. 
Deception Introduce beat signals into the servo feedback loop through 
sensor signals, or signal that offsets the AGC.  
Servos & 
FCS 
Disrupt/destroy Induce disruptive or destructive high-power signal into the 
sensors or into sensor electronics. 
Threat 
timelines 
-- Reaction timelines: CM directed at sensors as mentioned above, 
tactical measures to delay detection and identification. 
Table 28: Conceptual solutions for threat technology countermeasures. The basic principle is 
repeated in all sensor cases, but the feasibility of the methods varies from technology to 
technology. Threat development and deployment times cannot be influenced by EWSP, but need 
a set of actions ranging from armed attacks and tactical deception to political influence. Legend: 
AGC=automatic gain control. 
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4.2.7 Conclusions and implications for EWSP 
 
The helicopter cannot outmaneuver an approaching threat, but threat reaction times 
are often too long for engagement if the helicopter keeps moving and makes good 
use of terrain masking. This places NOE capability and aircrew situational awareness 
(SA) among the most important susceptibility reduction means for battlefield 
helicopters. Hard- and soft-kill support assets that can suppress enemy threat systems 
come next in importance for survivability, and EWSP rates third. Threat technology 
is the key to effective CMs, but countermeasures have to be tailored to the threat. 
Applying CMs against threats that are not susceptible to such actions is a waste of 
resources and potentially harmful, although they may have some positive influence 
on aircrew moral.  
 
 
4.3 EWSP countermeasure technology 
 
4.3.1 The scope of EWSP countermeasure technology 
 
Countering a threat by EWSP requires, first, threat detection and identification, and 
next execution of effective countermeasures. This is a repetition of the sequence for 
flare rejection, discussed in Table 25. The chain of events and alternative actions is 
somewhat more complex, as demonstrated by Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Events and actions in the EWSP countermeasure process, and major factors involved 
in the process. The influence of CMs and maneuvers on threats is shown as a feedback loop. 
 
 
The following discussion will proceed according to the events in Figure 30. That is, 
first a discussion on warning systems that perform the detection and identification 
task, and then a discussion on countermeasure technology. Questions related to the 
control of the countermeasure process will be covered in Chapter 5, together with 
other systems aspects. 
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4.3.2 Warning system technology 
 
General requirements on warning systems 
Concluding from the earlier discussion the warning system of an EWSP suite of 
battlefield helicopters shall fulfill the following criteria: The warning system shall 
provide sufficient, timely, accurate and prioritized information on relevant threats to 
support decisions on further actions. On this level of generalization the criteria are 
applicable to any platform. For the present work the criteria will act as a guideline, 
but it should be recognized that they are idealized and cannot be satisfied in a strict 
sense. Judgement and analysis are required to find practical solutions. Figure 31 
shows the typical spatial coverage of helicopter warning systems and RF jammer. 
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Figure 31: Spatial coverage of the proposed ASPIS EWSP suite on the Apache attack helicopter 
[Oeh98]. Top-attack weapons will not be detected. In practice the coverage has blind sectors due 
to rotors, tail boom, external stores and other protruding structures [Boe95]. Pod-mounted 
sensors on Dutch Apache helicopters allow spherical MWS coverage [Jan04b]. Information on 
blind sectors is classified, since they represent weak spots. Legend: LWR=laser warning 
receiver, MWS=missile warning system, RFJ=RF jammer, RWR=radar warning receiver. 
 
Radar warning receivers 
The RF environment of RWRs is dense with signals from friendly, enemy, and 
neutral transmitters; in a relative sense the RWR has to operate in a more demanding 
environment than the other warning systems. The detector part of the RWR is one of 
the RF receivers listed in Appendix 1, Table 1-2. CVRs (crystal video receiver), 
IFMs (instantaneous frequency measurement), and tuned receivers are used in 
rotorcraft EWSP applications, while digital receivers are emerging. In cases when 
only the most basic RF warning system is needed the CVR receiver is still a viable 
option, assuming that the RF environment does not hold strong simultaneous signals. 
In more demanding cases each receiver type has to be judged against the specific 
requirements of the environment. Table 29 summarizes the most important questions 
on RWR performance. 
 
Threat identification and classification are today computerized processes [Bro98 
pp.205-207], although a trained person still can identify many threats by listening to 
the PRF and AM signal of a radar. Figure 32 shows in a block diagram the 
manipulation, identification and classification process of intercepted signals.  
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RWR issue Contemplation 
Threat 
scenario 
Ideally the RWR should be tailored to mission threats and not be burdened with 
undue capabilities. A generic scenario asks for sufficient HW capability, modularity 
and tailoring by SW. A decision is also required if the RWR is to serve only the 
self-protection task, or if it also should support tactical intelligence.92 
Probability 
of intercept 
(POI) 
POI is a loosely defined term [Tsu86 p.76]. POI should be as close to 100% as 
possible, which is the strength of wide-open receivers. The POI of tuned (and 
digital) receivers depends on the IBW, scan rate and signal environment. The risk of 
missing high-threat emitters is alleviated by an MDF-driven search strategy. 
Sensitivity The threat footprint of low-flying helicopters is small and a low-sensitivity receiver 
(CVR) has traditionally been sufficient for self-protection [Sch86 p.34]. LPI 
technology introduces new challenges, as does requirements on improved SA. 
Digital receivers promise, among other benefits, high sensitivity.  
Signal 
density 
Density is scenario dependent. In addition to threats, friendly and neutral emitters 
(including cellular phones) must be accounted for. RWR receiver & processor load 
increases with increased sensitivity, bringing risk for degraded performance. 
Probability 
of false 
alarm (Pfa) 
Pfa > 1/hour easily leads to loss of confidence in the RWR. High receiver sensitivity 
and low resolution, together with threat identification ambiguities, are main 
contributors to high Pfa. Adjustable sensitivity, filtering of irrelevant emitters, and 
mission-tailored MDFs are methods to decrease Pfa. 
Frequency 
band 
The 2-18 GHz band is almost institutionalized for RWRs, but it should be asked if 
S-band and below is needed for helicopters. The Ka-band is of increasing 
importance, and some threats exist in the W-band.93 
Frequency 
resolution 
The maxim “the more the better” is valid, since frequency resolution contributes to 
resolving similar emitters and thereby avoiding ambiguities and false alarms. 
Signal 
modulation 
Radar selectivity (Appendix 1, Table 1-3) asks for capability to operate with pulse, 
PD, and CW/ICW emitters; with PRF staggering/jitter, frequency agility/jitter and 
interleaved modes; and to resolve major antenna scan patterns. 
Angle of 
arrival 
(AOA) 
High AOA resolution enhances deinterleaving, high accuracy supports RF jammer 
cueing. Geolocation capability may be required in SEAD operations [Nor99a] and 
also as an option for attack helicopters, but goes beyond traditional self-protection.94 
Antennas Influence spatial coverage, AOA accuracy, system sensitivity, and frequency 
dependence of the total installation. Cavity-backed spiral antennas are popular due 
to wide BW, circular polarization, and near-Gaussian gain pattern [Vac93 p.231]. 
MDF A large, general-purpose MDF leads to risk of ambiguous identification of similar 
emitters. Tailoring the MDF for the mission at hand filters out irrelevant emitters 
but requires accurate tactical intelligence and EW support personnel at the base. 
Conclusion A hybrid of different receiver types mitigates weaknesses of any single type. 
CVR+IFF and CVR+YIG are common solutions. Digital receivers may also require 
support by other receivers to avoid a narrow-IBW system with low POI. 
Table 29: Contemplations on RWR issues in the helicopter environment. 95  Legend: 
HW=hardware, MDF=mission data file, SW=software. 
                                                 
92  Operational experience shows that tactical aircraft entering high threat environments is often the 
first to detect emitters in such areas, even though more sophisticated ELINT platforms have monitored 
the same area at stand-off range [Rad99]. In Bosnia the high-flying U-2 was relegated strictly to 
stand-off range due to proliferation of long-range, high-altitude surface-to-air missiles [Hay95]. 
93  The AN/ALQ-211 SIRFC, under development for different US platforms, is obviously the first 
rotor-wing EWSP suite to include a W-band in the RWR [Anon97d]. 
94  The usual arrangement with four quadrant antennas (cf. Fig. 31) on the platform gives an AOA 
accuracy around 10o RMS (root mean square) for a good installation [Bro98 p.195]. 
95  The British Sky Guardian 2000 (core of the HIDAS system) is a present-generation RWR for 
helicopters. It is advertised to have the following performance [Put04, Whi98]: (1) UHF to Ka band 
coverage (0.5-18 GHz and 32-40 GHz) for pulsed and CW emitters. (2) Hybrid CVR receiver. (3) 
Pulse sensitivity in excess of –50 dBmi. (4) CW sensitivity in excess of –60 dBmi. (5) Dynamic range 
in excess of 50 dB. (6) Full capability in an environment exceeding 1 Mpps. (7) POI 100%. (8) Time 
to intercept <1 second. (9) Threat library with up to 4000 entries. (10) Weight 22 kg including RF 
heads and amplifiers. Legend: HIDAS=commercial acronym. 
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Figure 32: The emitter identification and classification process. Adapted from Vaccaro [Vac93 
pp.207-211]. Alternative approaches are presented in e.g. [Coo89, Gra86 pp.222-224, Lyn04 
pp.135-145, Ner01 pp.341-344, Tra94]; deinterleaving algorithms are discussed e.g. in [Wil93b]. 
 
Missile warning systems 
Three technological alternatives compete for the missile warning market: CW or 
pulse Doppler (PD) radars, IR detectors, and ultraviolet (UV) detectors. Their 
respective merits are given in Table 30. The detection range of IR systems is superior 
to UV under all atmospheric conditions except for drizzle. Detection range, however, 
is not important per se; the central issue is the warning time before missile impact. 
The advantages of UV detectors coupled with the less severe impact of their 
weakness in the helicopter environment have made them the favored alternative in 
helicopter EWSP. [Car99, Cos99, Gel01, Ner01 p.362, San96, Sim99] 
 
 
Type Properties 
PD operates e.g. in L-band to avoid ESM/RWR systems operating only above 2 GHz. 
Strengths Long-range, all-weather capability, controllable false-alarm rate, 
independent of missile emissions, missile time-to-go information. 
PD 
Weaknesses Active transmitter, strong ground clutter at low altitudes, rotor blade 
interference on helicopters, antenna space requirement, decreasing RCS of 
tactical missiles. 
IR detection typically in 3-5 m band; either mechanical scanning or FPAs. 
Strengths Detects both plume emission and hot engine parts, including PBO detection; 
lower atmospheric attenuation; high angular separation of targets. 
IR 
Weaknesses Strongly clutter limited performance, risk for saturation at short ranges due 
to need for high sensitivity to provide long-range detection, complexity due 
to need for cooling. 
UV detection of missile plume in the solar-blind region at 0.2-0.3 m; built around an 
image-intensifier. 
Strengths Minimal background clutter, hence lower demand on signal processing and 
reduced complexity; no cooling required; mature technology; lower cost. 
UV 
Weaknesses No PBO detection, restricted detection range due to ozone attenuation, UV 
clutter from man-made sources, requirement for sharp cut-off filter at 
approx. 0.29 m, possibility that UV threat decoys will be developed. 
Table 30: Strengths and weaknesses of MWS technologies [Bha97, Cos99, Fos01b, Her00, Kol65 
p.118, Law93, Moa78, Rea96, Sch99 p.453, Sim99, Tay98, Wil93a p.80]. Properties of IR and 
UV are in relation to each other; only monochromatic IR is considered. Legend: PBO=post-
burnout. 
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Laser warning receivers 
The chances for a helicopter to evade a laser-based threat once it has been fired at the 
helicopter are mostly low. Even when the helicopter’s LRF provides advance 
warning, a shell from the main gun of an MBT is only seconds away. The value of 
the LWR in the traditional self-protection sense—as represented by Figure 30—is 
therefore limited. The situation improves if the LRF measurement is made by a field 
artillery fire control squad, in which case the fire is a minute or two away. A further 
motivation for the LWR can be found if the EWSP suite is able to correlate data from 
multiple sources in order to decrease ambiguity of threat identification. Table 31 
presents central LWR technology questions. 
 
 
LWR challenge Solution Note 
Pulse rise time. Not entirely reliable due to rapid sun glitches, especially 
from helicopter’s tail rotor. 
Pulse energy. Challenging, since the dynamic range of LBR beams and 
indirect LRF splashes (low energy), and direct LRF hits 
(high energy), is 50 dB (optical) or more. 
Polarization. Complex measurement techniques, false alarms from 
partially polarized non-laser sources. 
Signal coherence. Military lasers are only partially coherent since the focus is 
on beam width, bandwidth and power density. 
Suppression of 
false alarms 
Sensitivity. Very high sensitivity would allow determination of TOA 
between direct port scatter and indirect main beam. 
LBR signals Sensitivity. Tradeoffs required to achieve 10-5 W/cm2 or better; related 
to false alarm rate, bandwidth, dynamic range, etc.96 
AOA 
resolution 
Detector array. Old single detector LWRs achieve only ±45° resolution, 
new systems reach ±1°. True need is a controversial issue. 
Wavelength 
band 
-- Typically 0.5 m to 1.6 m, addition of MWIR and LWIR 
bands increases costs and complexity. 
Wavelength 
resolution 
Multiple detectors. Two partly overlapping detector wavelengths resolve total 
band in three parts (Si & Ge diodes for 0.5-1.6 m band).97 
Table 31: Major challenges in LWR technology and alternative solutions [Col98; Dun89; 
Man96; Wil93a p.27,55,116,118,141]. Note that the column “solution” includes both beam 
parameters and LWR solutions. Legend: AOA=angle of arrival, Ge=germanium, LWIR=long-
wave IR, MWIR=medium-wave IR, Si=silicon, TOA=time of arrival. 
 
4.3.3 Countermeasure technology 
 
General requirements on countermeasures 
Concluding from earlier discussions the execution of countermeasures by an EWSP 
suite of battlefield helicopters shall fulfill the following general criteria: Electronic 
countermeasures shall be implemented optimally in time, space and frequency, and 
with maximum effect on the threat system. Countermeasures shall not endanger the 
                                                 
96  It is common to protect LWRs with wavelength-adapted filters to reduce sensitive at wavelengths 
where high irradiance can be encountered, e.g. 0.532 m, 0.694 m, 1.064 m, and 1.54 m; and to 
strive for peak sensitivity around 0.9 m. 
97  Laser detectors typically are semiconductor avalanche diodes. Imaging LWRs, e.g. based on CCD 
(charge-coupled device) technology, have been shown to give subdegree angular resolution, but have 
low dynamic range and produce no wavelength information [Col86]. 
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helicopter or its crew, nor friendly forces, non-combatants or civilian property. As 
with the previously defined criteria for warning systems these criteria are generic and 
applicable to any platform. The last criterion “(…) shall not endanger (…) civilian 
property” should be seen as a ROE requirement for PSO conditions.  Figure 33 
presents an overview of the main problem set that needs to be solved in the EWSP 
countermeasures process. 
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Figure 33: Time-space domain (friend/foe space) of EWSP countermeasures and parameters to 
bring into the domain in order to find a method for effective countermeasure execution. The set 
of questions are similar for friend and foe, but differ for preemptive and reactive actions. 
Questions to be brought into the time-space domain are scenario dependent, but valid for friend 
and foe alike. 
 
RF countermeasures 
Passive RF countermeasures in the helicopter EWSP environment equal to chaff, 
even when called aerosols for use against millimeter-wave seekers [Per99]. General 
requirements on chaff are given in Figure 34; an extended view on chaff ejection is 
presented in Appendix 1, Figure 1-12. A vital question is how to dispense chaff; 
bearing in mind the air flow of the main and tail rotor and the slow—even zero—
speed of the helicopter. If a chaff burst is sucked into the rotor vortex of a helicopter 
hovering at low altitude, the chaff will highlight the helicopter to the radar. One 
attempt to solve the problem is by dispensing chaff to the rear, into the air flow of the 
tail rotor. The advantages of this method are fast blooming and Doppler broadening 
due to the violent movement of chaff filaments in the air flow. The disadvantage is 
that chaff bursts always are located to one side of the helicopter, which may not 
match requirements of engagement geometry. 
 
The history of active RF electronic countermeasures (ECMs) is as long as that of 
EW, stressed by the fact that the number of radar ECM techniques listed in Van 
Brunt [Bru78,82,95] is close to 300, and more methods are proposed in patents and 
other publications. The basic techniques, however, are few; other techniques are 
resorted to when conditions so demand. Table 32 lists the primary RF threats to 
helicopters and contemplates countermeasure issues. Figure 35 presents RF tracking 
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guidance methods and classic ECM techniques to defeat these methods. Table 33 
reviews the main jamming techniques mentioned in Figure 35. 
 
 
Requirements
on chaff
Adequate dipole length
to tune to threat radar
wavelengthAdequately rapidblooming time to
create shielding
cloud.
Adequate ejection
sequence to create
optimal effect
Adequate dynamics
to impede Doppler
processing by threat
radar
Adequately light
weight to maximize
cloud persistence Adequate
coordination with
RF jammer
1
Adequately low
”birdnesting” properties
to maximize cloud
reflectivity
2
4
5
8
7
Adequate dipole
number in cartridge to
mask aircraft’s RCS3
Adequate
consideration of
engagement geometry
9
Adequate
consideration of
platform speed on
useful cloud life
Adequate
consideration of
helicopter rotor air
flows on chaff
11
6
10
 
Figure 34: Requirements on chaff. Some requirements are dictated more by general EW than 
by EWSP; but e.g. fall rate (requirement 4) is important to EWSP if a chaff-dispensing rocket is 
fired ahead of the helicopter. References for respective requirement: 1 [Ner01 p.460, Sho85]; 2 
[Sch99 p.427, Sho85]; 3 [Ner01 p.461, Sho85]; 4 [Sch99 p.421]; 5 [Anon92b, Phe98a]; 6 [Dun96]; 
7 [Bru78 pp.498-503]; 8 [Phe98a]; 9 [Bru78 pp.514-519, Phe98a]; 10 [Phe98a]; 11 [---]. 
 
 
ACTIVE RF COUNTERMEASURES: PHILOSOPHY 
RF threat Contemplation 
Search radars The helicopter is a weight and power constrained platform that does not allow 
high-power RF jammers. Achieving sufficient burn-through range even against 
short range search radars is difficult, but may be a necessary precondition for 
sufficient effect on gun FCS and semi-active guidance [Ner01 p.239]. A 
dedicated escort jammer platform may be needed for jamming search radars. 
Tracking radars Guidance types of importance are semi-active CW (some SAM systems), and 
active pulse and PD radars (FCS radars and missiles) including command 
guidance. Tracking methods in order of increasing performance and cost are, 
conical scan, lobe switching, COSRO, LORO, conopulse, and monopulse 
[Lot90 p.129, Ner01 p.137]; with HOJ as fallback. Monopulse is used in 
modern systems, but other types must be expected. Frequency agility is used in 
all modern systems. 
Guidance links Jamming has to be injected through the backlobes of the missile’s rear-looking 
receiver antenna. Required jammer power exceeds helicopter capability. The 
tracking radar is more vulnerable. 
Conclusion The motivation for RF jammers on helicopters is questionable, unless the 
aircraft is used for deep-penetration CSAR or special operations. Even in that 
case an escort jammer may be a more viable solution. 
Table 32: Contemplations on jamming RF threats with a helicopter EWSP suite. Helicopter 
weight and power constraints put major restrictions on opportunities. Legend: COSRO=conical 
scan on receive only, LORO=lobe-switching on receive only, SAM=surface-to-air missile. 
 
 
Expendable repeater jammers can offer some potential for helicopters since towed 
decoys may not be practical for helicopters, although a towed helicopter decoy is 
proposed in [Col80]. Expendable repeaters/transponders ejected from standard 
C/FDs (chaff/flare dispensers) would be a lower-cost solution than on-board jammers 
or, alternatively, as a complement to the on-board jammer. However, no such decoy 
for helicopters is known to be in operational use.  
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Figure 35:  RF tracking guidance taxonomy and main jamming techniques. Requirements on 
techniques differ for CW, pulse and PD radars. Power requirement of noise jamming is mostly 
excessive for helicopters. Legend: RGPO=range gate pull-off, VGPO=velocity gate pull-off.98 
 
 
ACTIVE RF COUNTERMEASURES: TECHNIQUES 
Target ECM technique Note 
Acquisition Deception by chaff bursts can delay acquisition if noise 
jamming is not an option. 
ECCM: Manual override 
by operator. 
Inverse gain is the basic method against conical scanning 
and lobe switching.  
ECCM: SORO and 
monopulse. 
Sensing SORO scan rate by a jog detector, after which 
inverse gain can be applied [Lot90 p.99]. Modulating 
jammer over expected radar scanning frequency. 
Weakness: Time required 
for CM. Improvement by 
conopulse [Sak78]. 
Cross-eye and -polarization are feasible against 
monopulse. Increased interest in cross-eye jamming after 
positive test results in Italy [Ner00, Ner01 pp.446-451]. 
ECCM: Flat-panel arrays 
and polarization screens 
[Sch99 p.266]. 
Angle 
tracking 
Conopulse (two-channel monopulse) has the strengths of 
monopulse, same ECM techniques are to be used. 
As monopulse. 
Range 
tracking 
The conventional form of RGPO is effective against 
noncoherent pulse radar; CW and PD require modified 
techniques. Can be combined e.g. with the holdout and 
hook technique. [Bru78 pp.786-809] 
ECCM: Leading-edge 
range trackers [Far90 
p.9/26, Ner01 pp.510-
516]. 
Velocity 
tracking 
VGPO either alone or in conjunction with e.g. amplitude 
modulation or holdout and hook techniques. VGPO works 
with CW and the power need is therefore relatively low. 
[Bru78 p.945, Ner01 p.437] 
ECCM: Guard gates 
[Ner01 pp.510-516] 
Terrain-bounce and chaff illumination: Provide 
alternatives with lower power demand than noise 
jamming. The jammer is in effect a directed repeater. 
Environment and 
geometry are difficult to 
master. 
Other 
Noise jamming: Ideally white Gaussian noise with output 
power in relation to the RCS of the helicopter. [Sch99 
p.157, Wie91 p.30]. 
Power demand is 
particularly high for 
barrage noise. 
Table 33: Classic RF jamming techniques against tracking radars. Legend: C/FD=chaff/flare 
dispenser, SORO=scan on receive only (COSRO, LORO). 
                                                 
98  A survey cited in Van Brunt [Bru78 p.14] lists 17 RF countermeasure techniques in order of 
decreasing number of references made to them in literature. The list contains the following of interest 
to the present work: (1) angle deception, (2) barrage noise, (…) (4) chaff, (…) (7) expendable 
jammers, (…) (9) inverse gain, (…) (11) RGPO, (…) (17) velocity deception. The act of ejecting an 
active expendable is only a partial technique, the other part being the signal repeated by the jammer. 
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EO countermeasures 
Some ideas have been presented on passive EO countermeasures for helicopter use. 
Examples are dispensing of smoke and laser-reflecting particles. The former idea is 
impractical due to the bulky dispensers and the short duration of the protective 
smokescreen, the latter has problems with the narrow engagement geometry (cf. 
pages 74 and 88) [Phe98b].  
 
Flares have remained the most important active countermeasure since their first use 
against IR seekers in Vietnam in the 1960s. The baseline flare is the Magnesium-
Teflon-Viton (MTV) pellet with various additives to increase radiant intensity. 
[Her95, Koc00b, Koc01, Pan95, Pri89 p.235-237]. Figure 36 shows the spectral and 
temporal behavior of an MTV flare. MTV flares have several drawbacks; particularly 
the hot temperature, rapid rise time, and free-falling trajectory open doors for 
counter-countermeasures. Requirements on modern flares are complex, as indicated 
by Figure 37. Additional insight into flare ejection from a helicopter is given in 
Appendix 1, Figure 1-13. Table 34 summarizes important propositions and solutions 
for satisfying flare requirements. A description of the exact nature of pyrophoric 
flares—also termed special material decoys—has not been published,99 but based on 
indirect evidence [Bal01, Hew04, Roc96, Rit03] it can be assumed that a 
hermetically sealed cartridge contains “chips” of spontaneously combustible iron 
foils that are ejected out of the cartridge.  
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Figure 36: Development of flare radiance as a function of time in a static test. In three seconds 
the flare is almost extinguished; the atmospheric extinction in this case is not stated. Adapted 
from Kujala and Kaurila [Kuj02]. 
 
 
                                                 
99  Contrary to the case with flares, a number of patents have been granted for inventions on towed 
canisters for spraying liquid pyrophoric material [Bri97, Hal96, Her95]. The unit price of pyrotechnic 
flares is reportedly US Dollars 135-138 [Riv04d]. 
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Figure 37: Requirements on flares. The requirements are idealistic and in part demand careful 
matching to the aircraft; they are partly contradicting and partly difficult to satisfy. References 
for respective requirement: 1 [Ear78 p.22/9, Dav98]; 2 [Mar95, Lia95, Dav98, Phe98b, Fra00]; 3 
[Dav98]; 4 [Fra00, Mei95, Nor99b]; 5 [Dav98, Phe98a]; 6 [---]; 7 [Lia95, Phe98b]; 8 [Lia95]; 9 [--
-]; 10 [Tay00] ]; 11 [---]. 
 
 
Solution Objective and methods Note 
Signature 
modification 
Matching between flare and platform signatures. 
Achieved by adding various chemicals to the basic 
MTV composition, by reduced flare size, by a mesh of 
INCONEL 601 in front of the flare to reduce radiance, 
and by pyrophoric flares.100 [Bal01, Bra01b, Chr01, 
Ger01, Her95, Mar95, Pan95, Phe98b, Woo91] 
Most popular technique for 
improving flares. Pyrophoric 
flares are presently state-of-
the-art. Pyrophoric materials 
do not highlight the platform 
as do MTV. 
Number of 
expendables 
Maximal number of on-board expendables. Achieved 
without increasing platform weight by decreasing flare 
size, which is sufficient for most cases and compatible 
with strive to reduce flare intensity. [Mar95] 
So-called modular flares 
allow double flare number 
in a 1”x8” C/FD casing 
[Mar95]. 
Flare 
kinematics 
Matching between flare and platform kinematics. 
Achieved by ejecting flares ahead of the aircraft, by 
ejecting flares obliquely forward (fixed-wing aircraft), 
and by stabilized flares with thrust divided into boost 
and sustain phases. [Dav98, Fra00, Her99, Mei95] 
Restrictions on rotorcraft 
due to low air speed, limited 
flight height, main and tail 
rotors and engine air intakes. 
Engagement 
geometry 
Maximum missile miss distance. Achieved by 
optimizing flare ejection direction relative to missile’s 
angle of arrival, by optimizing flare ejection timing 
relative to missile time-to-go, and by a towed flare or 
canister spraying pyrophoric liquid. [Put01b, Tsi84] 
Optimal direction of C/FDs 
and ejection algorithms. 
TTG data not available with 
passive MWSs and towed 
canister are impractical. 
Flare size Matching between flare and platform size. Attempted 
at by pyrophoric flares that create an extended volume 
of glowing material. [Lia95, Roc96] 
Additional benefit of 
improved spectral matching 
by pyrophoric flares. 
Flash flares Distracting gunners and EO sensors in the critical 
engagement phase. Achieved by flares producing an 
intensive optical flash or series of flashes. [Bra01b] 
Need for high flash 
intensity; problems with 
engagement geometry. 
Flare mix Optimal flare effectiveness. Achieved by ejecting 
flares with different properties. [Sho00] 
Increased flare load and/or 
lower number of salvos. 
Table 34: Major flare improvement techniques. There is a double benefit from pyrophoric 
flares: from the improved signature matching (temperature approx. 800 °C versus 2000 °C for 
MTV flares [Sho00]) and from a target-like size. Legend: TTG=time-to-go. 
 
 
                                                 
100   INCONEL 601 is an alloy of Nickel, Chromium and Iron, with smaller amounts of other 
substances. 
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Figure 38: Summary of active infrared countermeasures [Anon97c p.G-6, Gei02, Gun98 p.69, 
Ric85 p.112, She00, Tay00, Wal02]. Information on J/S ratios are from Snodgrass [Sno01]. 
Closed-loop DIRCMs are not yet operational. Legend: J/S=jamming-to-signal. 
 
 
Active, directed IR jammers (DIRCM, directed infrared countermeasure) are 
becoming operational, while mechanically modulated omnidirectional jammers still 
are effective against older IR missiles.101 Figure 38 summarizes the main features of 
IR jammers. As a minimum one jamming signal is needed in each of the wavelengths 
0.7-1.2 m, 2-3m, and 3-5 m [Sep97b]. Closer to 30 dB J/S ratio is needed to 
defeat reticle and first generation imaging seekers with impunity [Tay98]. It has been 
noticed that short laser pulses (0.1-50 ns), focused on the detector, create a plasma 
spark within the seeker near the detector (cf. Figure 26). The plasma may enhance 
jamming/blinding by pitting or scoring optics, creating debris, or upsetting 
electronics. A major advantage of the plasma spark is that it allows out-of-band or 
near-band lasers to be used. [Fie96]  
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Figure 39: Schematic diagram of a closed-loop DIRCM. Operational characteristics of the 
missile seeker are determined by Fourier analysis of the retroreflected laser signal. The term 
“active missile signal” refers to EO emissions. Adapted from [Bro02, Hic02]. Typical DIRCM 
laser specifications are inserted; however, 10-20 W laser output or more is obviously needed for 
interrogation [Jha00, Hew04]. The developmental European Flash system for protection of large 
aircraft aims at a closed-loop system capable of damaging missile seekers [Wal03a]. 
                                                 
101  The AN/ALQ-144 is reported to be ineffective against newer MANPAD missiles [Fis04a, Kan97]. 
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Figure 39 shows a schematic diagram of a closed-loop system; improvements are 
proposed in [Pep02]. Random variation of the jamming signal’s pulse parameters has 
been suggested as a method to avoid the need for closed-loop systems [Tak02]. 
 
4.3.4 Warning and countermeasure development trends and issues 
 
Warning systems are facing an increased set of challenges, in part due to 
development of threat technologies and in part due to the increasing number of civil 
emitters in various bands of the electromagnetic spectrum. Table 35 reviews the most 
important development trends and issues related to warning systems.  
 
 
WARNING SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND ISSUES 
System Issue Development prospect 
Digital 
receivers 
Telecommunication is driving digital receiver development, and RWR 
technology will be able to gain from civil progress. A technological 
breakthrough is, however, needed to allow AD conversion at carrier 
frequency. 
AOA 
resolution 
Improved AOA resolution enhances the deinterleaving process. The 
value of PLAID and other emitter location techniques [Ada00, Wil99] 
to the helicopter environment remains unconfirmed, but they promise a 
step forward without undue increase in hardware. 
Ambiguity Measurement accuracy and resolution contribute to reducing 
ambiguity, but progress is also needed in the areas of signal processing 
and artificial intelligence. Digital receivers promise improvements in 
this field. Alas, tactical intelligence and human judgement remain 
important for reducing ambiguity. 
RWR102 
LPI 
technology 
Growing need to detect and identify both low-power signals and 
intermittent pulses; single scan emissions are becoming more frequent. 
Radar 
technology 
The steady progress of radar technology can still make radar-based 
MWS a viable alternative. Anti-collision radars and conformal 
antennas, e.g., bring new opportunities to MWS development. 
IR technology US focus is on multispectral FPA technology, while Europe improves 
monospectral technology [Wal03b]. Hyperspectral technology, of 
interest to intelligence and environment surveillance, will in the long 
term bring spin-off to multispectral capability. 
MWS 
UV technology Alternatives to UV image-intensifiers and their critical wavelength 
filters are sought in AlGaN technology. Recent success in growing 
GaN wafers [Gep04] opens new potentials for this technology. 
Accuracy LWR accuracy has taken a step forward with recent development of 
systems capable of ±1° or less. As with RWR resolution, a need for 
this capability rises through SEAD and other forms of weapons effect. 
LWR 
Pfa  The difficulty in identifying threat lasers from other laser sources 
remains a major problem until laser pulses can be coded in some way. 
The technique of separating direct hits from nearby splashes and port 
scattering by increased sensitivity is still immature. 
Table 35: Current development trends and issues in warning system technology. Legend: 
AD=analogue-to-digital, (Al)GaN=(aluminum) gallium nitride, PLAID=precision location and 
identification. 
                                                 
102  Adamy [Ada00] lists RWR improvement requirements as: (1) Enough sensitivity to receive all 
threats from their sidelobe; (2) direction-finding accuracy adequate to hand off threat location to 
another friendly platform; (3) specific-emitter tracking or, preferably, specific-emitter identification; 
and (4) detection as well as location of LPI radars. 
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Development of countermeasures faces the challenge to match the ability of threat 
systems to track targets with an increasing number of discriminants in time, space 
and frequency. Simultaneously threat reaction times are decreasing as a result of 
sensor and C3 networking, and threat modification times decrease as threat sensors 
increasingly become SW reprogrammable. Table 36 reviews current countermeasure 
development issues. 
 
 
COUNTERMEASURE DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND ISSUES 
Field Type Development prospect 
Chaff Improved chaff properties, chaff for multiple frequency bands (Ku and 
Ka), matching of chaff bursts to helicopter RCS, and optimal chaff 
ejection are areas that need further research. 
Jamming Monopulse remains a challenge to jamming; DRFMs will be increasingly 
needed for jamming of coherent radars. Off-board jammers need further 
investigation for helicopter use. Solid-state transmitters and Vivaldi 
antenna arrays challenge traditional TWT transmitters.103 
RF 
Multiple Efficient chaff illumination requires jammer beam focusing on the chaff 
cloud; flexible antenna beam steering favors conformal antenna arrays. 
The requirements are in line with those of fixed-wing aircraft. 
Flares Ordinary flare pellets keep improving, while pyrophoric flares are 
gaining momentum. Improved flare dispensing techniques and mixed use 
of different flare types are needed to deal with advanced threats. Flares 
are needed to support DIRCM systems in case of multiple threats. 
DIRCM Improved missile seekers and the prospect of HOJ require fast threat 
suppression. Future DIRCMs must quickly disrupt/destroy the seeker, 
which will require higher laser powers than at present. PPLN is the prime 
OPO candidate for producing multiple wavelength lasers [Mye97, Pro99, 
Sep03]. Alternatives to the gimbal structure are being investigated; more 
agile solutions could defeat multiple threats [Dor00]. 
EO 
Laser Low-power lasers operating with high PRF at the most usual laser 
wavelengths should have the potential to deny range measurement. LBR 
jamming, either by illuminating the missile’s plume or by blinding the 
gunner, are not feasible in the foreseeable future. 
RF+EO Ideas on combined RF/IR chaff [Woo91] are interesting but practical 
problems have not been solved. The demand for this type of solutions is, 
however, increasing with proliferation of multispectral seekers. 
Multi-
spectral 
Acoustic+EO Successful tests with dropping the BAT acoustic/EO submunition from 
an UAV stress the need for protection against top-attack threats. There is 
no feasible method for deceiving the acoustic part of the seeker; the 
effort must be concentrated to the EO band. 
Table 36: Current development trends and issues in countermeasure technology. The need for 
RF jammers on helicopters is generally low; it is also claimed that “(…) such is the variety of 
radar out there, and such is the ability to alter signals, we cannot always think of combating 
them with ECM, (…)” [Kin04]. Legend: DRFM=digital radio-frequency memory, OPO=optical 
parametric oscillator, PPLN=periodically-poled lithium niobate. BAT (Brilliant Anti-Tank) is a 
commercial designation. 
 
 
                                                 
103  Serrodyning of TWT amplifiers has traditionally been used to translate the carrier RF to either side 
of the receiver RF. The drawback of this method is that it restricts the jammer to radiating one 
technique per band at any one time. [Tsi84]  
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4.3.5 Extended discussion on threats and countermeasures 
 
In line with traditional texts on EWSP the preceding discussion has mainly been 
concerned with one-on-one interactions; i.e. one threat using one technique, against 
one countermeasure asset using one technique. The usual combat situation is, 
however, more complex. The number of threat systems and techniques varies, as do 
countermeasure systems and techniques. In addition, the situation changes with time. 
Figure 40 depicts the situation as a multidimensional issue. Related to this discussion 
are e.g. the earlier mentioned question of mission survivability (Section 3.3.3), the 
issue of EWSP sensors in the tactical intelligence role [Pie01], and later the 
discussion on EMI and other interactions in the EWSP process (Section 5.4.1). 
However, experience shows that simulations are not appreciated by warfighters due 
to the uncertainty of real combat [Put01c]. 
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Figure 40: Interactions between threats and countermeasures vary with time, from the simplest 
case of one-one/one-one to the most complex case of many-many/many-many. 104  As the 
engagement progresses in time, the space of time-dependent threat-CM interactions undergoes 
constant state transitions. Coordination problems increase with increasing complexity. 
 
 
4.3.6 Conclusions on EWSP countermeasure technology 
 
The popular view of an eternal competition between threats and countermeasures—
where one step forward by threats is followed by next step by countermeasures—is 
only partially true, and this is especially true on the technological level. Threats in 
the form of imaging missile seekers are being fielded, but simultaneously their 
countermeasures are fielded in the form of the DIRCM. The next evolutionary step is 
likely to be IR seekers with HOJ capability, and the answer in the form of increased 
DIRCM jamming power is understood on the conceptual level. Threats and 
                                                 
104  Even more extreme cases exist. For instance, prior to an engagement, when warning systems are 
active but no threats are on the scene, there exists a zero-zero/point five-zero case. 
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countermeasures develop in parallel in a symbiotic manner and the development is 
driven mainly by technological and scientific progress; whereas complexity and cost 
act as limiting factors. Countermeasure development as a direct result of threats 
observed on the battlefield is often the result of oversight or misjudgment.105 Dual 
use technology plays an increasing role in the development of countermeasures. 
Research in mobile telecommunication, signal and image processing, software 
technology, semiconductor and laser technology, etc. form the technological 
infrastructure for EWSP. Areas that are dominated by defense research are high-
power MMIC transmit-receive modules, IR imaging technology, pyrotechnics, and 
stealth technology. In conclusion, comprehension of countermeasures requires 
understanding of a vast field of technologies for civil applications. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions on threats and countermeasures 
 
Helicopter threats are divided in two main groups, depending on the general threat 
scenario. One group is high-technology threats, which are related to scenarios of 
major war. The other group is low-technology threats, which are mainly related to 
low-intensity conflicts and asymmetric warfare. The common high-technology threat 
in both scenarios are IR guided MANPAD missiles. The basic EWSP suite of today 
should therefore consist of an MWS and a programmable dispenser, controlled by the 
MWS. Early next decade the suite should include an DIRCM capable of defeating 
imaging seekers. By the year 2020 the DIRCM need be able to quickly induce laser 
damage to missile seekers in order to avoid HOJ threats. 
 
Armed helicopters can benefit from a high-resolution LWR that can act as emitter 
location sensor and guide suppressive fire. To transport helicopters the LWR is of 
less value but it can indicate areas with high concentration of laser signals and which 
therefore are potentially hostile. Since there are no effective countermeasures to 
laser-guided threats (LBRs, and FCS of AA guns or MBTs etc.) the LWR is of no 
use once a line-of-sight (LOS) propagator has been fired at the helicopter. 
 
UN mandated PSOs and similar low-intensity operations do not mandate an RWR, 
far less an RF jammer. The need for them rises with increasing conflict intensity and 
complexity. An emerging issue in the discussion on RWR capability is the potential 
of the RWR to function as a tactical intelligence sensor. By combining the needs of 
self-protection and of intelligence both areas can benefit. RWR ambiguities are a 
major source of false alarms, which causes the crew to lose confidence in the system. 
A part of the threat avoidance task is intelligence-based mission planning, 
contingency planning, and capability for on-board flight route recalculation. 
Regardless of the scenario the threat from small-caliber weapons, RPGs, and 
manually operated AA guns remains. These will have to be met by utilization of 
terrain masking, continuous mobility, and suppressive fire. 
                                                 
105  These claims run contrary to statements on missile defense in Swedenburg [Swe94], according to 
which attack systems are developed without prior knowledge of countermeasures. Cases where threat 
technologies have come as a surprise are e.g. the first use of chaff in WWII, IR guided MANPAD 
missiles in Vietnam, and CW semi-active missile guidance in the Yom Kippur War. In these cases the 
lack of countermeasures was mainly a result of underestimating the enemy’s capability.  
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5 EWSP SYSTEMS AND SUPPORT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Systems and support issues are the “infrastructure” of EWSP. Some of these issues 
have been briefly mentioned in earlier chapters and the present chapter takes a more 
detailed look at the major factors, which are summarized in Figure 41. Under the 
term “systems factors” is grouped technical issues that are directly related to the 
EWSP suite. The group “support factors” includes mechanisms within and outside 
pure EW thinking, and their support for platform survivability (cf. Figure 13). 
Interactions and quantification issues do not logically fall into either of the two major 
groups. Mission support by SEAD and similar assets are mainly not covered in this 
chapter; they will re-emerge in Chapter 6. The emphasis of Figure 41 is on the 
assistance by systems and support factors to helicopter susceptibility reduction and 
the arrowhead direction is changed compared with earlier tree diagrams, where the 
emphasis has been on taxonomy. The usage of the terms “verification”, “validation”, 
(V&V) and “test and evaluation” (T&E) will be defined in Section 5.3.2. 
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Figure 41: The trio of susceptibility reduction measures that constitutes the “infrastructure” of 
EWSP: Major EWSP systems and support factors together with earlier discussed operational 
factors and countermeasure technology.  
 102
5.2 Support factors 
 
5.2.1 Support functions 
Intelligence 
Intelligence produces information on threat systems and technologies, based upon 
which countermeasures are developed. From the EWSP perspective intelligence can 
be divided into scientific and technical intelligence, which is strongly connected to 
preparations during peace, and operational and tactical intelligence that precedes a 
mission. With the exception for SIGINT, the unclassified literature gives scant 
information on the methods of scientific and technical intelligence.106  
 
 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Unclassified 
sources 
-  Majority of information is available 
from unclassified sources at low cost. 
- Low collection risk. 
- Useful information buried in the mass of 
public information. Requires massive 
filtering. 
Classified 
sources 
- Provides point information that is 
unavailable in unclassified sources. 
- Loss of information may not be 
obvious to intelligence target. 
- Requires illegal practices; e.g. US ferret 
missions over Soviet airspace [Bur03] and 
Soviet WWII activities in the US [Hay99]. 
- High costs and risk of deception.107 
Table 37: Intelligence matrix: advantages and disadvantages on accessing unclassified and 
classified information sources. The third group is “gray” information, which is unclassified but 
not freely available. Note classification of information types listed in Section 1.4.1. 
 
 
Systematic intelligence is usually seen as a demand-driven process and is often 
depicted by the intelligence cycle (e.g. [Hug99 p.6]). An alternative view is that the 
intelligence user often cannot state his needs and that intelligence therefore should be 
market driven, letting the user choose from the available intelligence lot [Her96 
pp.293-296]. Besides systematic targeting of information sources, chance 
opportunities can give valuable contribution to the intelligence flow. Examples of 
chance information are radar modes opened by accident, equipment being offered on 
the black arms market, and equipment having been conquered by friendly nations.108  
                                                 
106  R.V. Jones’s Most Secret War [Jon78] is the seminal work in this field. Almost completely 
missing are accounts on how to analyze acquired systems, in the manner that is presented e.g. in 
Wiley [Wil93b] for ELINT (electronic intelligence) data. 
107  It has been estimated that the UK spends the equivalent of 5% of its annual defense budget on 
intelligence [Pow00]. A reminder of the dangers in covert operations are those 163 US aircrew 
members listed in Burrow [Bur03 pp.353-356] that were killed in ferret missions over Communist 
countries between 1950 and 1969. 
108  Some occurrences in the past: In 1958 a Taiwanese fighter aircraft fired an AIM-9B Sidewinder 
missile at a Chinese MiG-17. The missile stuck into the body of the MiG without exploding, and it 
was sent to the Soviet Union where it was copied to become the K-13 (AA-2 Atoll), and later the 
Chinese PL-2, missile. [Anon99c] Following the shootdown of South Korean airliner KAL 007 in 
1983 the Soviets went through their checklist and activated all their radars; including equipment that 
the Americans did not know existed [Mun91 p.148]. China is claimed to have obtained several basic 
Stinger missiles from Pakistan and purchased Igla-1 (SA-16) missiles from unknown source(s) in 
order to exploit and reverse engineer both systems [Fet96]. The Swedish Defense Material 
Administration (FMV) used criminal middlemen to acquire a non-export radar version for the Russian 
Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft at a cost of approx. €9 millions [Lin03]. Israel supplied the US with 
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Figure 42: Intelligence cycle with templates marking relationship to the OODA loop. Adapted 
from [Ash97 p.13, Her96 pp.293-296, Hug99 p.6, Pol97 p.283, Wal98 p.118]. The term 
“material” is synonymous with the “physical information” defined in Section 1.4.1. 
 
 
The intelligence approach therefore needs to be a mixture of both systematic, 
demand-driven work and of exploiting chance opportunities and offering the 
intelligence to users. Figure 42 presents a view on the intelligence cycle, modified to 
suite the present work. Figure 43 expands the view by looking at intelligence tasks 
from the EWSP perspective, including operational and tactical intelligence and the 
later discussed roles of the EW support center (EWSC) and the flight squadron EW 
officer. 
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Figure 43: The tasks of intelligence in the EWSP perspective. Note that the intelligence cycle of 
Figure 42 is collapsed into the framed block. Legend: MDF=mission data file, ORD=operational 
requirements document, S&T=science and technology. 
                                                                                                                                          
samples of Soviet equipment after the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Among them were: S-75 Dvina (SA-
2 Guideline), S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa), 9M32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail) and ZRK-SD Kub/Kvadrant (SA-6 
Gainful) missiles. [Pri00 p.292] A further SA-6 system was acquired in 1986 through France [Ant00]. 
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Figures 42 and 43 make it clear that RF active countermeasures have limitations in 
UN mandated peace support operations and other cases where intelligence cannot be 
performed. EO countermeasures are effective also under these circumstances due to 
their generic nature. 
 
Intelligence timelines can vary from short to very long, as indicated by Table 38. 
This means that intelligence, as discussed previously, mainly cannot support a 
mission in progress. Tactical reconnaissance and surveillance assets combined with a 
near real-time C3 network are needed to assist strategic intelligence. Information 
sharing between platforms and tactical UAVs point the way to the future, while 
communications jamming and offensive information warfare methods become 
attractive countermeasures to networked combat assets. (Cf. Figure 48.) 
 
 
 IMINT SIGINT HUMINT 
Accuracy 15-600 m 1.5-15 km Centimeters…kilometers 
Timeliness Hours…days Minutes…hours Days…months 
Detail Centimeters…meters Depends on emitter type Variable 
Penetration Night/clouds Night/clouds Inside buildings 
Table 38: Comparative capabilities of IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT. Adapted from 
[Mar94].109 State-of-the-art IMINT and SIGINT assets produce better accuracy than stated 
here. 
 
EW support center 
The term “EW support center” (EWSC) is commonly used for the organization 
responsible for generation, maintenance and distribution of threat and CM techniques 
files—i.e. it is the organization responsible for transforming EW-related intelligence 
data to useful combat data. The following discussion uses the term EWSC for a 
larger field of responsibility, including support to procurement agencies, EW 
research (incorporating modeling and simulation, M&S), EW verification and 
validation (V&V), and aircrew EW training. The functions of the EWSC in this role 
are shown in Figure 44, which is related to Figure 43 but with aggregated 
intelligence and disaggregated EW functions. HUMINT is shown as providing 
physical samples of threat systems (missiles, radars, etc.), which are analyzed by the 
EWSC before countermeasures are developed and verified.110 SIGINT provides radar 
signatures, which the EWSC transforms into verified threat data files. Threat and 
countermeasure data files are distributed to the field, where the flight squadron’s EW 
officer compiles the threat files into mission data files (MDFs) that match the 
                                                 
109  The origin of the table in Marshall [Mar94] is MITRE Corporation paper ESD-TR-84-191 which 
has not been available for the present work. 
110  An example of long time delays in the EW analysis process: South Africa is claimed to have used 
two years to develop a multi-spectral flare against a newer generation IR missile that emerged in the 
region. The work included development of a digital data capture system (sic) for data analysis aimed 
at understanding the missile’s behavior, and development of a single-aperture broadband collimator 
system to generate target and CM settings for laboratory testing. The analysis process included X-
raying the seeker head for non-destructive characterization of components, laboratory testing, 
modeling and simulation, HWIL (hardware-in-the-loop) testing, integration with a mobile IR 
laboratory, field trials against aircraft flares followed by CM and IR jamming investigations, and final 
field trials to evaluate the new CMs. [Hei01b] 
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prevailing threat situation. The MDFs are loaded into the EWSP suite from a data 
cartridge that preferably also can record mission events. Recorded data together with 
post-mission debriefing information are used as feedback for subsequent missions 
[Pie01]. In peacetime the combat missions are exchanged for training missions, 
preferably on instrumented open air flight ranges. It is worth noting that compared 
with other recommendations for the MDF process (e.g. [Anon92c, Anon01d, 
Bat90]), the procedure described here puts stronger emphasis on the skill of the EW 
field officer. The view of an integrated EWSC team, responsible for EWSP support 
throughout the system’s life cycle, is an answer to learning cycle problems identified 
in Sowell [Sow97]. 
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Figure 44: Field of responsibility of the EWSC and its relation to intelligence and EW field 
support. Wartime mission support corresponds to training and validation in peace. The national 
intelligence data base is not literally a single entity but a collection of intelligence storages, 
including human knowledge and experience. Security rules and practices are part of the 
firewall. [How90b, How99, Ikr97] Legend: HWIL=hardware-in-the-loop, OAR=open air range. 
 
Mission planning and execution 
Typical mission stages are presented by the waterfall model in Figure 45. The figure 
is a companion to the onion skin model of Figure 12 and is drawn expressly to show 
the role of intelligence and reconnaissance in the mission process. The possible role 
of the EWSP suite in the reconnaissance and feedback processes will be discussed 
later. The effectiveness of the EWSP suite can benefit from mission planning in four 
ways: First, by the ability to correlate sensor data with map reference locations of 
known threats. Second, by information on the type of terrain and likely civil 
emissions that can influence EWSP false alarm rate. Third, by information that 
allows selection of self-protection strategy depending on mission phase. Fourth, by 
selection of modes and tasks of EWSP assets which are shared with other avionic 
functions. [Zan99]  
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Figure 45: The interaction of intelligence, tasking, mission planning, mission support, and 
reconnaissance in the helicopter mission process. 
 
 
Mission planning in its entirety covers functions that are not of interest for the 
present discussion (refueling, communication, flight corridors, etc.) but survivability 
aspects of mission planning are tightly connected to EWSP. However, the mission as 
a whole must dominate, since completion of mission objectives is the ultimate goal 
before which optimal survivability has to be sacrificed or, if costs are too high, the 
mission should not be executed. Figure 46 shows a conceptual mission survivability 
planning process as part of generating the overall mission plan. Detailed planning 
approaches are described e.g. in [Dei95, Gal01, Hus98]; a computer-based method 
for countering pop-up threats is described in [Dei97]. 
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Figure 46: Survivability estimation of mission flight leg. The output to the overall mission 
planning process can be e.g. cost matrix for the leg in case. An optional EW simulation can be 
performed for high-threat legs as a part of the aircerw mission rehersal process. There are two 
major feedback loops in the process, A and B. [Cha88, Gal01, Men94, Put01c] 
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The EWSP life cycle 
The “V” curve is well known in systems engineering and is applied to a special EW 
case in Fossier [Fos94], where a five-stage “V” consists of elaboration, definition, 
development, validation, and operational use.111 The simple “V” might adequately 
explain the development cycle of a product; a more comprehensive approach is 
needed to account for the entire life cycle of an EWSP suite. As a minimum a “W” 
curve of Figure 47 is needed, but the “V”-loops are in fact continuous. EWSP 
implications of the W-curve are discussed later. 
 
 
Operational use
Intelligence
Threats
Threat & technology
development
Techno-
logy
Time
W
-c
ur
ve
ACQUISITION
Intelligence
New
threats
Techno-
logy
Threat & technology
development
UPGRADES
Intelligence
New
threats
Techno-
logy
Threat & technology
development
Definition Verification &validation
Documented
experience
Verification and
validation
Development Modifications
Conceptualization Operational use
 
Figure 47: The W-curve interpretation of the life cycle of an EWSP suite. The driving force is 
threat and technology development; insight on development is gained through intelligence in 
various forms. Operational use is a stage that in itself requires support by intelligence, as 
indicated in figures 43 to 46. 
 
5.2.2 Aircrew factors 
 
EWSP has three aircrew-related issues that rise above others in importance: First, 
real-time situational awareness (SA). Second, skill to do whatever the situation 
requires. Third, means by which to take required actions. SA is informally defined as 
“knowing what is going on” and answers to the following informal questions: (1) 
Identification, “who is in the battle area?” (2) Location, “where is everyone?” (3) 
Activity, “what is everyone doing?” (4) Intent, “what is everyone going to do next?” 
[Sti99]. Together these lead to (5) Decision, “what should be done about it?” [Pet82 
p.3]. Situational awareness is a technical issue, one of having means to collect, fuse, 
distribute, and present information, but it also depends on individual cognitive 
capabilities [Kin95]. The aircrew’s vigilance and unobstructed view from the cockpit 
are important tools for information collection [Fis04b]. The wider aspects of 
information collection, fusion, and distribution are presented in Figure 48. The figure 
shows factors that are external to the platform; on-board SA factors will be covered 
as a part of the discussion on avionics integration. Related to SA is the question of 
                                                 
111  According to views in Fossier [Fos94] the industry should be responsible for the validation of the 
EW system, whereas the customer is responsible only for the operational use. This leaves open the 
question of who takes responsibility for such functions as intelligence, and techniques generation and 
testing. These questions will have to be addressed before commercial aircraft are fitted with EWSP 
systems.  
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fratricide, with one example being the US Marine Corps AH-1W Cobra firing a 
Hellfire missile at a friendly MBT in the 2003 Iraq War [Hew03, Rip03]. A deeper 
discussion of fratricide and battlefield identification falls outside the present 
discussion. 
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Figure 48: Networked C3 as a contributor to helicopter aircrew situational awareness. In the 
ideal communications network each node should be able to function as a relay station for other 
nodes. Situational awareness requires that the helicopter is able to share information with its 
own unit, with other fighting units, and with higher echelons. For a historical discussion, see 
[Ned01]. Legend: AEW=airborne early warning, SAR=synthetic aperture radar. 
 
 
The two other aircrew-related issues mentioned above are aircrew training and means 
to take actions. Aircrew training as a whole is beyond the scope of this study, but 
will be briefly touched in connection with validation and verification. The means by 
which to take actions is in the focus of susceptibility reduction in its entirety.  
 
5.2.3 Decision-making on EWSP 
 
The uneasy relation between EW experts and decision-makers was pointed out in 
Chapter 1. However, the rich body of publications on decision-making, stakeholder 
relations, and cognitive psychology (e.g. [Coh72, Con96, Eis92, Ho94, Hog80, 
Lan95, Min76, Mor83, Peh01, Sim92, Slo82, Woo97]) provides only general 
theories on decision situations. “Where do bad decisions come from?” asks 
Hammond et al. [Ham01], and gives the answer: “In many cases they can be traced 
back to the way the decisions were made—the alternatives were not clearly defined, 
the right information was not collected, the costs and benefits were not accurately 
weighed. But sometimes the fault lies not in the decision making process but rather 
in the mind of the decision maker.” The answer puts the blame not only on formal 
decision-makers, but also on the experts who fail to provide unbiased and adequate 
information to support the decisions.  
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One reason for “irrational” behavior in decision-making in the public sector on EW 
lies in industrial lobbying, and in political and personal aspirations. The decision 
process on the EWSP suite for the Nordic Standard Helicopter Program, presented in 
the case box below, is a blend of hidden agendas and non-EW issues—and also of 
trust in EW experts.112 Analysis of decision-making processes has attracted interest 
in the FSD community [Maa04], but it goes beyond the goals of the present work. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4 Conclusions on support functions 
 
Intelligence is the single most important support requirement of EWSP. Intelligence 
delays and reliability vary strongly, and this reflects in variations in the effectiveness 
of the EWSP suite. The second major EWSP support factor is the professionalism 
and resources of the EW support center. Reliability of the EWSP threat identification 
process depends on the quality of the MDF, which in its turn depends on the skill of 
the EW field officer that compiles the files and on the accuracy of tactical 
intelligence provided to him. The mission planning stage is of central importance 
also to the aircrew’s situational awareness and should be seen as a function that 
                                                 
112  A) The NSHP situation is more understandable when considering that the program ended up with 
four different helicopter types. Denmark selected the EH-101 whereas Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
chose the NH-90. However, the Finnish platform is the basic (German) troop transport version. 
Norway selected the naval version equipped for anti-submarine warfare. Sweden went for the troop 
transport version but changed the mission avionics suite for a Swedish-built one, and also equipped 
some helicopters for anti-submarine warfare in littoral waters. A common EWSP solution on these 
three NH-90 variants would have required three partly different installation efforts, whereas the end 
result was only two. 
B) The controversy surrounding the early stages of the Finnish helicopter program is described in 
some detail in Ahoniemi’s doctoral dissertation [Aho00]. Finnish views on problems in the 
multinational NSHP program have been expressed in Storgårds and Luoma [Sto01]. 
Case: Decision-making on the EWSP suite for NSHP helicopters. 
 
NSHP was a joint helicopter procurement program between Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden that peaked between 1999 and 2001. In an early stage of joint discussions Denmark 
made it clear that the country did not have resources to support two airborne EWSP suites and 
therefore intended to go for the EWSP solution on its F-16 fighter aircraft. What was not told was 
that Danish defense industry had a vested interest in this particular solution. The EW expert team 
of the other three nations made a unanimous recommendation on a solution that it saw as an 
advanced helicopter EWSP suite fulfilling—as the only offered solution—operational 
requirements of all three countries, providing opportunity for future cooperation between the 
nations, giving advantages in international operations, and having a price-tag in line with three of 
the four alternatives under consideration; while the risks were judged to be somewhat higher than 
for the competitors. Finland did the next move. Explaining that funding excluded anything but 
the cheapest EWSP solution it opted for the suite already installed by the helicopter 
manufacturer. Untold went a heated debate in 1997 between the Finnish Parliament and top-
ranking military decision-makers, where the latter had made ill-founded statements on the cost of 
setting up a battlefield helicopter unit. The number of helicopters therefore had to be maximized 
at the expense of equipment. With Finland gone the pressure mounted on Sweden to select a 
solution that would help its defense industry to meet earlier offset obligations. Thus Norway 
alone selected the solution proposed by the EW expert team. Apart from some pressure on 
Finland to change its mind there was no bargaining in order to find a common solution. 
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continues throughout the mission. Accurate SA throughout the mission requires that 
the aircrew has access to real-time intelligence and reconnaissance data, and that 
individual helicopters themselves can contribute with reconnaissance data to a C3 
network. 
 
Threat development is a major driving force of the W-curve. In order to provide 
flexible countermeasures to new threats the EWSP suite should, as far as possible, be 
software reconfigurable. However, the question of which factor, intelligence or 
technological progress, has a stronger impact on EW development is not answered by 
the W-curve. 
 
Decision-making processes are nonlinear and decisions are often formed by factors 
outside the realm of technical merits of the subject of interest. Chaos theory and 
multi-dimensional catastrophe theory could provide an approach to modeling these 
processes. However, bringing the discussion further, or attempting to model the 
decision-making process, is not beneficial for the present work. 
 
 
5.3 EWSP systems factors 
 
5.3.1 EWSP architecture and aircraft installation 
 
Benefits of an integrated EWSP suite were pointed out already in the 1960s [Ear78 
p.22/20]. Two decades later Coleman [Col98] lists the following five incentives: (1) 
Correlation of sensor inputs—improved situational awareness. (2) Coordination of 
countermeasures—selection and control of CM, multiple threat prioritization, 
optimum CM strategy. (3) Single interface to mission system—glass cockpit 
compatibility. (4) Coordinated mission data recording. (5) Coordinated 
interoperability with radar, IRST and weapons. To the list should be added (6) 
reduced aircrew workload, particularly under the stress of combat flight [Lum02, 
Tra97]. Figure 49 shows the functional diagram of an integrated EWSP suite. The 
CNI system (communication, navigation, and identification) handles external 
communication, and is therefore the helicopter’s link to the C3 network in Figure 48. 
Means for updating the aircrew’s SA are multifunctional displays, aural warning 
signals, and voice communication. Supporting instruments are the CNI system, 
ownship sensors, on-board mission data files, and software for data fusion.113 The 
number of on-board data files can be quite large, as shown in Figure 50. With similar 
types of sensors and data files—the RWR and ESM systems, for instance—the risk 
of conflicting information increases. This brings up the idea of a standardized EWSP 
data file architecture to improve the situation. Since competing manufacturers cannot 
be expected to agree on a common solution, it should be standardized e.g. within 
NATO. The idea is obviously new, since earlier discussions have focused on 
integrating hardware structures on aircraft, particularly antennas and other apertures, 
which is motivated by the weight increase between uninstalled and installed avionics 
system [Ree94, Ric96]. 
                                                 
113  The solution in Figure 49 is fictive, but similar ideas on integrated EWSP suites have been 
presented in Tran [Tran96, Tra97] and Fogh [Fog02]. 
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Figure 49: Functional diagram of an integrated EWSP suite in three different configurations; 
the DIRCM is not controlled by the EWC (EW controller). Data links S1…S9 can also be 
implemented as an EW bus. The DTU is for loading mission data to the suite, the recorder for 
recording sensor and other data for post-mission analysis. Signals S3 and S9 are conflicting as 
shown; a decision must be made on which unit controls blanking during RF jamming. 
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Figure 50: Block diagram emphasizing the potential number of on-board data files with a 
comprehensive EWSP/ESM solution. Correlating data from sensors with independent data files 
can lead to ambiguities and conflict situations. A standardized data file solution would improve 
the situation.  
 112
Platform installation is an engineering task which goes beyond the scope of the 
present work, but remarks on some issues that are not discussed elsewhere are 
motivated. First, sufficient aperture isolation is required and this can be a problem 
particularly for a small platform; ground reflections can also cause interferences. 
Second, data bus capacity requires careful consideration; particularly in threat 
evasion situations with rapid maneuvers. Third, cockpit MMI (man-machine 
interface) must observe pilot workload; for instance, automatic pop-up of threat 
information can impair the pilot’s ability to save the aircraft in high-threat situations. 
Fourth, air worthiness certification is required and this can incur significant costs 
[Zan99]. Location of apertures on the fuselage can be a major installation problem; 
Figure 51 shows locations on the AH-64 Apache Longbow.114 
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Figure 51: Location of EWSP apertures/subsystems and the RFI antenna on the AH-64 Apache 
Longbow [Anon02b]. For the installation of a proposed suite with DIRCM, see [Anon94b]. Since 
the ALQ-144 is a preemptive CM system it does not need an MWS. There are RF jammer 
transmit/receive antennas only in the forward sector. 
 
5.3.2 Validation and verification 
Definitions 
The present work distinguishes between the terms “validation” and “verification” in 
the spirit of ISO 9000:2000; while test and evaluation (T&E), and modeling and 
simulation (M&S) are means to reach the objectives of validation and verification. 
The relations are depicted graphically in Figure 52. Logically the sequence is to look 
first at verification and then at validation, since verification is connected to formal 
requirements but validation is related to less formal expectations. Verification is 
preceded by requirements specification, but this process will not be covered here. 
Verification and validation can both be directed at the EWSP suite per se, as well as 
at the installed suite. Validation has been described as “end-to-end verification i.e. 
meeting the user requirements in the operational environment” [Ste98 p.159] and 
encompasses not only the suite and platform but the total contribution of the EWSP 
suite to helicopter survivability. Validation, therefore, also covers threat systems and 
tactics, environmental factors, system responses, aircrew behavior, etc. 
 
                                                 
114  The question is not only about finding space for the physical location of apertures and dispensers. 
For instance, apertures should not be clogged by oil or snow, and the mechanical stress on the 
fuselage from flare ejections has to be considered. 
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Figure 52: Venn diagram showing the relations between validation, verification, M&S, and 
T&E. The objectives of validation are broader but less specific than those of verification. 
 
Verification 
Verification of an EWSP suite encompasses three major steps:115 (1) Laboratory 
measurements in a test bench to verify the performance of the integrated EW suite. 
(2) Measurement range tests, including measurements in an anechoic chamber, of the 
installed performance of the EW suite [Ali97, Rob00, Smi94]. (3) Open air range 
(OAR) flight tests to evaluate EW systems in background, clutter, noise, and 
dynamic environments [Anon00b p.41, Boe95, Smi94], including the performance of 
the suite in peacetime signal environment. The skill of the customer is put on trial in 
the second step, which requires that necessary operational scenarios have been 
defined.116 However, it has been shown that test results of the three methods correlate 
poorly. Operator actions are a prime source of test variances, but they do not explain 
all inconsistencies. One speculation regarding verification of RF jammers is that 
nonlinear effects may produce chaotic behavior of the system and lead to 
unpredictable jammer performance [Tuc01a, Tuc01b]. The idea is intriguing, but 
earlier observations of ambiguity problems in EW testing and simulations could very 
well explain the nonlinearities [Boe95].117  
Validation 
The problem of validation lies in substantiating the somewhat obscure “specified 
intended use” of the EW suite. As has been showed earlier, “rainbow threats” imply 
that almost any perceivable operational scenario is possible. Generic scenarios, 
building on national defense requirements with additional components from likely 
PSOs (peace support operations), are therefore an acceptable—although broad—
compromise in defining the “specified intended use”. A realistic validation process 
                                                 
115  A) The three-step procedure described here is suitable for procurement of existing systems. DOD 
5000.2-R [Anon96] defines a five-step T&E process, including four milestones, for cases when 
equipment are designed and built to specification. DOD 5000.2-R has a weakness (shared with US Air 
Force Manual 99-112) in concentrating on the acquisition phase and not supporting subsequent life-
cycle phases. The problem is discussed in Sowell [Sow97]. 
B) A useful set of performance standards for wideband RF receivers is given in Tsui et al. [Tsu89]. 
Similar standards for EO systems are not known to exist. 
116  A) According to Pywell and Stubley [Pyw96] an ideal EW equipment specification would in the 
pre-contract stage include time-histories of signals and functions as quantitative benchmarks for the 
aircraft and its installed EWSP suite: pulse density vs. frequency sub-band vs. time, instantaneous 
dynamic range requirements vs. time, number of simultaneous pulsed and CW emitters vs. time, etc. 
This level of detail, the paper claims, is rarely seen in specifications. 
B) The OAR stage covers aircrew behavior and is therefore a border case between verification and 
validation. 
117  Charland and Pulsifer [Cha02] reports of simulations on cross-polarization jamming on a generic 
terminal-phase seeker, and have found evidence of chaos and fractals in the results. 
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requires that the helicopter with its installed EWSP suite is flown under measurable 
conditions against simulated and/or real threat systems on an OAR. If possible, OAR 
tests should be repeated before a campaign, with the test range instrumented to the 
best possible match with the scenario to be expected.  
Modeling and simulation 
Modeling and simulation used on its own has the risk of producing distorted results. 
Combined with test and evaluation the methods can support each other. Figure 53 
shows M&S support to T&E at various EW development stages, to produce 
predictions of overall system performance. Slightly different model approaches are 
the cyclic M&S/T&E processes described in [Anon95b, Anon96]. 
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Figure 53: Support of digital M&S to T&E at various EW development stages. The use of M&S 
to define scenarios can be noted. Adapted from [Anon00b p.33]. The process focuses on RF 
aspects of EWSP and needs modification to fit EO equipment. Generic models can be used to 
advantage in M&S of infrared CMs [For01]. 
 
 
Modeling and simulation is frequently used in mission analysis, as indicated in 
Figure 46, and in the “flight test facility” stage of Figure 53. An important issue to 
platform survivability is the probability of kill (Pk) during a mission (cf. Table 5). 
Figure 54 shows one approach to estimating the minimum probability of kill (min-
Pk) for a flight leg. The idea is to calculate a basic-Pk (no countermeasures) that acts 
as reference for the flight leg and then minimize Pk with a mixture of threat 
elimination and evasion measures. Since threat avoidance and elimination actions 
will influence the threats, the calculated basic-Pk value is valid only for a limited 
flight leg. In reality alternative legs will have to be investigated in order to find the 
min-Pk for the leg in case; with consideration for limitations imposed by flight 
corridors, flight formations, etc. As with all simulations the level of detail in the 
M&S process has to be judged against the additional benefit given by the details. 
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Figure 54: Simulation of minimum probability of kill (Min-Pk) for a mission leg. Apart from the 
shown Pk iteration (“define new mix”), the full simulation requires different leg alternatives to 
be evaluated and the influence of threat avoidance and elimination actions to be fed back to the 
Basic-Pk calculation. Adapted from Arcidiacono [Arc87]. 
 
Test and evaluation 
Three verification types were mentioned above: test bench laboratory measurements, 
measurement range tests, and OAR flight tests.118 In addition Figure 44 covered 
some T&E resources of the EWSC. Table 39 reviews the benefits of M&S, ground 
tests, and OAR test flights. A more detailed discussion is presented in Appendix 1, 
Table 1-4. The ground tests in Table 39 split into three main groups: test bench 
laboratory measurements on uninstalled EWSP suites (or individual subsystems), 
indoor tests on installed suites, and outdoor tests on installed suites. Anechoic 
chambers provide an electromagnetically controlled test environment for precision 
RF measurements, which is of importance for repeatability and for testing classified 
signal parameters. Outdoor measurement ranges provide less controlled environment, 
and are also influenced by weather conditions, but are less expensive than anechoic 
chambers. In addition, outdoor ranges allow testing with all aircraft systems on, 
which is not possible in an anechoic chamber. [Ali97, Smi94] The cost of 
reverberating chambers is lower than that of anechoic chambers. Reverberating 
chamber measurement on helicopters has been investigated in at least one case 
[Joh98a]. The method is, however, feasible only for electromagnetic compatibility 
and interference (EMC/EMI). 
 
The alternative to OARs is to test airborne equipment against ground equipment 
during ordinary military maneuvers. This is a low-cost solution that produces some 
results, but its true value remains uncertain: Emitter control is scanty, the telemetry 
outfit is usually poor, and the measurements cannot be repeated to validate results. 
Military maneuvers attract the interest of other nations, and are monitored by foreign 
SIGINT assets, and the type of scenarios and emissions must be limited.  
                                                 
118  Requirements on open-air testing of IRCM systems have been outlined in a recent US DOD report 
[Anon04b]; OAR scenarios for fixed-wing applications are presented in chapter 7 of [Bru95]. 
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 M&S Ground tests OAR flight tests 
Test factors    
EW system — — — 
      number Very good Good Fair 
      credibility Fair Good Very good 
Threat system — — — 
      number  Very good Fair Fair 
     quality Fair Good Very good 
Tactics — — — 
      develop Good Very good Fair 
      evaluate Fair Fair Very good 
Identify sensitivities Very good Good Fair 
Configuration flexibility Good Very good Fair 
Environmental realism Fair Fair Good 
Operator interaction N/A Fair (threat) Good (threat and friendly) 
Systems interaction N/A Fair Good 
General factors    
      cost Lowest Moderate Expensive 
      capacity High Moderate Limited application 
      timeliness Hours/days Weeks/months Months 
      credibility Low Moderate High 
Table 39: Comparison of the advantages and limitations of three V&V methodologies. Adapted 
from Wright [Wri93].119 Ground tests can be performed on either uninstalled or installed EWSP 
suites; for installed suites an outdoor test site is less expensive than an anechoic chamber but 
outdoor measurements bring the risk of compromising classified system parameters.   
 
 
Dedicated OARs focused on EW testing are populated with high fidelity threat 
simulators in addition to basic range instrumentation and airspace control 
capabilities. Threats are reproduced by fixed and mobile simulators, as well as by 
operational materiel. [Anon85, Anon00b p.41, Kin04, Wod01]120  A drawback for 
helicopter EWSP is the less developed state of EO than that of RF test equipment. IR 
guided missiles are a particular challenge, since both IR and UV radiation should be 
produced with kinematic and intensity correctness [She01]. Figure 55 outlines a 
procedure for conducting an OAR test. In the procedure a predictive model of the test 
is first developed, next the test flight is conducted according to the “script” of the 
model, and finally test data are evaluated and performed with predictions. 121  If 
unaccounted discrepancies emerge the model must be change or the test be repeated. 
                                                 
119  A) The information in Wright [Wri93] is based on Farmer, W.D., Nagel, J.F.: Electronic Warfare 
System Operational Test and Evaluation, final report, Air Force Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland 
AFB, NM, 1980; and on Anon: Test Process for Electronic Combat Systems Development, vol. 2: 
Report and Appendices, USAF Ad Hoc Group, Andrews AFB, Washington DC, AFSC/TE, 10 
October 1982. These reports have not been available for the present work. 
B) The term “capacity” refers to how many enemy and friendly resources can be presented in a 
scenario, “timeliness” refers to how soon answers to key questions can be provided, and “credibility” 
to the degree to which users believe that the tool is representative of the system under test [Wri93]. 
120  An example of a large OAR is the Polygone area, spreading over 20,000 km2 across the Franco-
German border. The facility has three major tasks: (1) Development, testing, and verifying tactics in 
the face of actual or simulated SAMs. (2) Assessing and validating airborne countermeasures 
equipment. (3) Improving aircrew skills in a dense threat environment. Threats are reproduced by 
fixed and mobile simulators, as well as by operational materiel. The effectiveness of the Polygone 
facility has been enhanced by the expertise of former East-German military personnel, who provide 
insight into operational procedures of the former Soviet Union.  [Wod01] 
121  The process can be compared with the predict-test-compare philosophy in [Anon95b]. 
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Figure 55: Example of an OAR test process. The process has two feedback loops between M&S 
and T&E (A and B). Maneuvers and other aircrew actions are not part of the modeling and 
introduce a discrepancy that has to be observed when evaluating test data. The resemblance 
with Figure 46 can be noted. 
 
Aircrew training 
A benefit of OARs is the realistic aircrew EW training opportunity they offer 
[Wod01]. However, due to the cost of OAR flights they cannot be used as a standard 
EW training tool. A lower cost combat training solution has been proposed in the 
form of a data management system between multiple low-flying players, and a high-
flying control aircraft transmitting simulating threats and evaluating engagement 
outcomes. EW tests could form one part of these encounters. The solution is also 
claimed to improve realism compared with OAR training by switching off “killed” 
threats and providing correlation between countermeasure initiation and evasive 
maneuvers. [Ras98] A yet simpler training simulator is an on-board terminal for 
injecting predetermined threat scenarios into the aircraft’s avionics [Ras90]; this idea 
easily transforms to an embedded software training module, as indicated in Figure 
49. A shortcoming of the simpler solutions is that they are limited to the training role 
and provide no information for EWSP assessment. 
 
5.3.3 Conclusions on EWSP systems factors 
 
The avionics architecture of the helicopter directly influences EWSP effectiveness, 
aircrew situational awareness, and the helicopter’s ability to contribute to 
information sharing within a networked C3 solution. Management of on-board data 
files has not received sufficient attention and is therefore a bottleneck to the 
efficiency of the helicopter’s integrated avionics assets. 
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Platform installation requires careful attention to details. Verification and validation 
are costly processes but necessary to reach a cost-effective level of susceptibility 
reduction. Both modeling and simulation, and test and evaluation methodologies are 
needed to fulfill verification and validation objectives. Due to the cost of validation 
small countries will remain dependent on friendly nations—or on alliances—for 
adequate verification and validation of their EWSP suites, and to provide aircrews 
with sufficiently realistic training on operations in high-threat environment. 
 
 
5.4 Interactions and quantification 
 
5.4.1 Interactions 
 
The question of threat and countermeasure interactions was discussed in Section 
4.3.5. This discussion can be extended to all types of interactions in processes related 
to EWSP. Electromagnetic compatibility between friendly forces is one type, as was 
demonstrated during the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo when German Tornado 
aircraft were unable to fulfill SEAD missions due to jamming by American EA-6B 
Prowler aircraft [Put02b]. Interactions between hard-kill and soft-kill self-protection 
measures in the naval case have been pointed out in Thé and Liem [Thé92, Thé95]. 
Figure 56 shows a polygon model of interactions, based on an idea in [Thé92]. Both 
polygons contain k=8  nodes, which gives k(k-1) /2=28 interaction routes if all 
links are of relevance. Assuming that each node of the top-level polygon leads to a 
lower-level polygon with eight nodes, the number of isolated interactions on the 
lower level is 224. Continuing this discussion quickly uncovers an unmanageable 
problem complexity. The analysis therefore has to focus on the most important 
interactions—in line with requirements on aggregation in modeling and simulation. 
Adding to the difficulties for the EWSP suite is the fact that threat signals often are 
orders of magnitude weaker than interfering signals. 
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Figure 56: Interactions on different levels interpreted through polygons. Only one lower-level 
polygon and no levels beyond that are shown. Investigating all interaction alternatives becomes 
unmanageable, which indicates that complete validation of the EWSP suite is impossible.  
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5.4.2 Quantification 
There is need for a common base on which to evaluate the true value of an EWSP 
suite. The following are some value-related questions that should be answered 
[Joh98b]: (1) Which is the primary objective, to fight the enemy or to limit one’s 
own losses? (2) Which is the value of survivability measures that aid in minimizing 
own and maximizing enemy losses, but simultaneously increase the time needed to 
fulfill the primary task? (3) Which EWSP solution is to prefer, one that gives low 
losses assuming that both system and operator function optimally or one that gives 
somewhat higher losses but is robust and functions under all conditions? (4) How 
should one evaluate indirect effects, e.g. the value of survivability means that 
discourage the enemy from conducting an operation or forces him to select a 
secondary objective instead of the primary one? (5) How does one evaluate the 
psychological effects of an EWSP suite? From these questions Johansson [Joh98b] 
concludes that it is impossible to give a definite answer on how to quantify the value 
of an EWSP suite. The conclusion is incorrect in the sense that quantification is quite 
possible (e.g. Delphi and AHP methods), the problem is the reliability of the 
quantified information. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusions on EWSP systems and support issues 
 
The importance of scientific and technical intelligence to EWSP is overwhelming. A 
country either has an effective intelligence apparatus of its own or depends on other 
nations for basic information required for the effectiveness of EW resources. This 
comment is equally valid for the EWSC organization, which in the present work 
covers EW research, analysis of threat equipment, EW acquisition support, 
generation and management of emission and countermeasures files, verification and 
validation of EWSP systems, aircrew EW training, etc. 
 
Decision-making on EWSP shows similarities with comparable functions within the 
public sector. “Rational” processes are overruled by political and personal interests, 
and hampered by communication problems between experts and decision-makers. A 
further investigation of problems related to decision-making must be left for future 
research, but the discussion shows the difficulties in one of the central issues of this 
study: communication between stakeholders. 
 
Thorough EWSP validation is a costly infrastructure process, beyond the reach of 
independent small countries with limited defense budgets. This brings EWSP 
alternatives on the political agenda: A country either has to increase or reallocate 
defense funding to support acquired high-tech equipment, to become reliant on other 
nations for the support, to make acquisitions that in reality are a waste of money due 
to lack of required life-cycle support, or to consciously forsake platform protection 
by EWSP. 
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6 SYNTHESIS OF THE HOLISTIC VIEW 
 
 
6.1 The legacy of earlier chapters 
 
The earlier discussion leads to hypothesize a preliminary holistic view for 
susceptibility reduction of battlefield helicopters through EWSP; shown by the 
causal loop diagram (CLD) in Figure 57. The scope of this view is much wider than 
the guideline in Section 3.3.1. In the model susceptibility reduction (EWSP 
effectiveness) rests on four “pillars”: First, on intelligence that provides information 
on which survivability in general and countermeasures in particular are based. 
Second, on the importance of survivability in the defense budget; this defines 
allocation of resources and acts as the general constraint factor. Third, on scientific 
and technical (S&T) resources that facilitate transformation of intelligence into 
practical countermeasures. Fourth, on the importance of survivability in doctrine and 
tactics that governs conditions under which the EWSP suite should function. The 
engine of change lies in the exogenous group of threats, scenarios, and technology. 
Three questions from the earlier discussion need to be considered: First, how can the 
status of EWSP be improved in the eyes of decision-makers (= importance in defense 
budget)? Second, which role can a high-grade EWSP suite have in intelligence? 
These questions are indicated by the red arrows in the figure. Third, is the 
preliminary model correct and does it represent a true holistic view?  
 
 
Threats, scenarios, technology
EWSP
effectiveness
importance of
survivability in defense
budget
intelligence
effectiveness
importance of
survivability in doctrine
and tactics
EWSP S&T
resources
 
Figure 57: Preliminary view of major factors in susceptibility reduction of battlefield helicopters 
through EWSP. Effectiveness rests on four “pillars” (blue/bold links). The driving force of the 
model is the exogenous group of threats, combat scenarios, and technology. Interactions are 
mainly one-way (blue links), and delays in implementing changes are long, but questions on the 
status and role of EWSP introduce feedback links (red links). 
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Figure 58 reviews earlier discussed mission-related susceptibility factors and their 
relations in more detail, with the threat-intelligence interaction of Figure 57 as the 
starting point and the term “intelligence” used in the broad sense of information 
gathering and analysis, not only as the duty of a specialized organization. The arrows 
in Figure 57 represent dynamic changes, whereas Figure 58 takes a snapshot view 
that disregards resources and doctrinal questions although they are inherently 
present. The central implications of Figure 58 are: 
 
1. Intelligence works on different temporal levels. In the long term it supports 
the definition and acquisition phase, in the medium term it supports library 
production and the continuing validation process, and in the short term it 
supports missions.122 
2. Intelligence and the C3 network link the helicopter to the wider battlespace, 
only local information is produced by on-board sensors. Analysis of the 
EWSP suite alone, or as part of the helicopter’s avionics suite, requires 
introduction of artificial boundaries. 
3. The trio of susceptibility mechanisms of threat elimination, threat avoidance, 
and threat evasion are interwoven through common assets and objectives, and 
therefore also influence each other. Analysis of any single mechanism 
requires introduction of artificial boundaries. Consequently the EWSP has the 
potential to influence all three mechanisms of susceptibility reduction (cf. 
Figure 13). 
4. Situational awareness has a local dimension residing in the aircrew of an 
individual helicopter, and a holistic dimension that extends throughout the 
C3-networked battlespace. 
5. The EWSC strongly influences threat avoidance and evasion through its 
involvement in EWSP V&V, as well as in emission and CM data file 
generation and management. The influence on threat elimination depends on 
the geolocation capability of the EWSP suite. 
6. The effectiveness of the EWSP suite is the intersection of its intrinsic 
hardware/software (HW/SW) potential, of its validated performance and of 
mission-specific MDFs. Scenario changes impose requirements on 
revalidation, but since every scenario cannot be validated a decision has to be 
made on which ones to validate and which ones to bypass. 
7. Threat elimination depends heavily on friendly support assets—DEAD and 
support jamming—and requires considerable planning. A more flexible 
response is achieved if the mission plan can be altered during mission 
execution. 
 
A main conclusion of these implications is that network centric warfare capability 
has a positive effect on helicopter survivability and that the EWSP suite can 
contribute to this capability. Figure 58 does not resolve the earlier question whether 
the engine of EWSP development lies in the threats themselves or in technological 
progress. The figure does point out a major limitation of stealth technology: Stealth 
is effective only for threat avoidance, one of three susceptibility reduction 
mechanisms.  
 
                                                 
122  Note that here the term “intelligence” embraces reconnaissance and surveillance. 
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Figure 58: Text in figure. 
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One approach to susceptibility is presented in Ball [Bal03 p.54/fig.1.1]. When 
comparing the ideas of Ball to those presented in Figures 12, 13, 57, and 58, the 
marked difference is in the emphasis on financial resources, intelligence, and EWSP 
support assets. (The question of resource allocation between EWSP and non-EWSP 
survivability measures has not received attention in the open literature and is 
obviously solved on an ad hoc basis: Mission planning has to live with whatever 
support assets are allocated by the task order, regardless of whether the aircraft are 
protected by EWSP or not.123) It must therefore be concluded that a holistic view on 
EWSP can be based on different approaches and that the outcome will differ. This 
invariably leads to thoughts of a suprasystem for EWSP (cf. Figure 2), not unlike von 
Bertalanffy’s quest for a General System Theory [Ber68].  However, the General 
System Theory has not materialized, and pushing such ideas too strongly for EWSP 
may well be counterproductive. 
 
 
6.2 Aspects of holism in the EWSP context 
 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
The term “holistic view”—which in Section 1.3.4 was defined to be a surrogate for 
the term “systems thinking view”—is central to the present work. Section 6.2 
attempts to identify a bounded domain that is sufficiently unambiguous and has 
holistic hallmarks to be used as a guideline for investigating EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters. The search concentrates on two approaches, a temporal and a hierarchic 
approach that together would form a bounded time/hierarchy domain. 
 
6.2.2 Temporal bounds 
 
The time scale of EWSP-related events vary from at least 10-11 seconds, the 
approximate period time of a 94 GHz carrier, to 30 years (l109 seconds), the time 
scale of an EWSP system from design initiation to decommissioning. EWSP time 
scales therefore cover 20 orders of magnitude—more if optical carriers are 
considered. Various EW interest groups look at different parts of the total time scale, 
as depicted in Figure 59. The figure shows that the lower end of the time dimension 
covers physical, logical and similar factors, which are of main interest to EW 
systems engineers. The upper end of the time dimension is concerned with planning, 
acquisition and missions; i.e. events that are of prime concern to military planners 
and upper-echelon decision-makers. The range 1…103 seconds is a transition region 
which is of main concern to individuals focusing on platform performance, 
engagements, and survivability.  
                                                 
123  In light of the discussion around the successor to the US EA-6 Prowler it can be asked if 
optimization is possible at all: Overoptimistic expectations on stealth technology caused a deficit in 
US stand-off jammer capability (cf. Section 1.2.2). Only when the limitations of stealth became 
obvious did plans for a successor to the Prowler become urgent. It is difficult to find an optimal mix 
between stand-off jamming, attack aircraft, artillery, escort helicopters, on-board weapons, and EWSP 
in helicopter operations—especially under the uncertainties of the battlefield. Despite this the lack of 
an attempt to understand the basic mechanisms for optimization is striking. 
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Figure 59: Text in figure. 
 
 126
Based on Figure 59, events lasting 103 seconds (approx. 15 minutes) or longer can be 
selected candidates for the holistic definition in the temporal sense. This time limit 
coincides incidentally with the definition of a mission element in Dickmanns and 
Fürst [Dic98], which seeks to define a multiple scales representation of time for 
mission performance at several temporal levels. The 15 minute-definition would 
make individual mission elements the shortest time elements to observed in a holistic 
view; the upper limit are processes like the EWSP life cycle and the military long-
term planning period. Physical and technical details, individual pilot actions, etc. 
would be disclosed, since they easily clutter a holistic discussion on EWSP with 
excessive detail. 
 
6.2.3 Hierarchic bounds 
 
Luttwak [Lut87 pp.69-70] defines four strategic levels: the strategic, operational, 
tactical and technical levels. The present work needs a finer hierarchic grading. For 
that purpose a hierarchic grading of strategic, operational, tactical, entity, technical, 
logical, and physical levels is proposed in Table 40.124 There are three reasons for 
selecting this particular solution: First, in addition to ordinary strategic hierarchies it 
brings in both technical and human aspects of EWSP. Second, its conceptual 
similarity to the ISO OSI hierarchy of communication systems is recognizable. The 
hierarchy is therefore familiar to the military and electronics communities alike.125 
Third, the model has an ideological resemblance with the onion skin model of Fig. 
12 (solve problems outside-in, or top-down in Table 40), and also with the mission 
oriented analysis methodology proposed in Coyle et al. [Coy89, Coy99]. 
 
Based on Table 40 candidates for the holistic definition in the hierarchical sense are 
mission elements on the entity level and above. This definition would mostly be 
concerned with problems from the sphere of operational officers, national assets, 
logistics, and management; while excluding technical details.  
 
6.2.4 The fallacy of the bounded time/hierarchy domain 
 
When combining the temporal and hierarchical candidates for the holistic definition, 
the shaded rectangle in Figure 60 emerges. This will be referred to as the bounded 
holistic time/hierarchy domain of EWSP. It is attractive in defining a clear-cut 
domain for further investigation; it also highlights the area of interest of most EWSP 
stakeholders. The area of major interest to the EW community is indicated by the 
oval, and it emphasizes the communication problems in EWSP: Interests of 
stakeholders are located in diagonally opposite corners of the figure. 
 
                                                 
124  The term “entity” is adapted from Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 
2000-2035, Volume 9 Modeling and Simulation, National Academy Press, 1997, p.72. Its usage by 
the Navy and Marine Corps is in the context of hierarchic families of models (strategic, operational, 
tactical, entity), similar to Luttwak’s definition of strategic levels. In the present work the term 
“entity” points to the helicopter, either singly or as member of an operational unit (entity). 
125  In EW modeling and simulation a four-level construction has been defined by US authorities: 
Level I, engineering; Level II, platform; Level III, mission; and Level IV, theater or campaign 
[Anon95b]. For instance, the Joint Modeling and Simulation System (JMASS) covers the two lowest 
levels of this hierarchy [San00]. 
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HOSTILE FRIENDLY Hierarchy 
level Threat component EWSP component Support component 
Strategic Scientific, engineering, and 
economic capability to 
develop and field new threat 
systems, and the will to do so. 
Research on CMs to 
potential threat systems 
and technologies, 
training and validation. 
Intelligence on the 
actions and intentions of 
the potential enemy, and 
of threat capabilities. 
Operational Decision to deploy threat 
systems and capabilities to 
conflict area. 
Requirements on EWSP 
configuration(s) and 
emission data files. 
Intelligence on enemy 
deployment, intentions 
and capabilities. Tasking. 
Tactical Decision to group threat 
systems and capabilities to 
mission area. 
Mission planning, 
compilation of mission-
specific MDFs. 
Intelligence on enemy 
grouping; mission 
planning with support. 
Entity Decision to use threat systems 
against friendly assets. 
Aircrew SA, support to 
threat avoidance & 
elimination, threat 
evasion. 
Reconnaissance and real-
time C3 support for 
mission SA, SEAD and 
other fire support assets. 
Technical Performance of threat systems 
and technologies, sensor 
coverage & C3 delays, 
engagement timelines. 
EWSP systems and 
technologies, FOV, 
POI, AOA, sensitivity, 
Pd, Pfa, maneuvers. 
Preemptive only: 
intelligence, R&D, V&V, 
aircrew training, etc.  
Logical Engagement tactics, spatial & 
temporal signal distribution, 
modulation types. 
Tactics, temporal & 
spatial CM distribution, 
modulation types. 
Preemptive only: 
intelligence, R&D. 
Physical Time, space, energy, speed, 
frequency, BW, acceleration, 
power. 
Time, space, energy, 
speed, frequency, BW, 
acceleration, power. 
Preemptive only: R&D. 
Table 40: Proposed EWSP hierarchy.  The fourth strategic level according to Luttwak [Lut87 
pp.69-70]—the technical level—is divided into the technical, logical and physical levels. The 
entity level covers mission events on the platform level, i.e. the human dimension in EWSP. The 
transition region in Figure 59 overlaps the border between the entity and technical levels. 
Considering the short engagement timelines of helicopters there are essentially no effective 
support measures once an engagement commences (shaded cells). 
 
 
Despite the attractive idea of a bounded holistic domain, a critical analysis reveals 
that the interpretation is oversimplified, as exemplified by the events depicted in 
Figure 60: Assume that the strategic/operational SIGINT asset intercepts a new threat 
parameter—an event that may last only a short while. The information is delivered to 
the EWSC where it is analyzed and identified as a new threat mode. The information 
is subsequently used in threat and countermeasure techniques files on the helicopter 
and in the data files of the SIGINT aircraft as an identified emitter mode. If the 
implications of the observed threat mode are serious enough, an EWSP modification 
program will have to be initiated.126 A similar chain of events is possible if the 
EWSP suite of the helicopter records emissions with sufficient fidelity and the data 
can be used to update threat libraries. It is therefore obvious that the bounded 
time/hierarchy domain is critically dependent on its environment, and that a strict 
division into holistic and non-holistic domains is too restrictive. A true holistic view 
must accept interactions on different temporal, hierarchical and other levels, and 
between different survivability mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
126  Incidents of this kind are reported e.g. in [Bro99, Gri00].  
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Figure 60: The bounded time/hierarchy domain of EWSP, the EW community's area of interest, 
and interactions opposing the interpretation of a strictly bounded holistic view on EWSP of 
battlefield helicopters. 
 
 
In conclusion, the holistic view can take the bounded domain in Figure 60 as its 
starting point but must accept the necessity for interaction outside this domain. The 
definition below is therefore taken as the holistic view of EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters. The consequence of open bounds is that the holistic view remains partly 
open to interpretation. 
 
Definition 1: 
 
 
 
6.3 Revisiting the tentative idea for the present work 
 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 contain the essence of the holistic view on EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters (recalling, however, that Figure 57 has been discussed only partly). 
Before a more detailed discussion it is motivated to compare the picture so far with 
the tentative idea of Figure 3. The comparison reveals the following:  
 
1. Technical and scientific details in Figure 3 are not of prime concern for the 
holistic view, although they can work as “glitches” with impact on the 
bounded time/hierarchy domain. The importance of verification and 
validation has been amplified. 
The holistic view of EWSP of battlefield helicopters focuses on the 
bounded time/hierarchy domain and events or actions that interact 
with this domain. 
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2. The role of intelligence, particularly scientific and technical intelligence, and 
the role of the EW support center have grown in importance compared with 
what is indicated in Figure 3. 
3. Stakeholders are present mainly as a collective group and behavioral issues 
have been omitted by necessity. The exception is the aircrew, its training 
level, situational awareness, and actions during the mission. 
4. Issues of strategy remain only indirectly as alliances or coalition partners and 
the influence that these have on EWSP. 
5. Missing from Figure 3 are the following: 
- Resource constraints, particularly funding of EWSP and the 
competition from other defense programs (although this was initially 
discussed as the “umbrella” problem). 
- Questions of threats and scenarios and their implications for EWSP. 
- Survivability thinking as a whole and the role of EWSP to platform 
and mission survivability; the role of SEAD and other support factors. 
- Mutual interactions among the holistic mechanisms and the dynamics 
introduced by the interactions on different temporal levels. 
 
It is obvious that the view has changed considerably in the course of the work and 
that the synthesis must still be refined. In line with Figure 4 the discussion thus far 
has been bottom-up, the remaining discussion will be top-down. The next approach 
to holistic thinking will be through FSD modeling and simulation. 
 
 
6.4 The top-down view on EWSP 
 
Military modeling and simulation is traditionally depicted by the M&S pyramid 
shown in Figure 61a [Anon01e, Coo03]. In light of the earlier discussion a holistic 
view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters requires a fifth level, since a campaign can 
be successful only when the necessary capability is available. The priorities of this 
study can therefore be depicted by the cone in Figure 61b. 
 
 
Campaign
Engineering
Engagement
Mission
Campaign
Engineering
Engagement
Mission
Capability
(a) (b)
Higher resolution
Higher aggregation
 
Figure 61: Abstraction levels in the traditional military M&S "pyramid"(a); versus the cone of 
priorities of the present work (b). The bottom level, engineering, also covers basic EWSP science 
issues such as atmospheric physics and pyrotechnics chemistry. 
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6.5 Modeling the EWSP capability level 
 
6.5.1 The conceptual model 
 
Figure 62 shows a conceptualization of a model on the capability level. The approach 
is a modification of Figure 57, with two major changes: First, the addition of 
interactions with threats, scenarios, and technology. EWSP is assumed to trig further 
development of threats, as can be seen e.g. in the present race between directed 
infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) and development of IR missiles with home-on-
jam (HOJ) capability. Thus, threat development in itself lowers EWSP effectiveness, 
which is observed by the negative interaction. The eventual influence of positive and 
negative links is largely a question of delays: are threats developing faster than 
countermeasures or vice versa? Second, the link from intelligence to the defense 
budget has been substituted with a link to doctrine and tactics. This is in line with 
usual military practices, where operational demands govern budget priorities. The 
question here is, how the operational officers responsible for defining staff 
requirements prioritize survivability and EWSP. The links from doctrine and tactics 
are therefore marked arbitrary (a, either + or -). The possibility for EWSP to directly 
influence its budget allocations is somewhat obscure (dashed link), but an example 
was seen during the 1997 discussion in the Finnish Parliament on the Defence 
Force’s plans for helicopters. A view expressed by members of Parliament was to 
protect transport helicopters by EWSP instead of using escort helicopters. 
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Figure 62: Conceptual approach to the capability model; a modification of Figure 57 with three 
remaining “pillars”. The variable “importance of survivability in doctrine and tactics” is  seen 
to be central for the system, but torn between competing needs the operational staffs may vote 
either for or against survivability.  The ability of EWSP to directly influence its budget 
allocations is seen as questionable (dashed link).  
 
FSD (Forrester system dynamics) allows the dynamic interactions in Figure 62 to be 
studied in some detail, even if quantitative data has to be hypothesized for the present 
work. The aim is not to arrive at a quantitatively “precise” answer, but to understand 
the behavior of the interactions and particularly to see if the system contains a 
detectable leverage point. A further aim is to use FSD as a tool for judging the 
quality of thinking represented by Figures 57 and 62. 
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6.5.2 The problem 
 
The first FSD model of the present work—the Capability Model—is constructed on 
the problem statement and dynamic hypothesis given below. The model is presented 
in Figure 63 and simulations in Figure 64. The motivations for quantitative values of 
constants are summarized in Appendix 2, Table 2-2. 
 
Problem Statement 1:  
 
 
Dynamic Hypothesis 1:  
 
 
 
The first point to note is that neither the problem statement nor the dynamic 
hypothesis refer to any existing EWSP system. The second point is that the dynamic 
hypothesis is partial and covers only the initial conditions, which implies that the 
system represented by the equilibrium criterion is representative for dynamic 
situations. Together these two notes mean that validation is possible only by critical 
judgement of simulations for different circumstances, including sensitivity analysis 
by Monte Carlo simulation. The question “does it make sense?” is of critical 
importance to the validation. 
 
6.5.3 Discussion on the Capability Model 
 
In order to satisfy the dynamic hypothesis the rate of threat flow at t = 0 was selected 
as 12.5 “lethalities” per month. The unit “Lethality” represents the entire spectrum of 
parameters that the EWSC has to master in order to detect, identify and classify 
threats, and to develop countermeasures to them. Examples are radar PRF and 
modulation on pulse; IR seeker sensitivity and modulation; laser PRI and 
wavelength; RF an IR jamming technique; flare radiance and ejection timing, etc. In 
order to satisfy the initial condition (12.5 Lethality/Month) the ratio between 
INTELLIGENCE EFFICIENCY and INTELLIGENCE DELAY had to be 
matched;127 similarly CM IMPORTANCE FOR THREAT DEVELOPMENT had to 
be selected precisely. Both, however, are within realistic bounds. 
 
                                                 
127  The ratio INTELLIGENCE EFFICIENCY/INTELLIGENCE DELAY represents a decay fraction. 
The true influence of the factors in Figure 62 on EWSP, the dynamic 
behavior of the modeled system, and the possible existence of a 
leverage point of importance to EWSP are not known. That is, which 
is the relation between structure and dynamics of the model? 
Simulations shall show the dynamic behavior of the model over a time 
period of 30 years in relation to an equilibrium at t = 0. For this 
purpose the flow of threats in Figure 62 is assumed to be constant in 
the open-loop case. 
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Figure 63: FSD model for building EWSP capability, based on Figure 62. Arrows are colored to 
highlight similarities with Figure 62. Changes relative to Figure 62 are partly due to the 
requiremets of simulation, partly a consequence of improved understanding of the system 
gained by building the model. The exogenous variable “EWSp influence on budget changes” is 
used to investigate the effects of sudden budget changes (cf. dashed link in Figure 62).  
 
 
Transformation of Figure 62 to the FSD model showed that the conceptual model 
figure contained inaccuracies that had to be corrected to allow a useful simulation. 
The main changes are summarized in Table 41. 
 
 
Change Reason for the change 
Block headings The scope of “importance of survivability in defense budget” is too wide, 
focusing on EWSP is in line with the problem statement. “EW S&T resources” 
has been renamed “EWSC capacity”. Issues of doctrine and tactics are handled by 
operational staffs, which are reflected in “operational demand on EWSP budget”. 
“Threats, scenarios and technology” has been narrowed to “Threats”, although 
simulation demanded threats to be divided into two parts in Fig. 63. 
Deleted links The link “EWSP effectiveness”…”intelligence on threats, scenarios, and 
technology” in Figure 62 does not have any counterpart in Figure 63. EWSP is an 
intelligence asset on the tactical level; its merits as an intelligence asset are 
judged by operational officers responsible for producing staff requirements. 
Added link The link “Identified threats” … “EWSC capacity” is necessary in order to provide 
“EWSC capacity” a reference. It points to a conceptual error in Figure 62: 
Capability does not depend on money alone, information is also needed. 
Table 41: Main differences between Figures 62 and 63, and motivation for implementing these 
changes. The changes are also a result of the level of aggregation in the FSD model. 
 133
6.5.4 Discussion on Capability Model simulations 
 
The three most striking results of the simulations are, first, the robustness of the 
model, next the strong correcting behavior of the feedback loop, and thirdly the 
filtering (smoothing) effect of delays in the system. Table 42 summarizes 
conclusions on the simulations. 
 
 
Simulation Dynamic behavior 
Basic Run The strongest fluctuation is in the growth of “Identified threats”. 
This is a logical consequence of selecting the quotient “Treats with 
CMs” / (“Threats with CMs” + “Identified threats”) as the 
dominating feedback parameter in the auxiliary “operational 
demand on EWSP budget”.128 
30% increase in THREAT 
INCENTIVE at t=120 
An increase of this kind is possible e.g. for a small country that 
decides to participate in international operations in a new region 
with a strongly different threat environment. The step function most 
strongly influences “Identified threats”, which is natural since this 
level is directly influenced by the increase. In order to improve the 
situation the requirements on EWSP should be changed as soon as a 
threat increase of this kind is anticipated. 
Increase in  EXPECTED 
EWSP EFFECTIVENESS 
from 0.8 to 0.9 at t=120 
The sudden strong increase in the demand on EWSP effectiveness 
causes a rapid increase in the need for finances, and it 
understandably drives “Identified threats” to its lowest value. The 
situation, however, shows signs of leveling by t=360. 
50% increase in “required 
EWSP budget” at t=120 
The sudden increase in the EWSP budget improves the situation, but 
not nearly as much as a smaller relative increase in the required 
effectiveness (which leads to a stronger but delayed budget 
pressure). It is most likely that a sudden influx of money is 
ineffective for a long time, since the EWSC does not have time to 
respond to the change.  
Sensitivity analysis The system is not sensitive to any of the parameter changes. The 
range of fluctuations is not symmetric since a number of parameters 
were changed by -50…+100%. 
Conclusion The behavior of the model brings up the question of synchronized 
development of all factors contributing to EWSP. A “quick-fix” by 
a sudden budget increase in one area may well be wasted unless 
supporting areas are able to keep pace. Also, natural delays in 
building resources do not support sudden budget changes; 
competence in EWSP has to be built over time. The conclusions are 
general and not restricted to EWSP. 
Table 42: Conclusions on the dynamic behavior of the EWSP Capability Model. 
 
 
The most critical factor to the behavior of the model is the operational decision-
making process and its expectations on EWSP. In this sense it can be called a 
leverage point. Influencing the political level to make sudden budget changes leads 
to improvements, but it is nonetheless wasteful because the system cannot respond 
quickly. 
 
                                                 
128 FSD models are constructed from “levels” (also called “stocks”), “rates” (“flows”), exogenous 
variables/views (usually numerical constants), and “auxiliaries” (auxiliary equations/variables). An 
auxiliary takes the present value of other variables (levels, constants or other auxiliaries) to compute 
its own present value. 
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Figure 64: Simulations with the Capability Model.  The behavior of four parameters under 
different conditions have been computed and a Monte Carlo simulation (bottom) has been 
performed to test system sensitivity to parameter changes. 
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The Capability Model is built on the highest possible aggregation level, which is 
reflected in its accuracy. For instance, the major factor governing the behavior of the 
model is the comparison between “Identified threats” and “Threats with CMs” that is 
done in the auxiliary “operational demand on EWSP budget”—usually termed a 
decision rule in FSD. “Identified threats”, however, includes threats that are being 
processed by the EWSP but for which countermeasures have not yet been devised. In 
order to make the model more accurate the level “Identified threats” should be 
divided into two parts, one part (“Newly identified threats”) which provides feedback 
to operational decision-making, a subsequent part (“Identified threats being 
processed by EWSC”) which does not influence decision-making any more. Another 
factor that should be changed when improved accuracy is needed is to impose 
restraints on budget changes to better model the ordinary situation with a fixed 
budget frame and a number of programs competing for funding. 
 
6.5.5 Lessons from building the Capability Model 
 
The major lessons learned in building the Capability Model are: 
 
1. Modeling without simulation is at least as wrong as simulation with 
hypothetical data. The stringent systematic work that was required to produce 
a model that could be simulated revealed inaccuracies and errors of thought 
in the cognitive models represented by Figure 62, indirectly also by Figure 
57. The corrected CLD is shown in Figure 65. It must be assumed that 
inaccuracies can be found in the DFDs of earlier chapters by remodeling and 
simulating them. 
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Figure 65: CLD representation of Figure 63 showing the level to which Figure 63 can be 
aggregated for a generad discussion on the problem. 
 
 
2. A major restriction to quantitative accuracy is assumptions on human 
behavior. The advantage of FSD is that since the dynamic behavior of the 
model is largely governed by the structure of the model, inaccuracies in 
quantitative data are smoothed out. This was demonstrated by the Monte 
Carlo simulation above. 
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3. The model becomes generic when the level of aggregation or abstraction is 
sufficiently high. This indicates that survivability of military platforms have a 
common core of problems. On the other hand, this observation comes 
naturally from Figure 12 since the onion skin model is applicable to any 
platform type. 
4. Requirements to modify conceptual models when shifting to FSD models are 
due not only to errors in thinking. Limitations in the FSD paradigm and the 
software package introduce their own restrictions, with the result that the 
simulated model is not an accurate description of the original problem.  
 
 
6.6 Modeling the EWSP campaign level 
 
6.6.1 Conceptualization 
 
The most popular theoretical interpretation of a military campaign is given by the 
Lanchester-type of differential equations. The short form, also termed “Lanchester’s 
equations for modern warfare” [Tay80 pp.23-24], is considered to be a sufficient 
starting point for this study. The case under study is in reality composed of 
heterogeneous forces (several or many combatant types), but this leads to problems 
which are exceedingly difficult to solve [Tay83 p.248] and are therefore beyond the 
scope of the present work. In order to give a realistic insight into the role of EWSP 
on the campaign level, the model—henceforth called the Campaign Model—should 
include the influences of intelligence, battle damage repair (BDR), and other support 
activities, which therefore are reflected in Problem Statement 2: 
 
Problem Statement 2:  
 
 
The conceptual idea for the Campaign Model is shown in Figure 66. The CLD is not 
concerned with deployment of assets to the combat area, only with the actual battle. 
According to the CLD concept the model depends on a number of factors, for 
instance: (1) Friendly standoff assets (SEAD, artillery support, etc.) that are required 
to be strong in order to have a preemptive influence on enemy activities. (2) 
Protection by flight path, which depends not only on the route, but also on 
topographic and atmospheric conditions. (3) Contribution of EWSP to intelligence, 
which is possible only if the EWSP suite has the capacity to produce detailed 
information. In addition, the quality of the C3 system determines if the collected 
information can be used in real time. (4) Enemy air defenses, which influence 
friendly airborne standoff support assets but are of no concern to friendly artillery. 
The amount of detail that should be included in the model has to be judged against 
the chief aim of the model. A better understanding on these questions is gained by 
simulating the model. 
The role of various campaign-related actions and assets to helicopter 
survivability and availability is not known. In particular, what is the 
value of EWSP in the campaign framework? 
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Figure 66: CLD concept (mental model) for the Campaign Model. The diagram represents a 
combat situation between two forces, i.e. a force-on-force engagement in the spirit of 
Lanchester’s combat models. Legend: MDF=mission data file. 
 
 
The Campaign Model is expected to behave according to the short form of 
Lanchester’s equations given in Figure 67, and which form Dynamic Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
Dynamic Hypothesis 2:  
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Figure 67: Dynamic hypothesis for the Campaign Model. The model is expected to behave 
similar to the short form of Lanchester equations for two homogenous forces. For the shown 
case x0 > y0 and a > b.129 EWSP is expected to improve the situation for friendly forces Y, i.e. to 
increase a.  
 
                                                 
129   For X to win the battle the requirement x0/y0 > (a/b)1/2 should be satisfied according to 
Lanchester’s square law [Tay80 p.23], which is not the case in Figure 67. 
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6.6.2 Discussion on the Campaign Model 
 
The FSD model in Figure 68 is an implementation of the Lanchester equations, with 
added features to allow investigation of the influence of EWSP and BDR. Certain 
scenario-related features are included and for that reason the enemy is modeled in 
more detail than friendly forces. The motivation behind the selected parameter values 
is given in Appendix 2, Table 2-3. Helicopters and other friendly assets have not 
been separated at this level of aggregation; EWSP therefore influences all friendly 
platforms. 
 
The Campaign Model lacks the signature influence shown in Figure 66. This is 
another example of faulty reasoning, similar to the discrepancy between Figure 63 
and the Capability Model. Bringing signature issues into the Campaign Model would 
require a considerable extension of the model on the technical level and require 
simulation on different time scales. The auxiliary “MDF quality” (cf. Figure 66) is 
included to show that this question has not been forgotten. However, MDF quality is 
an extremely nonlinear factor: if one single critical parameter is missing (carrier 
frequency, PRF, missile IR/UV signature, etc.) the momentary value of the MDF can 
be very low. 
 
The Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients are basically given by the parameters 
FRIENDLY COMBAT POTENTIAL and ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS 
(“a” and “b” respectively in Figure 67). Intelligence (“intelligence on enemy assets”) 
also contributes to “a”. Intelligence consists of strategic intelligence 
(INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS) and the additional contribution of EWSP 
(EWSP INTEL CONTRIBUTION). The total intelligence effectiveness is defined as 
the percentage of relevant information on the enemy that can be gathered in a 
specific time. This specific time is the time that the enemy is assumed to remain at a 
locatable position where he can be destroyed by support assets before redeploying. 
The time is represented by the constant AVERAGE TIME ACTIVE. 
 
The influence of ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS is divided into two parts, 
high-tech and low-tech weapons. EWSP is assumed to have an influence only on 
high-tech weapons (missiles, radar-guided guns, etc.). The influence of EWSP is 
therefore scenario related, as defined by the constant HIGH-TECH THREAT RATIO 
that is given a value between 0 and 1 (the value 1 indicates that all threats are high-
tech).  
 
Three scenario-related factors have been included in order to provide a means to 
study the effects of such influences. First is the earlier mentioned HIGH-TECH 
THREAT RATIO. Second, friendly strength is assumed to have some pre-emptive 
effect on the enemy’s readiness to engage targets (cf. “threat activity” in Figure 66). 
This is done with the nonlinear lookup table “preventive effect”. It can be argued that 
AVERAGE TIME ACTIVE also should be influenced, but the underlying idea is that 
the enemy shifts positions twice a day and this routine does not change. Third, the 
intensity of the campaign can be altered with the lookup table “campaign intensity”. 
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Figure 68: The FSD Campaign Model. The model is an implementation of the basic Lanchester 
equations for modern warfare: The parameters FRIENDLY COMBAT POTENTIAL and 
ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS correspond to the basic Lanchester attrition-rate 
coefficients and the bold/blue arrows their related links. Features are added to allow the 
influence of EWSP, intelligence, BDR, and certain scenario-related attributes to be studied.  
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The influence of EWSP is twofold. First, it reduces the attrition rate of high-tech 
threats, but the reduction depends on MDF quality, which in turn depends on 
intelligence effectiveness. Second, the EWSP influences intelligence by adding to 
INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS, which represents strategic and other tactical 
intelligence resources. 
 
Figure 69 shows a corrected and condensed CLD of the Campaign Model, as it is 
implemented in the FSD model. The figure highlights the degree of changes that take 
place when building a simulation model from the mental model in Figure 66. 
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Figure 69: CLD showing the eventual design of the Campaign Model in a condensed form. The 
model has only one major feedback loop (outer loop) and one auxiliary loop (inner loop). In the 
FSD model, however, “EWSP effectiveness” is divided between two exogenous variables. 
 
 
6.6.3 Discussion of simulation results 
 
Simulations for three different cases are shown in Figure 70. Table 43 summarizes 
the findings of these simulations. The sensitivity analysis of “Active friendly assets” 
and the enemy’s total assets are presented in Figure 71. Friendly and enemy assets 
that are killed or undergoing BDR are not included in these totals. Apart from HIGH-
TECH RATIO the scenario-related influences have hot been activated. The reason is 
that they were found to introduce nonlinearities that would have complicated 
understanding of the main problem to investigate, i.e., the link to Dynamic 
Hypothesis 2 would have been obscured. Although the scenario can be of value on 
the campaign level when modeling a specific case, in this case the scenario 
parameters are an example of introducing excessive details into a model. Thus, there 
is also no real need to separate enemy assets into active and passive ones. 
 
The sensitivity analysis confirms that the model is robust under the introduced 
parameter variations, which mostly range between -50% and +100% relative to the 
nominal values given in Appendix 2, Table 2-3. The dynamic behavior of the 
Lanchester-type functions is retained, superimposed with the influence of BDR. 
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Dynamic behavior of the
Campaign Model:
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Figure 70: Simulations with the Campaign Model. The simulations confirm that the models 
behave according to Dynamic Hypothesis 2 even when parameter values are changed. The 
simulations highlight the earlier discussion on the role of EWSP to platform survivability: 
EWSP contributes to platform survivability both directly and indirectly.  
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Simulation Dynamic behavior 
Basic Runs The model shows the typical behavior of Lanchester-type attrition models. 
BDR makes a significant difference to both parties and is therefore an 
important survivability mechanism from the field commander’s viewpoint. 
However, shortening BDR from 48 to 24 hours gives only a marginal 
improvement and it must be asked if such an action is cost-effective. 
Attacking enemy BDR assets can be a better way of reducing the enemy’s 
combat effectiveness. 
Intelligence Effect Compared with Basic Runs the imperfect intelligence in the Intelligence 
Effect simulations lowers enemy attrition in a straightforward manner, as can 
be expected. This is not a consequence of the model’s structure, but follows 
from the quantitative data used. 
EWSP 
Contribution 
The contribution of EWSP to survivability is strongly scenario-dependent. In 
the low-tech scenario (80% low-tech threats) friendly losses amount to 
approx 54% at the end of the one-month combat, in the high-tech scenario 
(80% high-tech threats) the losses are only 22%. However, the value of 
EWSP decreases if the MDF or other contributing factors have limitations. 
Conclusion Simulation of the Campaign Model does not show unforeseen behavior, but 
neither should it be expected with a model of this simplicity and 
straightforward feedback loops. The sinking marginal value of BDR is of 
interest and should be noted when developing BDR services. The direct 
influence of EWSP on the enemy’s combat effectiveness (attrition-rate 
coefficient) is evident in the simulation; in this regard EWSP is superior to 
BDR for preserving friendly combat resources. The main value of the 
Campaign Model is in providing understanding of which factors are 
important and which are not when modeling on this aggregation level. 
Table 43: Conclusions of the dynamic behavior of the Campaign Model. 
 
6.6.4 Lessons from building the Campaign Model 
 
The major lessons learned in building the Campaign Model are: 
 
1. From the commander’s perspective BDR can be more effective than EWSP in 
sustaining the number of combat-ready helicopters. However, EWSP directly 
influences the enemy’s combat effectiveness, whereas BDR improves 
friendly combat effectiveness indirectly by providing more combat-capable 
assets. In addition, the value of EWSP in bolstering aircrew moral is also a 
factor to take into account; BDR—together with vulnerability reduction—is 
effective only when the aircraft first has taken a hit. 
2. The FSD paradigm supports simulation only on a single time scale, i.e. on a 
single hierarchic level. Thus an FSD model cutting vertically through e.g. 
Figures 60 and 61 is not possible, since it would require the model to operate 
with different time scales to ensure that long-term delays (intelligence delay, 
campaign duration, mission duration, etc.) do not filter out short-term 
phenomena (flight leg duration, exposure duration, engagement duration, 
etc.). There is a need for an extension of the FSD paradigm to hierarchic 
modeling and simulation.130 Hierarchy in the form of submodels would also 
ease partial testing of the model. 
                                                 
130  The lack of hierarchy can be traced to the systems thinking school. Laszlo [Las72 pp.14-15], for 
instance, states: “(…) the systems view always treats systems as integrated wholes of their subsidiary 
components and never as mechanistic aggregate parts in isolable causal relations.” The idea of 
system-of-systems is not accepted in such proclamations. 
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3. FSD is a modeling alternative as long as the scenario can be presented two-
dimensionally. A three-dimensional scenario can in principle be processed by 
outlining the scenario (topographic map, enemy deployment and 
sensor/weapon coverage, flight route, etc.) on spreadsheets and using the data 
from spreadsheet cells along the flight route. However, more advanced 
methods are available for processing three-dimensional map data. FSD 
should not be used when high-level scenario accuracy is required. 
 
The main question of Problem Statement 2 was “what is the value of EWSP in the 
campaign framework?” The answer is that EWSP can give an important contribution 
to platform survivability by reducing the attrition rate in a high-tech combat 
environment. EWSP reduces both the number of platforms killed and the workload 
of the BDR organization. 
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Figure 71: Sensitivity analysis of the Campaign Model. The model is robust under the 
parameter variations used in the simulation. The main contributors to the spread of the 
confidence intervals is the -50/+100% varitation of the Lancester attrition-rate coefficients 
ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS and FRIENDLY COMBAT POTENTIAL. 
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6.7 Modeling the EWSP mission level 
 
6.7.1 Conceptualization 
 
The onion skin model (Figure 12) together with Figures 46 and 54 contain the 
essential ingredients for investigating EWSP on the mission level, although the 
amount of detail in Figures 46 and 54 is beyond the need for a general understanding 
of the mission system. FSD is also not suited for modeling topography, enemy 
disposition, flight plan overlaid on a topographical map, etc (cf. Section 6.6.4). 
Problem Statement 3 together with Figures 72 and 73 form the problem definition 
and system conceptualization for the FSD model. 
 
Problem Statement 3:  
 
 
The aggregated combat scenario is selected according to Figure 72, which is an 
adaptation of Figure 10. It is simple when compared with e.g. the scenario generation 
method outlined in [Don87]. Some 198 lethal threats are assumed to exist in the 
mission area; the risk of being targeted roughly follows the distribution shown in 
Figure 73 (cf. Table 7). Defining the number of threats is not straightforward because 
the term “threat” has different connotations. One possible interpretation is given in 
Table 44. It is evident from the table that different survivability components are 
mutually exclusive only to some extent. For instance, helicopter EWSP is not an 
alternative against long-range air defense missile launchers, and stand-off jammers 
are not an alternative against IR guided MANPAD missiles. 
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Figure 72: Scenario for the Mission Model. Enemy air defense capability is strongest around 
FEBA (forward extension of battle area); however, long range air defense, stray helicopters and 
other enemy assets make the threat nonzero along the entire flight route.  
The role of various survivability assets to the platform’s probability 
of surviving a combat mission in an aggregated but realistic mission 
scenario is not known. In particular, what is the role of EWSP in such 
a scenario? 
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Threat system Total penetrators Note 
3x long-range air 
defense launchers 
3x4 missiles with two 
reloads (Æ total = 48) 
Long-range air defense missile system has time 
to reload twice in the course of the mission. 
3x attack 
helicopters 
3x2 missiles (Æ 6) 
3x8 gun salvos (Æ 24) 
Attack helicopters are assumed to be 
encountered only once during the mission. 
2x3x SPAAG 2x3x4 missiles (Æ 24) 
2x3x8 gun salvos (Æ48) 
Number of threat systems double since the 
return flight is selected along a different route. 
2x12x MANPADS 2x2x12 missiles (Æ48) Ditto; assumed two missiles per launcher. 
Total 198 lethal threats  
Table 44: A plausible interpretation of the mix of threats used in the Mission Model. Note that 
non-radar ballistic threats (e.g. MBTs, RPGs and optically aimed AA guns) are not included in 
the list since they cannot be countered by EWSP. Hard-kill assets have an advantage over 
EWSP in destroying the launcher, and at the same time a number of penetrators. 
 
 
The general idea for producing a solution to the problem is according to Figure 73, 
which is derived from the onion skin model in Figure 12. An intrinsic feature of 
Figure 73 is that the mission process is sequential and seemingly lacks feedback 
loops. Threats are eliminated, avoided or evaded by different assets at different 
times, with few if any interactions. The value of FSD in this case therefore remains 
to be seen; the alternative approach would be to use spreadsheets to demonstrate 
influences of various modifications within the process. 
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Figure 73: Sequences of the Mission Model, an adaptation of Figure 12.  The model is essentially 
a sequential process without dominating feedback, when the events in the model are observed in 
the logical outside-in approach.131 
 
 
A dynamic hypothesis in line with the previous FSD models is not motivated since 
the case is trivial: EWSP will improve the survivability of helicopters by an amount 
that depends only on the quantitative value of exogenous parameters. 
 
                                                 
131  Note the critical view in Section 3.3.3, according to which traditional survivability thinking is 
platform-centric and in effect starts from the center of the onion-skin model. 
 146
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 7
4:
 T
he
 F
SD
 m
is
si
on
 m
od
el
, a
 d
yn
am
ic
 r
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 s
eq
ue
nt
ia
l p
ro
ce
ss
 in
 F
ig
ur
e 
73
. T
he
 g
ra
y 
bo
rd
er
s 
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
m
ar
k 
sy
st
em
 p
ar
ts
. A
s 
di
sc
us
se
d 
in
co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 F
ig
ur
e 
73
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s d
oe
s n
ot
 c
on
ta
in
 a
ny
 fe
ed
ba
ck
 o
f i
m
po
rt
an
ce
. T
he
 sc
en
ar
io
 is
 o
bs
er
ve
d 
in
 th
e 
m
od
el
 th
ro
ug
h 
lo
ok
up
 ta
bl
es
 a
nd
 a
ux
ili
ar
ie
s i
n 
th
e 
re
d 
bo
xe
s,
an
d 
th
re
at
 d
en
si
ty
 m
ar
ke
d 
gr
ee
n.
 T
he
 o
ut
pu
ts
 m
ar
ke
d 
in
 b
lu
e 
ar
e 
le
ve
ls
 t
ha
t 
ar
e 
us
ed
 o
nl
y 
fo
r 
pl
ot
tin
g 
an
d 
fo
r 
ch
ec
ki
ng
 t
he
 o
ut
co
m
e 
of
 t
he
 s
im
ul
at
io
ns
, b
ut
 a
re
 n
ot
 u
se
d
ot
he
rw
ise
 in
 th
e 
m
od
el
. T
he
 le
ve
l ”
Th
re
at
s w
ith
 e
ng
ag
em
en
t p
ot
en
tia
l”
 is
 c
ol
or
ed
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 in
di
ca
te
 it
s r
el
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
la
ye
rs
 in
 F
ig
ur
e 
73
. T
he
 si
m
ul
at
io
n 
co
ve
rs
 a
 2
.5
 h
ou
r 
(9
00
0
se
co
nd
) m
is
sio
n 
in
 0
.2
5 
se
co
nd
 in
te
rv
al
s. 
Th
e 
m
od
el
 c
om
pe
ns
at
es
 fo
r 
th
e 
so
ftw
ar
e-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
D
EL
A
Y
 C
O
N
V
E
Y
O
R
 fu
nc
tio
ns
, g
iv
in
g 
a 
to
ta
l s
ce
na
ri
o 
tim
e 
of
 1
0,
08
7 
se
co
nd
s.
 
Figure 74: Text in figure. 
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6.7.2 Discussion on the Mission Model 
 
The FSD model in Figure 74—the Mission Model—is a sequential process that 
includes the stages of Figure 73. The last stage of differentiating between damages 
and kills are excluded but would be a simple matter of division by using e.g. the 
quantitative data in Table 5 as a guideline. The model is constructed with sequential 
delayed subprocesses, and each subprocess leaking with a defined decay time 
(Vensim’s DELAY CONVEYOR function). The motivations behind the selected 
decay times are given in Appendix 2, Table 2-4. The use of leaking delays agrees 
with the logic that the chances of eliminating threats depend on their number and 
never reaches 100%, which also is in agreement with Lanchester’s combat models.  
 
The 2.5 hour (9000 second) Mission Model observes the time-dependent scenario 
variations shown in Figure 75, and which are implemented either through lookup 
tables or through auxiliaries: First, the threats are assumed to be distributed 
according to the scenario in Figure 72 with relative densities ranging from 0.1 near 
the base and rising to 0.9 at FEBA (blue graph). Second, standoff assets are assumed 
to be directed at threats that are effective around and behind FEBA, i.e. 
approximately the range covered by enemy medium range air defense systems in 
Figure 72 (red graph). These very defenses are also assumed to cause the potential 
effectiveness of stand-off assets to drop linearly from 0 to 20% between the base and 
LZ (green graph). Third, the full effect of flight tactics (including NOE flight) is felt 
only around and beyond FEBA. Low-level flight is assumed to be three times more 
susceptible than NOE flight, varying between 0.33 and 1.0 (grey graph). A special 
construct in the model is due to the DELAY CONVEYOR function, which does not 
permit feedforward signals to the decay rate auxiliary since this interferes with the 
requirement on conservation of material in FSD models. Saturation effects are 
therefore simulated by speeding up the conveyors “Threats with engagement 
potential” and “Pop-up threats to helicopter”, while the associated decay rates remain 
constant. Speeding up the conveyors introduces a small error since the total conveyor 
delay is not constant any more, but the error is unimportant.132 
 
The Mission Model is simplified in a number of ways. The following are some 
additions to observe for a more comprehensive model (or models): 
 
1. The influence of the enemy C3 system, and its possible disruption by friendly 
stand-off assets (stand-off jammers), have not been included in the model. 
The C3 system is particularly important in a conflict between even 
antagonists, but is less important to the weaker side when the opponent has 
air superiority. 
2. The value of stand-off assets decreases on a fragmented battlefield due to the 
increasing risk of fratricide. This puts a heavier emphasis on friendly C3 and 
IFF assets (not included in the model), and on escort assets. 
                                                 
132  It is possible to compensate the error with a nonlinear lookup table function for decay rates, but 
this has not been regarded necessary. 
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3. Cost-benefit considerations and limitations of each survivability asset can aid 
in understanding the optimal mix of assets. However, FSD is not suited for 
predictive cost-benefit analysis [Luc02]. 
 
 
Table Functions in the Mission Model
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Figure 75: Scenario effects used in the Mission Model. The scenario effects are implemented 
through lookup tables. The scenario is assumed to be symmetric around the landing zone (LZ) 
at 4500 seconds (cf. Figures 10 and 72). The total simulation lasts for 10,087 seconds in order to 
account for delays in the conveyor structures (9,000+900+2x90+5+2 seconds). Legend: 
Dmnl=dimensionless. 
 
6.7.3 Discussion on simulations and results 
 
As stated earlier, this model differs from the Capability and Campaign models in 
depending almost entirely on quantitative data; in addition the logic behind the 
lookup tables in Figure 75 dominate the model’s dynamic behavior. A basic relation 
between structure and dynamic behavior is, however, present through the sequential 
process of the model and the leaking conveyor functions. 
 
Simulation results are presented in Figure 76 for four different cases, requirements 
on EWSP in these four cases are shown in more detail in Figure 77. The chief aim is 
to show how the scenario and restrictions on resources affect the situation. Figure 78 
shows a simulation that is applicable to combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) cases: the 
mission has to be accomplished using only on-board survivability aids; the effects of 
stand-off and escort assets are set to zero but the effects of NOE flight route are 
active. 
 
The Basic Run simulation in Figure 76 is a baseline case where friendly standoff 
assets are assumed to attack the enemy throughout the mission with equal intensity, 
while the threats have no influence on the standoff assets. The flight height is 
constant throughout the mission and the influence of flight height and escort 
capability on survivability is not saturated by the number of threats. The case is 
theoretical but can act as a reference to other simulations.  
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Figure 76: Simulation of the Mission Model for four different cases. The last case is the most 
complete one and gives best insight into mission events. The earlier simulations show how the 
model behaves under different limiting conditions.  
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In the next two simulations—Standoff Scenario Active and Standoff and Flight 
Tactics Active—table functions related to scenario effects of standoff assets are first 
activated (“attack area” and “air defense effect on standoff assets”). Next the table 
function “effect of flight height” is activated.  There is a considerable change 
between Basic Run and Standoff Scenario Active. The change is mainly due to the 
restricted geographical area which can be attacked by standoff assets, which 
therefore limits the effect of standoff support. Since the effect of flight tactics does 
not change, the drop in “Threats eliminated by standoff assets” transforms to a rise in 
“Threats eliminated by escort assets” and “Threats evaded by EWSP assets”. Both 
drop when “Threats avoided by flight tactics” increases in the third simulation. 
 
The fourth simulation—Standoff, Tactics, and Saturation Active—adds saturation of 
susceptibility reduction provided by flight tactics and escort asset resources. The 
result is increased requirements on EWSP. As the number of hits on helicopters is 
related to the requirements on EWSP (approx 10% of threats approaching a 
helicopter are assumed to pass the EWSP defense), the number of hits is about 2.6 
per mission. The fourth simulation is the most detailed one and the best 
representation of an actual mission scenario. The simulated losses, however, are 
comparatively high and it can be reasoned that a mission would hardly be launched if 
this was a true combat situation. Only some 27% of all potential threats are avoided 
by flight tactics (flight route selection and terrain masking), which is a low figure.  
 
The requirements imposed on the EWSP suite in the previous simulations are shown 
in more detail in Figure 77. The model does not make any assumptions on the 
number of helicopters involved, but the maximum of almost 27 successful 
countermeasure actions (and 2.7 hits on helicopters) during a mission is very high 
indeed. The high causality rates in the simulations imply that modifications to the 
model must be considered. For instance, it can be expected that the pilot changes the 
flight route when the environment becomes too dangerous. To cope with this the 
model should include a feedback from the level “Threats firing at helicopters” to the 
auxiliary “threat decay rate by flight tactics”. 
 
A “CSAR simulation” (Figure 78) was run in order to investigate the model’s 
behavior under extreme conditions. In this simulation the effects of standoff support 
and escort assets were nullified, but the effect of flight tactics was retained. The 
simulation indicates that the EWSP suite has to counter over 100 lethal threats, and 
over 10 hits are scored (if possible). This is unrealistic, since no CSAR operation 
would be attempted under such conditions. The result brings up two important issues 
that require further investigation: First, the value of flight route selection and terrain 
masking to helicopter survivability. It is obvious that the quantitative data used in 
this simulation underestimate the effectiveness of terrain masking (cf. figure 6.11 in 
Ball [Bal03]). The discussion in Section 3.3.3 also indicated that the 90 second 
exposure time used in the Mission Model is too long—particularly when applied to 
each and every threat. Second, the value of surprise to survivability is not considered. 
The issue of surprise is frequently discussed in military literature, but successful 
attempts at quantifying it are not known (cf. comment in Section 2.3.2). The 
conclusion is therefore that stealth and surprise are preconditions for successful 
CSAR operations, and that EWSP has an important contribution to make, but the 
study will not venture further into the CSAR scenario. 
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Figure 77: A detailed view of the requirements on EWSP that are indicated by the four 
simulations in Figure 76. The figures are too high to represent a real combat mission, implying 
that the quantitative data in Table 2-4, Appendix 2, requires further investigation. In addition, 
the influence of surprise and other intangible combat factors should be considered. 
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Figure 78: The "CSAR simulation" with no support or escort assets, and the flight route is 
saturated with threats, which boosts the requirements on EWSP to unrealistic proportions. The 
bottom plots are overlapping. 
 
6.7.4 Lessons from building the Mission Model 
 
The major lessons from building the Mission Model are: 
 
1. The Mission Model uses quantitative data based on “educated guesses”—as 
do the Capability and Campaign Models. The data form an acceptable basis 
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for simulations, but better data are required to provide results that are 
representative for a true combat situation. In the present form the model can 
act as an educational tool. Simulations do, however, open up a range of 
questions that are not evident from Figures 72 and 73. On the other hand, 
nonlinear qualities of threats remain a problem to solve: The total number of 
threats on the battlefield is of less concern than individual threats to which no 
countermeasures are available. 
2. With its open-loop structure the Mission Model is an atypical employment of 
FSD, but it shows the versatility of the paradigm. The benefit of FSD 
compared with a spreadsheet solution in this particular case is the graphical 
model, which makes it easier to discuss the effects of changes. An alternative 
modeling approach would have been the long form of Lanchester’s equations 
(Figure 79), but it was felt that this would only have been an extension of the 
Campaign Model and that a different approach should be attempted. The 
complete model in Figure 74 is, however, cluttered with details and lacks the 
important attribute of transparency [Lee73]. A simplified graphical model or 
an FSD “flight simulator” should be prepared for such cases. 
 
 
The long form of Lanchester equations:
The attrition between two homogenous primary forces X
and Y with superimposed fire support Xs and Ys are given
by
where the supporting fire units are not subject to attrition
[Tay80 pp.34-35].
X Y
x(t)
y(t)
a
b
,
,
Ys
Xs
c
d
dx
dt = -a y-cys
dy
dt = -b x-dxs
 
Figure 79: The long form of Lanchester's equations would be an alternative starting point for 
the Mission Model. This approach was not selected above because it would only have been an 
extension of the Campaign Model on a lower hierarchy level. Furthermore, enemy artillery and 
other forms of indirect fire support are a lesser threat to helicopters (influence of Xs when Y 
represents friendly helicopters). 
 
3. The interactions on different levels shown in Figure 60 are a complicating 
factor for FSD. This was not foreseen when selecting FSD as the simulation 
tool of choice. (See also lesson 2 of the Campaign Model.) The time scales 
used in the model—over 10,000 seconds total time, versus 2 seconds 
minimum delay and 0.25 second time steps—are barely within the capability 
of the Vensim software package (a delay overflow is reported during 
simulation, but decreasing the time step to 0.5 second introduces a larger 
integration error than the delay overflow).  
 
The answer to the main question of Problem Statement 3 (“what is the role of EWSP 
in such a scenario?”) can be given as: The value of EWSP to helicopter survivability 
is limited when compared with other susceptibility reduction measures. The 
importance of EWSP increases if other survivability assets are not available and 
decreases in a low-tech conflict. The decision to invest in EWSP requires careful 
contemplation of expected combat scenarios. 
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6.8 The holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters, a 
resolve 
 
6.8.1 The survivability paradigm 
 
It was concluded in Section 6.1 that a holistic view on EWSP can be based on 
different approaches and that the outcome will differ for these approaches. An 
example that became evident through the simulations is the battlefield commander, 
to whom the number of available helicopters may be more important than the loss of 
an individual platform. The idea of a suprasystem for EWSP was mentioned with a 
caution in Section 6.1. The simulations, on the other hand, imply attractiveness of an 
EWSP concept that is independent of platform types, that is set in a framework wider 
than the platform, and that uses multiple approaches to optimize the survivability of 
assets. These ideas are intrinsic to Figures 12 and 13, which, with small 
modifications, are applicable to any platform type. This reasoning leads to two 
hypothetical conclusions that answer to the challenge in Section 1.3.3—to gain 
understanding of the suprasystem of EWSP—and  to Objective 4. 
 
Conclusions 1 and 2: 
 
 
Conclusion 1 only introduces a shift in terminology by equating suprasystem = 
holistic view. The terminology shift could have been introduced earlier, but it was 
felt that a fuller discussion should be presented first. Conclusion 2 requires a more 
detailed discussion, but it should be noted that Conclusions 1 and 2 are not in conflict 
with Definition 1 (Section 6.2.4); they rather introduce a new dimension to the 
definition. Before entering the detailed discussion the newly introduced term 
“paradigm” is defined.133  
 
Definition 2: 
 
                                                 
133  The word paradigm is usually attributed to the philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn, but his major work 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions [Kuh96] does not give a clear definition of the term. The 
simplest definition given in Kuhn is “(…) a paradigm is an accepted model or pattern, (…)” [Kuh96 
p.23], but that is not representative for the entire message of his essay. Various authors have therefore 
formed personal interpretations that suite their needs. The definition presented here does not 
contradict Kuhn’s ideas; it is useful for the present work, but not necessarily of general value. 
The term “paradigm” refers to a set of values, theories, rules and 
methodologies that are shared by a group of practitioners on a 
subject. 
1) Ideas on a suprasystem of EWSP can be equated with the 
sought holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters.  
2) The suprasystem of EWSP can be equated with the 
survivability paradigm. 
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By Definition 2 the survivability paradigm means a set of values, theories, rules, and 
methodologies that are shared by the survivability community. The paradigm puts 
the emphasis on the scientific community, not on survivability per se. 
 
The motivations for Conclusion 2 is addressed through the following questions and 
answers: 
 
1. Why resort to a survivability paradigm, is an EWSP paradigm not possible? 
The EWSP paradigm exists although it has not been explicitly expressed in 
the past (cf. Figure 57). The values of the EW community are typically 
articulated by the Association of Old Crows (AOC, <http://www.crows. 
org>); the theories, rules and methodologies are given in the EW literature. 
However, the present work set out to break through the traditional EWSP 
barriers, to take a holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters. The 
conclusion is that the holistic view is to be found in survivability-oriented 
thinking. A survivability paradigm is not at odds with the earlier finding that 
multiple holistic views on EWSP are possible. Multiple views are possible 
within the wider framework of survivability. 
2. Why introduce the concept of a survivability paradigm when survivability 
already is a mature field of study? There are three answers to that question. 
First, paradigm is a convenient term that aggregates disparate issues or 
problems of the subject matter (survivability). Second, “Paradigms gain their 
status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a 
few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” 
[Kuh96 p.23]. Successful paradigms, therefore, provide an advantage. Third, 
the paradigm is expected to promote a joint (army/navy/air force) approach to 
survivability. 
3. Does a survivability paradigm exist? The answer is that the components of 
the survivability paradigm are at hand, they exist in the various survivability 
approaches practiced by armies, navies, and air forces, but they have not been 
collected to a unified paradigm. Nor has the EW community committed itself 
as a part of the survivability community. This is indicated, for instance, in the 
decision of the AOC to diversify to information warfare rather than to 
survivability. The survivability community, if judged by publications of the 
US Joint Technical Coordination Group on Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS, 
<http://www.bahdayton.com/surviac/JTCGBooks.htm>) and NATO RTO 
(Research and Technology Organization, <http://www.rta.nato.int>), shows 
more interest in EWSP; but the response from the EW community is lame 
and a joint vision is missing.134 
 
Figure 80 presents an EWSP-centric map of subjects that should be covered by the 
survivability paradigm; grouped under the main headings: human factors, platform, 
EWSC, tactics and operations, and support assets. The four foundations of the 
paradigm (values, theories, rules, methodologies) can be seen as flowing with time, 
orthogonally to the map of subjects. In this interpretation the paradigm is a three-
dimensional concept and it is most appropriately classified as a global paradigm 
[Kuh96]. The figure represents the ultimate holistic view on EWSP of battlefield 
                                                 
134  The mentioned web sites were accessed on July 15, 2004. 
 155
helicopters. In the academic sense the global paradigm can be called survivability 
science, but with the caution that the view in Figure 80 is narrowed to mobile 
platforms.135 The global survivability paradigm can be expected to be of special 
importance to countries with limited resources. First by ensuring that survivability 
progress within one armed service can be utilized to the fullest by other services; 
next by ensuring that survivability is achieved by the best possible cost-effectiveness. 
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Figure 80: EWSP-centric map of the three-dimensional global survivability paradigm with 
approximate relations between the subjects. The areas of subjects and overlapping are 
arbitrary. The paradigm is equally valid for air, ground, and naval assets. Legend: BDR=battle 
damage repair; C3=command, control, and communications; EWSC=electronic warfare 
support center; MDF=mission data file; NVIS=night vision; SA=situational awareness; 
V&V=verification and validation. 
 
6.8.2 Additional observations 
 
The preceding discussion has been quite comprehensive, but the study has indicated 
additional aspects that need to be observed in the survivability paradigm: 
 
1. The capability-centric approach. Existing capability sets the limits for EWSP 
effectiveness regardless of scientific, technical and other opportunities. The 
traditional division of military M&S (Figure 61) into the campaign, mission, 
engagement, and engineering levels is limited, since the capability of EWSP 
of battlefield helicopters requires a vast infrastructure (cf. Figures 44, 46, 55, 
                                                 
135  A wider approach to survivability should cover fixed assets, such as telecommunication networks 
and buildings, and mobile assets such as troops and space assets. With these the concept of 
survivability approaches the areas of hazard and risk analysis, and protection of infrastructure. 
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and 58), without which EWSP cannot be effective. Interactions between 
resources and delays must be understood and appreciated. 
2. Independence of temporal and hierarchical bounds. A holistic discussion on 
EWSP should be capable of dealing with interactions on different levels, as is 
best exemplified by Figure 60. Boundaries can only be imposed as a way of 
artificially limiting the amount of detail to a manageable level, or to fit to the 
knowledge level of the audience. 
3. Legacy. Present options are bounded by legacy constraints. The effectiveness 
of EWSP and other survivability assets is surrounded by questions of 
financial limitations, legacy equipment, knowledge, doctrine, methodologies, 
training practices, support resources, etc. These issues are reflected back to 
the questions of resources and delays in the capability-centric approach. They 
also raise the question of feasibility, mentioned in Section 3.3.2, which is 
equally valid for friend as for foe. However, introduction of legacy 
complicates the survivability paradigm since the number of variations 
increases drastically. It is likely that issues of legacy can be considered only 
as an appendix or overlay to the survivability paradigm. 
4. Cost-effectiveness. The influence of legacy may well mean that optimal cost-
effectiveness cannot be achieved. One has mainly to live with what is 
available—equipment that was developed for other scenarios and 
requirements—but despite this the aim should be for the optimum under 
prevailing circumstances. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1 Description of results 
 
7.1.1 Recollection of objectives 
 
Section 1.3.2 stated the Objectives of Work as: (1) To generate improved 
understanding of EWSP of battlefield helicopters. (2) To unite disconnected 
information on and factors contributing to EWSP of battlefield helicopters. (3) To 
develop or identify tools or methodologies that can be used for communication on 
EWSP with disparate interest groups. (4) To resolve on the notion “holistic view on 
EWSP of battlefield helicopters”. In addition, three secondary objectives were 
assumed to be met as a consequence of satisfying the main objectives. 
 
Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 stated three Hypotheses: First, the field of battlefield 
helicopter survivability, including EWSP, will benefit from an investigation that 
unifies EWSP and other survivability issues. Second, the field of battlefield 
helicopter survivability, including EWSP, will benefit from tools or a tool that 
facilitate(s) communication on EWSP issues without prerequisite of specialized 
technical or scientific knowledge. Third, objective 1 is satisfied if Objectives 2 and 3 
are met and the work towards meeting them is performed systematically, and is 
documented in a consistent and unambiguous manner. Additional statements, claims 
or problems that originally were of concern and therefore warrant a discussion are 
summarized in Table 45. 
 
7.1.2 Description of results in the light of the objectives 
 
According to Hypothesis 3, meeting Objectives 2 and 3 is a precondition for meeting 
Objective 1. Thus Objectives 2 and 3 will be discussed first; then Objectives 1 and 4, 
followed by the secondary objectives and other issues. 
Objective 2: Uniting information on and factors contributing to EWSP 
After scanning thousands of articles, books, conference proceedings, data banks, and 
other information sources in the course of this research, the closest similarities to the 
present work are those mentioned in Section 1.4.2. It can therefore be claimed with 
high degree of certainty that this work is the first attempt to form a holistic view on 
EWSP of battlefield helicopters in the unclassified domain, and even indications on 
classified work in the field are rare. 
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Chapters 3 through 5 are a systematic review of previously disconnected information 
on and factors contributing to EWSP of battlefield helicopters. The information in 
these chapters is largely based on existing sources but it has been compiled in a 
coherent way, which also supports the synthesis of the study. New thinking and 
analytic approaches are represented by Figures 40-47, 50, and 55, and the discussion 
related to them. The value of these parts is augmented by the fact that similar 
discussions are not found in the existing literature for any type of military platforms. 
 
The discussion in Chapter 6 leading to the bounded time/hierarchy domain is unique. 
Although it does not provide a conclusive answer to the holistic view it does give 
certain insight. The FSD simulations are of less importance per se—particularly 
since the simulations are based on hypothetical data (“educated guesses”)—but the 
systematic work towards models that could be simulated had a corrective influence 
on qualitative mapping and thinking. FSD modeling and simulations were not done 
below the mission level, but there is no reason why FSD could not be used as a 
conceptualization tool on the engagement level. However, further work is needed in 
order to generate a more coherent approach in applying FSD to problems of EWSP. 
 
With these comments it is claimed that the present work satisfies its goal of uniting 
disconnected information on and factors contributing to EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters, to the extent that can be expected from a study without the benefit of 
guidance by previous work in the field. 
Objective 3: Tools or methodologies for communication on EWSP 
Chapter 2 discussed various alternatives for analysis and synthesis that also could be 
used for communicating with stakeholders. Only two methodologies discussed in 
Chapter 2 were not used later—Checkland’s soft system methodology (SSM) and 
tools for mathematical computation. A major shift of tools occurs when entering the 
synthesis part of Chapter 6. Chapters 3 through 5 are built on the idea of presenting 
information using graphical/qualitative mapping, whereas the emphasis in Chapter 6 
is to use Forrester system dynamics (FSD). Although Figure 7 showed that CLDs can 
be used interchangeably with data flow diagrams (DFDs), it was found that CLDs are 
more natural companions to FSD. It can be asked if CLDs should have been used 
throughout the study to provide a more coherent approach. This is a valid question, 
but so is the argument in Section 2.4 that DFDs are better known to the engineering 
audience. The answer is therefore one of personal preference. 
 
FSD as a communication tool has the obvious advantage of explaining the temporal 
behavior of the system under study. The disadvantage is that a complete FSD model 
quickly becomes cluttered with details, as is exemplified by the simple models in 
Chapter 6. Simplified presentations are needed for communication with an audience 
less familiar with FSD. CLDs and interactive FSD “flight simulators” can be of help, 
but need careful construction in order not to obscure the main issue under discussion. 
 
Tabulated information was mentioned as an alternative in Table 1, and the method 
was used in Chapters 3 and 4 to compress the review of technical information. The 
advantage is a concise and systematic presentation; the disadvantage is that tables 
easily become tiresome for the reader. Tabulated information does not compete with 
dynamic simulations and should be used with care when communicating with EWSP 
stakeholders. 
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With these comments it is claimed that the present work has shown that systems 
thinking—including the use of DFDs, CLDs, and FSD modeling and simulation—is 
a versatile tool for communicating issues on EWSP with various stakeholders. The 
tool to use must, however, be selected according to the requirements of the problem. 
Objective 1: Improved understanding on EWSP of battlefield helicopters 
It is claimed above that Objectives 2 and 3 have been met. Without a separate 
discussion it is stated that the present work, in its strive to meet Objectives 2 and 3, 
has been performed systematically, and documented in a sufficiently consistent and 
unambiguous manner. Hence, the study has met Objective 1. 
Objective 4: The notion “holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters” 
In Section 6.8 the holistic view on EWSP of battlefield helicopters was defined—by 
using the concept of the suprasystem as an auxiliary step—as the survivability 
paradigm. There is room for controversy in this conclusion for three reasons: First, 
the survivability paradigm did not evolve as the candidate through a series of well-
connected analytical steps in the study. Survivability was present from the outset, but 
was focused in on since no competing candidate emerged. Second, the survivability 
paradigm is global and embraces the EWSP paradigm. The holistic view on EWSP 
has therefore been declared to extend well beyond the realm of EW. On the other 
hand, a comparison between the subjects of the survivability paradigm (Figure 80) 
and the tentative idea in Figure 3 does not show a major discrepancy. Third, it was 
concluded in Section 6.1 that a holistic view on EWSP can be based on different 
approaches to give different outcomes, whereas the global survivability paradigm is a 
single entity. This case was already discussed as the first question in Section 6.8.1. 
 
With these comments it is claimed that Objective 4 has been met, and that Figure 80 
represents a valid starting point for future research. 
Secondary objectives 
The secondary objectives indicated by Figure 1 have been met to the following 
extent: 
 
1. Influence of EW experts on decision-makers: The conclusion of the present 
work is that EWSP should claim the credits that rightfully belong to it, but no 
more. These credits can be best achieved by joining force with the 
survivability community, not by direct appeals to decision-makers. The tools 
for communicating that have been utilized in this study are of value for 
conceptualization and for forming a general understanding of a problem, but 
should not be seen as a general solution to the communication problem. 
2. Obscuration of EWSP by umbrella programs: The previous discussion is 
valid. As a consequence of the experience of decision-making in the NSHP 
undertaking (Section 5.2.3), the problem of non-relevant issues interfering 
with decision-making on EWSP was determined complex, and extending 
beyond the objectives of this study. 
3. Intangible benefits: The discussion under 1 is valid. The benefits of EWSP 
are best appreciated by the survivability community, which can act as a lever 
for promoting the EWSP case. 
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In conclusion, the insight gained through the present work points to the secondary 
objectives having been inaccurately formulated, or requiring a discussion outside the 
objectives of the study. 
Discussion on other issues of concern 
Table 45 summarizes a set of issues that originally (i.e. Chapter 1) were of concern 
and which have not been discussed elsewhere, or the discussion has been indirect. 
 
 
Issue Discussion 
Difficulty of EWSP to gain 
appreciation (Section 1.2) 
EW public-relations problems (1.2) 
Possible bias of EW community (1.2) 
Optimization of the EWSP suite to the 
scenario (1.2) 
There is every indication that EW community is biased and 
should have a better appreciation of the fact that EWSP is 
only one alternative in the survivability toolbox, and that 
the value of EWSP is scenario-related. EWSP can gain the 
appreciation it deserves with a structured approach to 
survivability. 
Involvement of the regret theory (1.2) In view of the example on decision-making in the NSHP 
case (Section 5.2.3), the question is irrelevant. 
Competition from stealth technology 
(1.2) 
The Cold War stealth euphoria is fading, as shown by the 
cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche program. A multi-
dimensional survivability approach is needed. 
Determining appropriate weights to the 
views of experts (1.2) 
The NSHP case shows that EW experts are easily 
overruled by political and other considerations. The global 
survivability paradigm, and the survivability community, 
can improve the status of EWSP. 
Gaining understanding of the 
suprasystem of EWSP (1.3.3) 
Defined in Section 6.8 as being equal to the survivability 
paradigm. 
Leverage in the EWSP system (1.3.4) Can be achieved through the global survivability paradigm. 
EWSP achieves leverage on its own through combat losses, 
as was demonstrated in the 2003 Iraq War. 
The question of emergence and 
complexity (1.3.4) 
EWSP of battlefield helicopters is a complex issue, but it is 
not emergent in the sense that some completely new 
patterns, structures, or properties would arise. 
The risk of “circular information” 
(1.4.1) 
Information errors were found on a detail level in 
respectable sources (e.g. performance parameters stated by 
Jane’s), but hidden errors in the deductions of the present 
work are likely to have more serious consequences. 
The tentative idea for the research 
(1.4.2) 
On a detail level the tentative idea was basically sound, but 
it gave no clues for synthesizing the holistic view. 
Specific and generic scenarios (1.4.3) The discussion in Section 1.4.3 is valid, although in the 
present situation in Iraq (July 2004) assassinations, 
homemade bombs, and suicide attacks are the major threat. 
Table 45: Discussion on other issues that were of concern in Chapter 1.  
 
 
Table 45 does not cover systems and support issues, which were discussed in 
Chapter 5 and addressed by the models and simulations of Chapter 6. These issues 
were originally mentioned in Figure 3, but their true importance to the holistic view 
on EWSP emerged only in the course of work. A reason is that support issues have 
previously received only scant attention in EW literature. This study has showed that 
due to the need of an extensive intelligence apparatus and other support resources, 
EWSP becomes a political issue. Small countries that lack the necessary 
infrastructure will either have to plead for it from political allies, or have to be 
satisfied with low-grade EWSP protection (cf. Section 5.5). 
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Discussion on the bottom-up approach 
The bottom-up approach taken in this research led to quite detailed discussions on 
issues that later were only of marginal utility (Chapters 3 and 4). A valid question is 
therefore if the bottom-up approach was motivated at all? Obviously, if the study 
could restart from this point the approach would be top-down. This, however, is said 
with the experience from the entire research effort. At the outset, with no support 
from previous work in the field, the bottom-up approach was the only viable 
solution. The bottom-up approach is also consistent with Objective 2, to unite 
disconnected information on and factors contributing to EWSP of battlefield 
helicopters. 
Summary of experiences from FSD 
A considerable amount of work went into applying FSD to the study. Knowingly this 
is the first time that FSD has been applied to problems on EW in general, and to 
EWSP in particular. The experience is that FSD gave a useful indirect contribution, 
although its limitations are obvious. Apart from FSD limitations mentioned in 
Chapter 6 it was found that the criticism in Section 2.3.7, according to which FSD is 
global and disregards local variations, is valid for instance when the effectiveness of 
different EWSP systems has to be modeled on the mission level. 
 
The most valuable contribution of FSD simulations was to provide a quality 
assurance aspect to ideas that have been mapped by other means (CLD, DFD, etc.). 
This supports the view in Glasow [Gla00 (cf. Section 2.3.1)], that FSD helps to 
understand the problem. The quotation “it is still not more misleading to simulate 
without mapping than to map without simulation” (Section 2.3.2) was rephrased 
“modeling without simulation is at least as wrong as simulation with hypothetical 
data” (Section 6.5.5). On the other hand, learning FSD requires considerable effort 
and it will not become a general tool of EW experts. This supports the idea of a 
survivability paradigm that produces easily modifiable simulation tools. 
 
The work with FSD models showed that if a problem is attacked from different 
angles with different models, the quantitative insight from simulating one model can 
be of use to other models. This is possible because each model limits the range of 
certain parameters and that knowledge can be put to use in other models. Such 
“autogeneration” of data can be of help when no other method for finding 
quantitative data is available, or for assessing contradicting data. 
 
 
7.2 Importance of results, generality, author’s contribution 
 
7.2.1 Importance of results 
 
The main value of Chapters 3 and 4 is in providing a compact information source on 
helicopter EWSP. Chapter 5 adds by extending the information with less obvious 
aspects of EWSP, and also by providing insight into EWSP-related areas that 
previously have received only scant attention in the freely available literature. The 
synthesis in Chapter 6 leads to the insight of Section 6.8 that the survivability 
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paradigm is the most viable alternative for the holistic view. The idea of a global 
survivability paradigm, as represented by Figure 80, is not known to have been 
proposed before. Its importance lies in providing the foundation for a joint 
army/navy/air force approach to survivability. The paradigm can also function as a 
blueprint for developing a survivability science in the academic sense. 
 
The present work should be seen as the first iteration loop in the goal of improving 
understanding of EWSP of battlefield helicopters, and its importance is in taking that 
first step. That first step also includes a contribution to simulation based acquisition 
(SBA), which is described in Fallin [Fal98] as: “It is intended to make smart use of 
M&S technologies to equip our forces with quality systems of high military worth, in 
less time, and at lower cost than traditional means.” The central messages of the 
present work to the EW community—that EWSP is often of limited value to 
helicopter survivability—are not likely to be accepted without debate. The second 
message, that the EW community should strive for closer cooperation with the 
survivability community, is less controversial and stands a better chance of being 
accepted. 
 
7.2.2 Generality of the work 
 
This study shows that EWSP of battlefield helicopters shares its major mechanisms 
with EWSP of other types of military platforms, which led to the proposal for the 
global survivability paradigm. Parts of the work are of a general value in different 
areas: The review in Chapters 3 and 4 are of a general interest to the rotorcraft and 
EW communities, the time/hierarchy domain in Figure 60 is generally applicable to 
military electronics, the Capability Model can be used for investigating almost any 
type of capability-related activity, and the Campaign Model requires only small 
changes for other aspects of military campaigns. 
 
7.2.3 Author’s contribution 
 
The author has contributed to scientific thinking in that he has 
 
1. improved the general understanding of EWSP of battlefield helicopters;   
2. united disconnected information on and factors contributing to EWSP of 
battlefield helicopters; 
3. developed tools and methodologies that can be used for communication on 
EWSP with disparate interest groups, although these tools need further 
refinement; 
4. provided a first discussion of some issues relevant to EW in general and 
EWSP in particular; 
5. made a novel application of FSD to problems of EWSP; and 
6. resolved the term “holistic view” through the survivability paradigm, which is 
of general value to military science. Furthermore, 
7. he will propose a roadmap for future research (Section 7.3). 
 
In addition, the author has made the following proposals and observations: (1) 
proposal for standardization of platform data files (Section 5.3.1); (2) observation 
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that the costly infrastructure of EWSP can have political consequences for small 
countries (Section 5.5); (3) proposal for an EWSP hierarchy model that can be 
extended to survivability (Section 6.2.3/Table 40); (4) proposal to include capability 
as the fifth level in military modeling and simulation (Section 6.4); (5) observation 
that the marginal value of BDR decreases with decreasing BDR time (Section 6.6.3); 
and (6) observation of the need for extensions to the FSD paradigm that would allow 
hierarchical models and simulations with multiple time bases (Section 6.6.4). 
 
These contributions have not eradicated the problems addressed in Section 1.2 and 
Figure 1, but are a step forward in alleviating them. 
 
 
7.3 Conclusion, suggestion for further research 
 
The overall conclusion is that the present work has fulfilled its defined objectives, 
but the tools for communication on EWSP with interest groups need further 
refinement. The tools therefore need to be worked on, but a more important task is to 
proceed with the survivability paradigm and the role of EWSP in this setting: Using 
Figure 80 as the starting point a top-down approach should be taken, and the work 
proceed systematically towards more detailed levels. The aim should be for a 
balanced treatment of the subject. This does not imply that Figure 80 should be 
worked into a single system, since the caution in Section 6.1 against too high 
expectations of generalization in systems thinking is still valid. It is more appropriate 
to take a hierarchical look at the subjects of the survivability paradigm (cf. Figures 
60 and 61) and to divide them into vertical sectors. Each sector can then be worked 
through in a consistent manner, while making sure that horizontal interactions 
between the sectors can be implemented later. The process is shown conceptually in 
Figure 81. The first task will be to select the sectors and levels, the next task to select 
the theories and methodologies that are applicable to the problems of each level. 
Both tasks are demanding, but the undertaking is possible since much of the 
information exists and only needs to be put into the relevant setting. 
 
One tool that will be needed is a figure-of-merit (FOM) for survivability. Developing 
the FOM (or FOMs) is a challenge, but it will allow the contribution of different 
survivability mechanisms, and their combined effect, to be assessed objectively. An 
integrated survivability assessment (ISA) methodology, proposed in Guzie [Guz04], 
could offer a starting point for this work. In its proposed form the ISA is technically 
and engagement oriented and needs to be expanded to accord with the ideas and 
conclusions of the present work. A broader ISA methodology is outlined in Pywell 
[Pyw02]. The extended survivability FOM should consider at least six factors: 
Campaign or mission objectives, human resources, materiel and financial resources, 
time requirements and delays, technical performance, and the effect of these on 
survivability. The questions asked in Section 5.4.2 are related to the first factor, 
mission objectives. 
 
A part of the future research is to look for alternatives to FSD, or for alternative FSD 
tools. For instance, other FSD software packages could be more versatile in military 
applications than the Vensim® package used in this study. The Simile modeling 
environment has provision for defining submodels, a feature that should be useful 
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when modeling different EWSP systems or concurrent survivability alternatives 
[Mue03].136 The Simulink® toolbox is common in engineering applications and can 
be an alternative for solving FSD-like problems, while at the same time introducing 
the rigidity of control engineering to the modeling process. 
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Figure 81: Roadmap for further research: Divide the subjects of the survivability paradigm into 
horizontal levels and vertical sectors; then find theories and methodologies that are applicable 
to each level. After this the work can progress top-down, sector by sector, with an eye for 
horizontal interactions. 
 
 
If FSD remains an M&S methodology of choice, a data acquisition methodology is 
required that produces quantitative data in a form that is readily applicable to the 
FSD paradigm. This study has used quantitative data and equations based on 
“educated guesses”. The other extremes can be found in Santoso [San84 pp.102-
151,188-220], where a considerable amount of theoretical work goes into deriving 
detailed equations for models, and in the mass of statistics in Dupuy [Dup79]. When 
considering the uncertainties of warfare—and of associated intelligence, planning, 
budgeting and decision-making processes—the mentioned alternatives are excessive. 
Compromises are needed to describe the systems or processes under study with 
sufficient accuracy, but no more. 
 
 
 
Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate 
William of Occam 
 
                                                 
136   Simile is developed at the University of Edinburgh, Institute of Ecology and Resource 
Management, and is copyright of Simulistics Ltd, <http://www.simulistics.com/>. Simile contains 
FSD-like features, but is categorized by its developers as a declarative modeling environment and/or a 
“System Dynamics plus objects” language. While Simile brings attractive extensions to the FSD 
paradigm, it lacks (version 3.3) important features of Vensim®. 
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Main rotor
Cockpit
Nose
Wheels
Tail rotor
and gearbox
fairing
Horizontal
stabilizer
Vertical
stabilizer
Cabin
Sponson
Main rotor
head
Engine inlets
Figure 1-3: Typical radar glint points on a helicopter. Adapted from Ball [Bal03 p.464]. The only
helicopter for which signature reduction has been a major design goal from the outset is the
canceled RAH-66 Comanche. Its signature levels have only been given in relation to the AH-64D:
295 times harder to detect by radar, 3.9 times stealthier in the IR spectrum, six times quieter from
the front, and 1.2 times harder to detect head-on with the naked eye [Coo99]. Courts [Cou02]
mentions slightly different figures; Courts also gives a rare comparison of RCS polar plots of the
RAH-66, AH-64, and OH-58 Kiowa. Legend: RCS=radar cross section.
Note:
Due to its rotors the helicopter causes a Doppler shift in radar backscatter even when hovering at zero
ground speed. The main rotor head is a strong backscatterer and must be covered in order to reduce the
RCS. The main rotor and the fuselage will always form corner reflectors in varying directions. Since the
RCS of rotor blades cannot be reduced by altering the geometry of the blades, radar absorbing paint is
the most feasible solution for improvements. The tail rotor is mostly hidden behind the fuselage of an
approaching helicopter. The fuselage can be indistinguishable from ground clutter. The duration of rotor
flashes is in the order of 0.25-0-5 ms. [Mis97] In order to reduce backscatter from the cockpit the
windshields can be made conductive; as is the rule with fighter aircraft.
 
 
 
Ambient air
Tapered exhaust manifold
Hot exhaust stream
Cooled
exhaust plume
Tail rotor drive shaft
Line limiting sight
into exhaust
Line limiting sight
into exhaust
Coated surface
Exhaust cooling:
As the exhaust is discharged from the
nozzles, through the mixing cells, a
Venturi effect is created, which
draws ambient air from the slots in
the airframe through the mixing cells
surrounding the nozzles.
Figure 1-4: Cut of a hexagonal-shaped helicopter tail boom with tapered engine exhaust manifolds for reduced
IR and radar signatures [Fra00]. No information exists on the amount of heating of the lower surface due to the
exhaust plume. The tail boom of the canceled RAH-66 Comanche is close to this shape.
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Phasing sector,
50% transmitting
OpaqueClear
b) ”Rising sun”a) ”Wagon wheel”
Target sensing sector
c) ”Checkerboard”
e) ”Sidewinder D/G/H” f) Reticle investigated
by Driggers et al.
d) ”Wagon wheel”
with center field
Explanation:
a) The basic episcotister or ”wagon wheel” is susceptible to confusion by extended background sources like
sunlit clouds or terrain [May83]. Symmetric spokes produce an AM output signal for circular scan, and FM
output with asymmetric spokes [Car63, Ger85 p.22/40].
b) The ”rising sun” developed by Bieberman and Estey to comply with their findings that there are no
background signals beyond the eight harmonic [Hud69 pp.239-243].
c) The ”checkerboard” is usually inserted in the center field of a ”wagon wheel” [May83].
d) Modified ”wagon wheel” that can be used with nutating scanning. Its output is either AM or FM modulated
[Ols92,94].
e) Simplified presentation of reticle used in some Sidewinder models [Hoi95 p.5b/15]. Other claimed
Sidewinder reticles can be found in Craubner [Cra80] and May and Van Zee [May83].
f) Reticle investigated in detail by Driggers et al. [Dri91].
Figure 1-6: Some basic reticle types. With the exception of some special cases there exists no closed form
mathematical solution to reticles (an exception is the infinite ”wagon wheel” assuming a Gaussian target
spot, investigated in Porras et al. [Por91]). Their operation therefore has to be investigated e.g. by
hardware-in-the-loop simulations or similar methods. Olsson [Ols92,94] provides insight into a method for
simulating the behavior of reticle seekers. Legend: AM=amplitude modulation, FM=frequency modulation.
 
 
 
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 1-7: Front end of some MANPAD missiles with control canards unfolded: (a) Igla-1 (SA-16), (b)
Igla (SA-18), (c) Mistral, (d) FIM-72 Stinger. Only Stinger retains the aerodynamically inefficient
hemispherical dome.
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Figure 1-8: Tracking error processing in a 2-prism system (e.g. rosette scan) and a 24-petal rosette
pattern. Orthogonal components of the prism drives are added to give orthogonal components of seeker
boresight error. [Jah97, May83, Oh01]
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The ECCM capability of the rosette scanning seeker can be augmented by not
visiting the exact same ”pixel” each cycle. This requires higher jamming-to-
signal ratio to guarantee that enough jamming power gets through. [Gro03]
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Figure 1-9: Missile seeker functional flow diagram used for investigation purposes in Bell and Glasow [Bel98]. The
diagram gives an overview of factors that need to be considered in a general-level discussion of FPA seekers.
Legend: AD=analog-to-digital, CCD=charge-coupled device, FPA=focal plane array, MTF=modulation transfer
function.
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Figure 1-10: Functional block diagram of a multispectral (RF+IR) seeker [Ald02]. Multispectral seekers are becoming
available for anti-tank missiles and smart artillery ammunition. Legend: INS = Inertial Navigation System.
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Figure 1-11: Example of the achievable accuracy with non-optimized RF, IR, and RF+IR seekers with no
countermeasures and in clear weather. Adapted from Alder [Ald02]. RF Doppler processing increases the
benefit of MS compared with range processing only [Kle97 p.32].
Note:
The advantages sought from multi-spectral seekers are capability to operate in inclement weather, to support robust
performance in high clutter, and to provide CM resistance. An RF sensor can provide range data that allow the
absolute size of objects in the IR imager to be calculated. Multiple sensors also provide information about the
target’s vulnerable area. In addition, the detection probability is higher since the false alarm rejection can be spread
over multiple seekers. [Kle97 pp.15-54]
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Table 1-1: IR DETECTORS 
Type Description Military applications 
Indium 
antimonide 
(InSb) 
High-quantum-efficiency device with 1-5.5 m useful 
spectral region. Arrays up to 640x512 pixels are in 
production, with 2048x2048 pixels under development. 
Superior intrinsinc uniformity to MCT, but seldom 
operated above 100 K. The ternary variant InAsSb 
achieves room temperature cutoff up to 12.5 m. 
Detection and tracking of 
airborne targets with a 
temperature of several 
hundred ºC (3-5 m band). 
IRST, IR cameras, FCS, 
missile seekers, MWS. 
Indium 
gallium 
arsenide 
(InGaAs) 
InGaAs has a useful spectral region of 0.8-1.7 m, 
extended to 2.6 m with addition of phosphor, or to 2.5 
m by a fractional increase of indium in the ternary 
compound.  
InGaAs avalanche diodes 
are used as detectors in 
laser range finders. 
Lead 
sulphide 
(PbS) 
Cooled and uncooled variants. PbS filtered to 1.9-2.9 
m well matched to the hot tailpipe emission of jet 
engines. Unfiltered response covers the 0.4-3.0 m 
band and receives more solar reflections from target’s 
body. Neither cooled nor uncooled are able to lock on 
the frontal aspect of aircraft. 
Dominated first-generation 
missile seekers. Now 
obsolete, but missiles with 
these seekers are still 
operational. 
Lead 
selenide 
(PbSe) 
Cooled and uncooled variants. 2-4.8 m spectral 
region. Used primarily in applications where the lower 
temperatures required by InSb are not tolerable. New 
developments in the former USSR may make PbSe a 
serious contender for MWIR applications. 
Primarily in obsolete 
systems. 
Mercury-
Cadmium-
Telluride 
(MCT) 
Tertiary quantum detector material (Hg(1-x)CdxTe) 
requiring cooling. Excellent 1/f-noise performance but 
large nonuniformities in 10-12 m band which require 
large bias voltage, with concurrent increase in power 
dissipation and reduction of dynamic range. Dual color 
detectors are available, three color arrays expected. 
Most frequent detector type 
for ground applications (8-
12 m band), also used in 
the 3-5 m band. Potential 
for the entire 0.7-20 m 
band. 
Platinum 
silicide 
(PtSi) 
Uncooled PtSi detectors in the 1-2 m range were used 
in first generation missile seekers. Cooled PtSi 
detectors with a wavelength cut-off at 4 m were the 
first staring sensor. Advantages are large array size and 
excellent intrinsinc uniformity. Hard pressed by MCT 
for high-end and by InSb for low-end applications due 
to low quantum efficiency. 
Used in many systems with 
imaging detectors, 
including missile seekers. 
Quantum 
well photo-
detectors 
(QWIP) 
Available in 256x256 arrays. Shows potential for large 
format staring arrays in the LWIR, although present 
arrays are limited to 8-9.5 m. Require lower 
temperature (60-67 K) than MCT, InSb or PtSi. 
Still in its infancy in 
military applications. 
Insufficient sensitivity to 
missile seekers. 
Uncooled 
detectors 
Uncooled imaging devices are either ferroelectric or 
thermo-electric devices. Usually some cooling is used 
to keep the detector array at a uniform temperature. 
Broadband wavelength cut-off typically 12 m. 
Microbolometer detectors of the ferroelectric type have 
been successful, while thermo-electric detectors based 
on vanadium oxide are promising. 
Increasing use in less 
demanding applications: 
Sniper’s sights, driver’s 
aids, night binoculars.  
 
Table 1-1: Overview of common IR detectors [Emm75, Gla99, Her00, Kle97 pp.39-54, Kno97, 
Kre97, Mey02, Mil96 pp.93-95, Nor02, Raz00, Rot99, Sch93 pp.164-165, Scr91, Wau98, Zie02]. 
Information on fielded detectors varies strongly 137 . Legend: FCS=fire control system, 
LWIR=long-wave infrared, MWIR=mid-wave infrared, MWS=missile warning system, 
PC=photoconductive, PV=photovoltaic. 
                                                 
137 As an example, the following approximate band limits for missile seeker detectors have been 
stated: CdS 0.1–0.6 m, Si 0.1-1.1 m, uncooled PbS 1.0-2.7 m, cooled PbS 2.7-3.8 m, Freon 
cooled PbS 2.7-3.4 m, HgCdTe (MCT) 2.7->5 m, InSb 3.8-4.7 m. [Tay98] 
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Table 1-2a: NON-SCANNING RF RECEIVERS 
Type Properties 
The most basic RWR solution, still very popular. 
Strengths - High POI (virtually 100%). 
- Wide RF bandwidth; can cover the entire band of interest. 
- Rapid detection output. 
- Capability to detect short pulses. 
- Capable of measuring amplitudes in the LVA version. 
- Low cost. 
CVR 
Weaknesses - Low sensitivity (é-50 dBm), but increases with wideband LNA in 
front of the detector. 
- No frequency measurement capability. 
- AC coupled video amplifier requires that CW signals are chopped to 
allow detection. 
- Noise on CW signals may fire the leading edge detector. 
- Can be blinded by strong simultaneous signals; in particular the 
response time of an LVA is a problem. 
Most common receiver type for frequency measurements. Either analog or 
digital (DIFM) architecture. 
Strengths - Instantaneous frequency measurements. 
- Excellent frequency resolution, responds well to frequency agility. 
- Multi-GHz RF bandwidth. 
- Submicrosecond delay. 
- Capability to detect short pulses. 
- Compact. 
- Reasonable cost. 
- Detects intra- and inter-pulse frequency agile emitters (DIFM). 
IFM 
Weaknesses - Reports an erroneous frequency based on the vector sum of multiple 
signals present, e.g. multiple CW signals. (Proposals for measuring two 
simultaneous signals exist [Tsu94].) Serious errors occur, however, 
only at less than 3 dB power separation between signals. 
- Wideband sensitivity limited to approx. -60 dBm. 
- Poor against modulated CW in a crowded environment. 
Essentially a bank of CVRs separated by bandpass filters. 
Strengths - Resolves/processes multiple RF input over a wide spectrum. 
- Frequency measurement with accuracy depending on channel widths. 
- Wide instantaneous BW. 
- High POI. 
- Capability to detect short pulses. 
Channelized 
Weaknesses - “Rabbit ear” transients at channel overlap. 
- Limitations in dynamic range on signals in nearby frequencies. 
- Resolution limited by number of channels. 
- Large size. 
- High cost (depends on number of channels). 
 
Table 1-2a: Characteristics of common non-scanning EW receivers [Bro98 pp.194-203, Sch86 
pp.59-69, Sel92, Sul02, Tsu86, Vac93 pp.97-151, Wie91 pp.139-159, Wil98 pp.12-18]. Receiver 
block diagrams are presented in Table 1-2d. Note that resolution and accuracy of measurement 
are not identical; accuracy is mostly much lower than resolution and can never be better than it 
[Tsu86 p.83]. Low-noise architecture has less dynamic range than a receiver with a mixer front-
end [Sko80 p.550]. Receiver sensitivity is a controversial issue since the general tendency is to 
ask for high sensitivity. However, the determining factor on operational sensitivity is the 
acceptable probability of false alarm [Vac93 p.87]. Higher sensitivity also tends to lead to lower 
dynamic range [Tsu95 p.13]. Legend: AC=alternate current, BW=bandwidth, CVR=crystal 
video receiver, DIFM=digital IFM, IFM= instantaneous frequency measurement, LNA=low-
noise amplifier, LVA=logarithmic video amplifier, POI=probability of intercept. 
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Table 1-2b: SCANNING RF RECEIVERS 
Type Properties 
Most common radar receiver; allows amplification at IF. 
Strengths - High sensitivity (>-90 dBm with 4 MHz BW over the 0.5 to 18 GHz 
band) and excellent frequency selectivity. 
- CW signal acquisition time is not a problem for narrow-IBW 
receiver. 
- Nearly matched to unmodulated pulse radars if IF BW is about 
reciprocal of pulse width. 
- Good against pulse Doppler and pulse compression radars if IF BW 
is matched to pulse compression code BW. 
- Faster than YIG-tuned receivers. 
Tuned, 
super-
heterodyne 
Weaknesses - Narrow instantaneous bandwidth (4 MHz), leading to low POI for 
pulsed signals. Wideband tuned receivers are possible if mixed e.g. 
with an IFM receiver for frequency measurement. 
- Restricted against chirped signals: Limited range, PW cannot be 
measured, multiple frequencies reported. 
- Poor linearity. 
- Spurious responses of the mixer. 
- Risk for polarity errors in signal tail causing servo to lock on wrong 
null point. 
- Preservation of sensitivity requires scan rate limit of approx. (BW)2 
of the IF. 
Common auxiliary RWR receiver; implemented as CVR or LVA receiver 
preceded by a YIG-tuned filter. 
Strengths - CW signal acquisition time is not a problem for narrow-IBW 
receiver. 
- Multioctave RF tuning. 
- Excellent linearity. 
Tuned, 
YIG 
Weaknesses - Restricted against chirped signals: Limited range, PW cannot be 
measured, multiple frequencies reported. 
- Low POI. 
- Slow tuning due to magnetic material. 
- Hysteresis that needs to be eliminated if knowledge of absolute 
frequency is required. 
Uncommon despite obvious advantages. Also called microscan receiver. 
Strengths - High POI. 
- Fast scan rate. 
- Moderately high bandwidth. 
- High sensitivity. 
- Provides frequency information. 
- Processes simultaneous signals assuming that they fill the DDL. 
- Interference from CW signals usually not a problem. 
Compressive 
Weaknesses - Fairly complex digitizing circuitry. 
- Digitizing of compressed video pulses that may be as short as 1 ns. 
- Pulses that do not fill the DDL can degrade performance. 
- Pulses shorter than the scan period may be missed. 
- IBW limitations determined by DDL capability. 
- Some limitations on dynamic range due to filter triple travel. 
 
Table 1-2b: Characteristics of common scanning EW receivers [Bro98 pp.197-202, Sch86 pp.59-
69; Sel92; Sul02; Tsu86; Vac93 pp. 97-126,153-168; Wie91 pp.159-164,180-183; Wil98 pp.11-18; 
Wis85]. Receiver block diagrams are presented in Table 1-2d. Compressive (microscan) 
receivers are not known to be used in helicopter EWSP suites. Proposed optical IFM and 
scanning receivers [Cho95, Win99, Win02] have yet to materialize. Legend: BW=bandwidth, 
DDL=dispersive delay line, IBW=instantaneous bandwidth, IF=intermediate frequency, 
YIG=yttrium iron garnet. 
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Table 1-2c: OTHER RF RECEIVERS 
Type Properties 
Standard and interferometric Bragg cell solutions. 
Strengths - Multiple simultaneous RF inputs. 
- Wide instantaneous BW (2 GHz). 
- Good frequency resolution (5 MHz) depending on the number of 
photodetectors at the output. 
- Small size. 
- Low/moderate cost. 
Acousto-
optic 
Weaknesses - Low sensitivity. 
- Low dynamic range (30 dB) although cascading brings 
improvements. 
Latest development stage in receiver technology. 
Strengths - The stability, repeatability, and flexibility/programmability of digital 
technology. 
- Allows signal processing that otherwise is not possible, e.g. 
wideband instantaneous analysis through FFT processing. 
- Inherent radar ECCM capability through enough IBW that allows 
real-time spectrum analysis around the target frequency. 
- Simple to extend to a DRFM that produces coherent time delays. 
- Indefinite storage time of intercepted signals. 
- Cost can become low as technology advances. 
- Improved processing of data streams for detection of LPI signals. 
Digital 
Weaknesses -Insufficient BW to directly digitize input signals, requires a superhet 
pre-receiver. Hence needs support by a wide band receiver in EW 
applications. 
-Time delay of single-AD approach. 
 
Table 1-2c: Characteristics of acousto-optic and digital EW receivers [Bro98 pp.203-205; Kai96; 
Kla99; Ner01 pp.109-110,322-323,500; Pac00 pp.19-57; Sch86 pp.59-69; Sel92; Sul02; Vac93 
pp.183-206; Wie91 pp.176-180]. Receiver block diagrams are presented in Table 1-2d. Acousto-
optic receivers are not known to be used in helicopter EWSP suites; Brooks and Reeve [Bro95] 
mentions much better frequency resolution than in the table, and Self [Sel92] regards the 
sensitivity of AO receivers as good. Digital receivers for RWRs are still in the development 
stage; unclassified information on the software-implemented architecture has not been 
published. Pace [Pac00 p.56] suggests a definition of absolute sensitivity for digital receivers as 
the lowest input power at the IF that reliably produces a PDW. Vaccaro [Vac93 p.198] states 
that misalignment and jitter in timing occur in two-AD digital receiver solutions, whereas Neri 
[Ner01 p.110] claims “very good I/Q channels balancing”. Legend: AD=analog-to-digital, 
DRFM=digital radio-frequency memory, FFT=fast Fourier transform, I-Q=in-quadrature, 
PDW=pulse descriptor word.  
 
 
Note on receivers in Tables 1-2a,b,c:  
The POI is high only within the instantaneous bandwidth (IBW) of the receiver. 
Receivers with narrow IBW therefore have low POI for the entire bandwidth of 
interest. To improve the POI for important threat systems the IBW scan pattern of 
narrow-band receivers is usually controlled by the mission data file (MDF). 
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Table 1-2d: RF RECEIVER BLOCK DIAGRAMS 
CVR 
 
 
Antenna
Detector
Video
amplifier
Comparator
Threshold
voltage
+
-
RF filter
LNA
 
 
IFM 
 
 
Antenna
Power
divider
Limiting
amplifier
Phase
detector
Delay line
Processor
sin
cos
Frequency
information
 
 
Super-
heterodyne 
 
 
Antenna
Detector Video
amplifier
Threshold
voltage
LO
IF
amplifier
Mixer
IF filter
Comparator
+
-
 
 
Channelized 
 
 
Antenna
LO
Mixer
IF filter
Detector Video
amplifier
LO
IF
amplifier
Mixer
IF filter
 
 
 Continues/… 
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Table 1-2d: RF RECEIVER BLOCK DIAGRAMS 
Compressive 
 
 
Antenna IF
amplifier
Mixer
Weighting
filter
Sweeping
LO
DDL Videodetector
FM
chirp
 
 
Acousto-optic 
 
 
Bragg
cell
Laser
source
Antenna
RF down-
conversion
IF in
Detector
arrayIFamplifier
Frequency
information
Laser
beam
 

2
sin      =
 2
Symbols:      = Bragg angle,    = wavelength of light,    = wavelength of acoustic energy 

 
 
Digital 
 
 
Antenna
RF down-
conversion
AD
conversion
IF Spectrum
analyzer
Analogue
data
Digital
data
Parameter
encoder
PDW Digital
processor
I
Q
 
 
 
Table 1-2d: Block diagrams for receivers mentioned in Tables 1-2. A preamplifier and RF filter 
have been shown only for the CVR, a threshold stage only for the CVR and superhet receivers. 
Adapted from [Bro98, Gol87 p.159, Ner01 p.319, Sch86, Pac00, Tsu86, Vac93]. For a proposed 
channelized digital IFM receiver, see [Tsu96]. Commonly used acousto-optic materials are 
tellurium dioxide, lead molybdate, and gallium phospide [Bro95]. The digital receiver is 
implemented either with one or two AD converters; the single-AD solution requires twice the 
sampling rate to achieve the same IBW as the double-AD solution [Ner01 pp.319-320]. The 
block diagram for channelized receivers represents the traditional approach; for new designs 
only digital receiver solutions are considered. Legend: AD=analogue-to-digital, DDL=dispersive 
delay line, FM=frequency modulation, IBW=instantaneous bandwidth, IF=intermediate 
frequency, LNA=low-noise amplifier, LO=local oscillator, PDW=pulse descriptor word, 
RF=radio-frequency. 
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Table 1-3: RADAR SELECTIVITY 
Selectivity 
group Technique Main impact 
Code switching Repels repeater jammer signals from previous PRIs, although 
the code must remain stable for duration of CPI. Enhances 
LPI qualities. 
Codes 
Compression ratio Compression ratio agility resembles code switching. 
Multi-lobe antenna Radar capability reduction due to jamming is limited to the 
beam that is being jammed. 
Adaptive arrays/ 
SLB/SLC 
Adaptive arrays and SLC provide the means to put a null in 
the direction of the jammer. In SLB a reference antenna 
allows comparison between the interference and the main 
beam signals, and to blank the latter when necessary.  
Direction 
Sidelobe reduction Reduces the risk of jamming signals entering through the 
sidelobes. Enhances LPI qualities. 
Frequency agility Forces the jammer to dilute its power over a wide frequency 
band. Insensitive to spot frequency jamming, long pulse jam-
ming, and swept frequency jamming. Enhances LPI qualities. 
Frequency diversity Basically same as for frequency agility, although the level of 
agility is not as high. Can involve multistatic techniques. 
Frequency 
Pulse compression/ 
pulse Doppler 
Increases the radar’s capability against extended signal returns 
like chaff, and reduces susceptibility to deceptive jamming. 
Enhances LPI qualities. 
Multistatic 
techniques 
Decreases vulnerability to ARMs through blinking radar 
network or decoy transmitters. Enhances LPI qualities. 
Infrequent scanning Reduced risk of being intercepted and of vital parameters 
being identified. Enhances LPI qualities. 
Site selection Enhances LPI qualities through a degree of natural masking 
against detection, particularly by ground-based ESM 
equipment. 
Operation 
Transmission 
discipline 
Decreases vulnerability to ARMs. Enhances LPI qualities. 
Polarization Polarization agility No operational polarization agile system has been reported. 
Polarization purity is an important ECCM feature. 
Power Power management Enhances LPI qualities through power reduction. Longer burn-
through range through increased power. Generally, military 
radars should have 20 dB more power-aperture product than 
standard designs [Far90].  
PRF agility/jitter Prevents anticipation of radar pulse. Enhances LPI qualities. 
Pulse width/jitter Impedes radar identification. 
Time 
Pulse train length On-off keying by transmitting short bursts of pulses. 
Decreases vulnerability to ARMs. Enhances LPI qualities.  
Table 1-3: Summary of important radar selectivity methods [Far90, Hei92, Hol99, Joh95, 
Ner91, Sch99, Sko80, Vac93]. A subgroup is receiver selectivity, which is divided into frequency, 
spatial, and time-domain selectivity [Gal63]. It should be noted that although there are 
numerous waveforms they nonetheless fall into a handful of classes. Mitchell [Mit76 p.51] 
distinguishes between five classes: short pulses, long pulses, noise-type waveforms, linear-FM 
waveforms, and coherent pulse trains. It should be noted that the mentioned techniques must 
not interfere with the radar’s main function. Frequency agility, for instance, is not an option 
within the CPI of a pulse Doppler radar. Legend: ARM=anti-radiation missile, CPI=coherent 
processing interval, LPI=low probability of intercept, PRF=pulse repetition frequency, 
PRI=pulse repetition interval, SLB=sidelobe blanking, SLC=sidelobe cancellation. 
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Table 1-4: VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION TOOLS 
Tool Advantages Disadvantages 
M&S + Supports establishment of mission-level requirements 
and translation of these into system specifications.  
+ Can assist studies of alternative concepts that satisfy 
operational needs. 
+ Can support OAR pretest planning and complement 
OAR tests by extending known parameters and test data 
to other operational scenarios. 
+ Can address MOE issues that cannot be determined 
directly from OAR tests. 
- Can be expensive to develop, operate, 
maintain, and validate. 
- Suffers from lack of confidence if not 
validated. 
U
ni
ns
ta
lle
d 
su
ite
 
+ Gives the opportunity to evaluate EWSP 
systems before installation on the platform. 
+ Tests can be performed when the platform is 
not ready for the EWSP suite, or when the 
interface HW and SW are not ready for 
integrated tests. 
- Does not provide information on the 
influence of the platform and its avionics. 
- Does not support evaluation of the 
coupling of free-space radiation. 
 
In
st
al
le
d 
su
ite
 
+ Allows evaluation of the integrated avionic 
system’s responses to stimulation. 
+ Allows a limited test setup with antenna hats 
placed over the apertures of a parked aircraft. 
+ Virtually any hostile or friendly RF emission 
can be generated . 
+ Flying in an operational scenario can be 
simulated with computer controlled tools. 
+ Saves time and money by identifying system 
performance problems. 
+ Provides preflight and postflight checkout of 
the aircraft’s avionics. 
+ Can be used to identify EMI and EMC 
problems between onboard avionics. 
+ The human operator can be included e.g. by 
linking an anechoic chamber to a flight 
simulator. 
- Free-space radiation in an anechoic 
chamber problematic due to limited 
space. 
- Anechoic chamber does not allow all 
aircraft systems to be switched on. 
- Target dynamics must be factored into 
the evaluation and polarization; 
concessions must be made. 
Ground 
test on 
EWSP 
suite 
Fe
at
ur
es
 c
om
m
on
 to
 a
ll 
gr
ou
nd
 te
st
s 
+ Provide methods to test EWSP performance in 
representative/multispectral threat environments 
+ Provide preflight and complementing data to 
OAR tests. 
+ Can overcome shortage of OAR threat simu-
lators by providing a dense signal environment to 
evaluate system performance. 
+ Can provide an environment that represents an 
integrated air defense system. 
+ Indoor facilities provide a secure test environ-
ment for classified systems. 
- A complete picture of system 
performance cannot be ascertained. 
- Test simulator needs validation to 
ensure credible results. 
- The human factor is mainly not taken 
into account in ground test facilities. 
- No realistic simulation of expendable 
ejection and threat responses. 
- Do not simulate very well such environ-
mental factors as terrain, meteorological, 
or atmospheric conditions. 
OAR 
flight 
test 
+ Provides the most credible data for T&E and shows 
how the system will perform in the operational 
environment, allows examination of many effects that 
cannot be accounted for with digital M&S and ground 
tests. 
+ Provides data to calibrate digital models and to 
validate threat simulators in ground test facilites. 
+ Provides complete end-to-end evaluation from sensor 
to aircrew members display in a dynamic environment, 
MMI issues can be addressed. 
- Range restrictions, instrumentation, 
safety considerations can restrict the tests; 
restricted battlefield densities and 
diversities. 
- Replication of tests is difficult, 
achieving statistical significance is costly. 
- OARs cannot keep up with the 
development of the latest threat systems. 
- The OAR is seldom truly representative 
of the operational environment. 
Table 1-4: Advantages and disadvantages of some V&V tools. Ground tests are divided into two 
groups, tests on uninstalled and installed EWSP suites.  The emphasis is on RF systems, since 
test methods for these are more developed than for EO systems. [Anon95, Wri93] Legend: 
EMC=electromagnetic compatibility, EMI=electromagnetic interference, MOE=measure of 
effectiveness, MMI=man-machine interface, OAR=open air range. 
 210
 
 
Appendix 1, References 
 
Ald02 Alder, C.: Air Target Seekers: Next Generation and Beyond, Techniques and 
technologies, Proceedings of the SMi Global Missile Summit 2002, SMi Conferences 
Ltd., London, 7-8 October 2002 
Anon95 Anonymous: Electronic Warfare Test and Evaluation Process—Direction and 
Methodology for EW Testing, AF Manual 99-112, US Air Force, 27 March, 1995 
Bal03 Ball, R.E.: The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, 2nd 
edition, AIAA Education Series, 2003 
Bel98 Bell, W.A., Glasgow, B.B.: On the Next Generation of Imaging Infrared Seekers for 
Anti-aircraft Missiles, Proc. SPIE, Vol. 3377, 1998, pp. 220-230 
Bro95 Brooks, P., Reeve, C.D.: Limitations in acousto-optic FM demodulators, IEE 
Proceedings on Optoelectronics, Vol. 142, No. 3, June 1995, pp. 149-156 
Bro98 Browne, J.P.R., Thurbon, M.T.: Electronic Warfare, Brassey’s, 1998 
Car63 Carpenter, R.O’B.: Comparison of AM and FM Reticle Systems, Applied Optics, Vol. 2, 
No. 3, pp. 229-236. Reprinted in Olsson, G. (ed.): Selected Papers on Reticles and their 
Applications, SPIE Milestone Series, Vol. MS155, 1999, pp. 350-357 
Cho95 Choi, Y.M.: Recent Advances in Electro-Optical Devices, Components and System for 
Microwave and Millimetre-Wave Applications, International Journal of Infrared and 
Millimeter Waves, Vol. 16, No. 8, 1995, pp. 1261-1284 
Coo99 Cook, N.: The disappearing helicopter, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 July 1999, pp. 23-26  
Cou02 Courts, M.: RAH-66 Comanche, Presentation at the Military Helicopter Conference, 
London, England, 23 April 2002 (CD ROM) 
Cra80 Craubner, S.: Digital simulation of reticle-systems, Image Processing for Missile 
Guidance, SPIE, Vol. 238, 1980, pp. 414-424 
Dir93 Dirschler, R.: Plume Radiation, AGARD Lecture Series 188, AGARD-LS-188, June 
1993, pp. 6/1-6/47, Accessible through <http://www.rta.nato.int/Abstracts.asp> 
(Accessed 12.3.2004) 
Dri91 Driggers, R.G.: et al.: Parameters of spinning AM reticles, Applied Optics, Vol. 30, No. 
19, 1 July 1991, pp. 2675-2684 
Emm75 Emmons, R.B. et al.: Infrared Detectors: An Overview, Optical Engineering, Vol. 14(1), 
pp. 21-30, 1975. Reprinted in: Johnson, R.B. et al. (eds.): Selected Papers on Infrared 
Design, SPIE Vol. 513, Part One, 1985, pp. 601-610 
Far90 Farina, A.: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures, Ch. 9 in: Skolnik, M.I. (ed.): Radar 
Handbook, 2nd ed., McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1990 
Fra00 Frawley, R.C. et al.: Suppression System for a Gas Turbine Engine, US Patent No. 
6,134,879, October 24, 2000 
Gal63 Galenian, J.C.: Designing Radar Receivers to Overcome Jamming, Electronics 
Magazine, Vol. 36, May 17, 1963, pp. 50-54. Reprinted as chapter 6.2 in Johnston, S.L. 
(ed.): Radar Electronic Counter-Countermeasures, Artech House, Inc., 1980 
Ger85 Gerson, G.: Tracking Systems, Ch. 22 in Wolfe, W.L., Zissis, G.J. (eds.): The Infrared 
Handbook, rev. ed., Environmental Research Center of Michigan, 1985. Pages 22/38-
22/46 are reprinted in Olsson, G. (ed.): Selected Papers on Reticles and their 
Applications, SPIE Milestone Series, Vol. MS155, 1999, pp. 122-130 
Gla99 Glasgow, B., Bell, W: The Future of Anti-Aircraft Imaging Infrared Seeker Missile 
Threats, Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Aerospace Conference, Vol. 4, 6-13 March 
1999, pp. 457-465 
Gol87 Golden, A. Jr.: Radar Electronic Warfare, AIAA Education Series, 1987 
Gro03 Grossman, J. et al.: Vertical Envelopment and the Future Transport Rotorcraft: 
Operational Considerations for the Objective Force, RAND Study MR-1713-A, 2003, 
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1713> (Retrieved 25.7.2004) 
Hei92 Heikkilä, E.: Elektronisen Sodankäynnin Vaikutukset Tutkan Rakenteeseen (The 
Influence of EW on Radar Design), Seminar handout, State Technical Research Center 
VTT, February 1992 (partially in Finnish) 
Her00 Herskovitz, D.: You Bet Your Life: Today’s Missile Warning Systems, The Journal of 
Electronic Defense, April 2000, pp. 51-56 
 211
Hoi95 Hoisington, D.B.: Electronic Warfare, Lynx Publishing, Sunnyvale, CA, 1995 (Two 
volumes) 
Hol99 Holbourn, P.E.: The Future Evolution of Airborne Radar, Military Technology, 8/1999, 
pp. 57-64 
How88 Hovanessian, S.A.: Introduction to Sensor Systems, Artech House, Inc., 1988 
Hud69 Hudson, R.D. jr: Infrared System Engineering, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969. Pages 
235-263 are reprinted in Olsson, G. (ed.): Selected Papers on Reticles and their 
Applications, SPIE Milestone Series, Vol. MS155, 1999, pp. 43-71  
Jah97 Jahng, S.G. et al.: Design and analysis of improved instantaneous field of view of rosette 
scanning infrared seeker, IEE Electronics Letters, Vol. 33, No. 23, 6th November 1997, 
pp.1964-1965 
Joh95 Johnston, S.L.: CESM—A New Category of Radar ECCM, IEEE Trans AES, Vol. 31, 
No. 2, April 1995, pp. 854-856 
Kai96 Kaiser, S.G.: Digital Receiver Technology, Architecture, and Application, Digest of the 
1996 IEEE Microwave Symposium, Vol. 3, IEEE MTT-S International, 17-21 June 
1996, pp. 1331-1334 
Kla99 Klass, P.J.: RWR, ESM Changes Prompt Litton Merger, Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, November 15, 1999, pp. 89-90 
Kle97 Klein, L.A.: Millimeter-Wave and Infrared Multisensor Design and Signal Processing, 
Artech House, Inc., 1997 
Kno97 Knowles, P., Baker, I.M.: Mercury cadmium telluride staring arrays for mid-IR 
detection, IEE Proc.-Optron., Vol. 144, No. 5, October 1997, pp.327-330 
Kre97 Kreider, J. et al.: Uncooled infrared arrays sense image scenes, Laser Focus World, 
August 1997, p. 197 
May83 May, J.J. Jr, Van Zee, M.E.: Electro-Optic and Infrared Sensors, Microwave Journal, 
September 1983, p. 121 
Mey02 Meyer, B.: The Incredible Shrinking IR Camera, Photonics Spectra, April 2002, pp. 119-
124 
Mil96 Miller, J.L., Friedman, E.: Photonics Rules of Thumb, McGraw-Hill, 1996 
Mis97 Misiurewicz, J., et al.: Analysis of Recorded Helicopter Echo, Proceedings of the IEE 97 
Radar Conference, 14-16 October 1997, pp. 449-453 (IEE Publication No. 449) 
Mit76 Mitchell, R.L.: Radar Signal Simulation, Artech House, Inc., 1976 
Ner91 Neri, F.: Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems, Artech House, Inc., 1991 
Ner01 Neri, F.: Introduction to Electronic Defense Systems, 2nd edition, Artech House, Inc., 
2001 
Nor02 Norton, P.: HgCdTe infrared detectors, Opto-Electronics Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2002, 
pp. 159-174, <http://www.wat.edu.pl/review/optor/10(3)159.pdf> (Retrieved 10.8.2004) 
Oh01 Oh, J.S. et al.: A New Two-color Cancellation Algorithm for Counter-counter-measures 
of Infrared Seekers, Optical Engineering, August 2001, <http://candy.ee.cau.ac.kr/ 
paper/intl_pasper/IJ-8.pdf> (Retrieved 21.5.2002) 
Ols92 Olsson, G.: Simulering Retikelmålsökning—Metodbeskrivning (Simulation of Reticle 
Seekers—Description of Method), FOA Rapport, C 30685-8.3, November 1992 (in 
Swedish) 
Ols94 Olsson, G.: Simulation of reticle seekers by means of an image processing system, 
Optical Engineering, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 730-736. Reprinted in Olsson, G. (ed.): Selected 
Papers on Reticles and their Applications, SPIE Milestone Series, Vol. MS155, 1999, 
pp. 461-467 
Pac00 Pace, P.E.: Advanced Techniques for Digital Receivers, Artech House, Inc., 2000 
Por91 Porras, M.A. et al.: Amplitude-modulated and frequency-modulated reticle responses of 
Gaussian beams, Optical Engineering, Vol. 30, No. 12, pp. 1986-1992. Reprinted in 
Olsson, G. (ed.): Selected Papers on Reticles and their Applications, SPIE Milestone 
Series, Vol. MS155, 1999, pp. 424-430 
Raz00 Razeghi, M.: Optoelectronic Devices Based on III-V Compound Semiconductors Which 
Have Made Major Scientific and Technological Impact in the Past 20 Years, IEEE 
Journal on Selected Topics in Quantum Electronics, Vol. 6, No. 6, November/December 
2000, p. 1344 
Ree81 Reedy, E.K., Ewell, G.W.: Millimeter Radar, Ch. 2 in Button, K.J., Wiltse, J.C. (eds.): 
Infrared and Millimeter Waves, Volume 4, Millimeter Systems, Academic Press, 1981 
Rot99 Rotolante, R.A.: Why the IR detector market is in a flux, Laser Focus World, October 
1999, p. 65 
 212
Sch86 Schleher, D.C.: Introduction to Electronic Warfare, Artech House, Inc., 1986 
Sch93 Schmieder, D.E., Walker, G.W.: Camouflage, Suppression, and Screening Systems, Ch. 
2 Accetta, J.S., Shumaker, D.L. (eds.): The Infrared and Electro-Optical Systems 
Handbook, Vol. 7 (Countermeasure Systems), Environmental Research Institute of 
Michigan, SPIE Optical Engineering Press, 1993 
Sch99 Schleher, D.C.: Electronic Warfare in the Information Age, Artech House, Inc., 1999 
Scr91 Scribner, D.A. et al.: Infrared Focal Plane Array Technology, Proceedings of the IEEE, 
Vol. 79, No. 1, January 1991, pp. 66-85 
Sel92 Self, A.G.: LOW COST ESM—what technology opportunities? Proceedings of the 1992 
International Radar Conference (Radar 92), 12-13 October 1992, pp.175-179 
Sko80 Skolnik, M.I.: Introduction to Radar Systems, 2nd ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1980 
Sul02 Sullivan, W.B.: Instantaneous Frequency Measurement Receivers for Maritime Patrol, 
The Journal of Electronic Defense, Vol. 25, No. 10, 2002, p. 55 
Tay98 Taylor, B.: Advanced Electro-optical/Infrared Countermeasures, Handout from briefing 
at the 35th AOC Symposium, Virginia Beach, VA, October 1998 
Tsu86 Tsui, J.B.-Y.: Microwave Receivers With Electronic Warfare Applications, John Wiley 
& Sons, Inc., 1986 
Tsu94 Tsui, J., Hedge, J.N.: Instantaneous Frequency Measurement (IFM) Receiver With Two 
Signal Capability, US Patent No. 5,291,125, March 1, 1994 
Tsu96 Tsui, J.B.Y.: Digital Channelized IFM Receiver, US Patent No. 5,499,391, March 12, 
1996 
Tsu95 Tsui, J.: Digital Techniques for Wideband Receivers, Artech House, Inc. 1995 
Vac93 Vaccaro, D.D.: Electronic Warfare Receiving Systems, Artech House, Inc., 1993 
Wau98 Wauters, J.: Novel IR detectors operate at room temperature, Laser Focus World, May 
1998, p. 175 
Wie91 Wiegand, J.R.: Radar Electronic Countermeasures Systems Design, Artech House, Inc., 
1991 
Wil93 Wilmot, D.W. et al: Warning systems, Ch. 1 in Accetta, J.S., Shumaker, D.L. (eds.): The 
Infrared and Electro-Optical Systems Handbook, Vol. 7 (Countermeasure Systems), 
Environmental Research Institute of Michigan, SPIE Optical Engineering Press, 1993 
Wil98 Wiley, R.G.: Intercepting Modern Signals, Seminar handout, 35th annual AOC 
International Convention, Virginia Beach, VA, 30 October 1998 
Win99 Winnall, S.T., Lindsay, A.C.: A Fabry-Perot Scanning Receiver for Microwave Signal 
Processing, IEEE Transactions on Microwave Theory and Techniques, Vol. 47, No. 7, 
July 1999, pp. 1385-1390 
Win02 Winnall, S.T., Hunter, D.B.: A Fibre Bragg Grating Based Scanning Receiver for 
Electronic Warfare Applications, (IEEE) International Topical Meeting on Microwave 
Photonics (MWP ’01), 7-9 January 2002, pp. 211-214 
Wis85 Wiseman, C.: Fine Resolution Angle of Arrival Is the Key to Sorting Agile Threats, 
International Countermeasures Handbook 1985, 10th Edition, EW Communications, Inc., 
1985, pp. 324-329 
Wri93 Wright, F.L.: Operational Test and Evaluation of Electronic Combat Systems, Air 
University Press, AU-ARI-92-2, August 1993 
Zel93 Zeller, B.M. (chair): Terminology and Assessment Methods of Solid Rocket Propellant 
Exhaust Signatures, AGARD-AR-287, February 1993, Accessible through <http://www. 
rta.nato.int/Abstracts.asp > (Retrieved 24.2.2004) 
Zie02 Ziegler, J. et al.: Advanced sensor technologies for high performance infrared detectors, 
Infrared Physics & Technology, Vol. 43, 2002, pp. 239-243 
  
 
 213
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: PARAMETERS IN FSD MODELS 
 
 
 
Parameters used in the FSD model in Figure 8. 
 
Parameter Value Motivation 
COLLECTION 
DELAY 
12 Month Assumed time for collecting information on a new 
subject. 
CONVERSION 
EFFICIENCY 
0.33 Pieces Every third piece of knowledge is assumed to contribute 
to gaining new information. 
INITIAL 
INFORMATION 
100 Pieces Selected as a basic value. 
INITIAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
1000 Pieces Selected as a basic value. 
LEARNING DELAY 24 Month Assumed delay in transforming information into 
knowledge. 
LEARNING 
EFFICIENCY 
0.1 1/Month The collected and stored information are assumed to 
convert into knowledge by 10%/month. 
RATE OF 
OBSOLESCENCE 
0.02 1/Month The collected and stored information are assumed to 
become obsolescent (be forgotten) by 2 %/Month before 
being turned into knowledge. 
 
Table 2-1: Motivation for parameter selection for the FSD example in Figure 8. The parameters 
are purely fictive, since the model serves only as a didactic example on FSD modeling and 
simulation. 
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Parameters used in the Capability Model (Figure 63) 
 
 
Parameter Value Motivation 
CM IMPORTANCE 
TO THREAT 
DEVELOPMENT 
0.166667 
Dmnl 
Assumed ratio for CM influence on threat development. 
Cannot be too high if available development resources 
are tied to work based on general technological progress. 
EWSp influence on 
budget changes 
1 Hypothetical value (c (0.5, 2), approximately), used only 
to study the influence of sudden changes. 
EWSP 
OBSOLESCENCE 
1% per annum The rate has to be conservative since old threats (radar 
modes etc.) can reemerge in new systems. 
EXPECTED EWSP 
EFFECTIVENESS 
0.8 The value 0.8 is required by the US DHS for DIRCM 
effectiveness on commercial airliners. 
INITIAL 
EVADABLE 
2000 Lethality Initial number of threats (INITIAL EVADABLE + 
INITIAL IDENTIFIED + INITIAL UNIDENTIFIED = 
3000) is below the capacity of British Sky Guardian 2000 
RWR (4000 data file entries). 
INITIAL EWSP 
FUNDING 
0.5 Million 
Euro/Month 
Annual EWSP costs of € 6 Million (the cost for 30-40 
man-years of labor) for maintaining 2000 CM modes and 
developing 120 new ones. 
INITIAL 
IDENTIFIED 
500 Mode(s) Threats for which CMs do not exist are assumed to split 
50-50 between identified and unidentified at time zero. 
INITIAL 
PRODUCTIVITY 
12.5 Lethality/ 
Month 
Basic value for the simulation; the number of threats 
doubles in 20 years with a constant 12.5 Lethality/Month. 
INITIAL 
UNIDENTIFIED 
500 Mode(s) Threats for which CMs do not exist are assumed to split 
50-50 between identified and unidentified at time zero. 
INTELLIGENCE 
DELAY 
 24 Month(s) Assumed that 60% knowledge on unidentified threats can 
be gained in 24 months. 
INTELLIGENCE 
EFFICIENCY 
0.6 Dmnl Assumed that 60% knowledge on unidentified threats can 
be gained in 24 months. 
REALLOCATION 
DELAY 
24 Month(s) One year for preparing budget allocation plus one year 
for the budget cycle. Shorter if existing funds are 
“cannibalized”. 
THREAT 
DEVELOPMENT 
DELAY 
24 Month(s) Assumed average time for developing threats. Selected 
quite short since the delay is mainly seen being related to 
crash programs in response to developed CMs. 
THREAT 
INCENTIVE 
10 Lethality/ 
Month 
The growth of threats that the EWSP suite has to identify 
and counter is a mixture of radar modes, missile seekers 
and laser pulses. Doubling in 25 years is adequate. 
TIME TO BUILD 
CAPABILITY 
36 Month(s) Three years is typical for hiring and training new 
personnel, constructing and equipping new facilities, etc. 
TIME TO 
DEVELOP CM 
24 Month(s) The time required to develop CMs varies widely; from 
hours in the case of new radar modes (war modes) to 
years in case a new EWSP system has to be developed. 
 
Table 2-2: Motivation for parameter selection for the Capability Model. Legend: 
DHS=Department of Homeland Security, Dmnl= dimensionless. 
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Parameters used in the Campaign Model (Figure 68) 
 
 
Parameter Value Motivation 
AVERAGE TIME 
ACTIVE 
9 Hours Enemy air defense assets are assumed to shift positions 
twice a day, with three hours required for 
redeployment and nine hours remaining for target 
engagement. 
ENEMY BDR 
DURATION 
48 Hours The value can change from minutes, in the case of 
computer rebooting, to days or more in case of 
damages caused by hard-kill assets. 48 hours is 
selected as a compromise. 
ENEMY COMBAT 
EFFECTIVENESS 
0.0001 
Dmnl/Hour*Asset 
Equals to a combat outcome of 1 hit friendly asset per 
10,000 hours for each enemy asset. The figure is 
realistic in a combat scenario that lasts for a month 
without completely exhausting resources. 
ENEMY P-KILL 
GIVEN A HIT 
0.3 Dmnl The discussion has shown Pk/H values to vary greatly in 
different scenarios, 30% is a realistic figure. 
EWSP CM 
POTENTIAL 
0.9 Dmnl Percentage of approaching threats countered by the 
EWSP suite. The US DHS has required at least 80% 
CM effectiveness of DIRCMs on civil aircraft. Since 
MDF restrictions lower the true EWSP capability the 
intrinsic potential must exceed the expected capability. 
EWSP INTEL 
CONTRIBUTION 
0.5 Dmnl The parameter value (c [0, 1]) adds to 
INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS. The value 0.5 is 
a baseline value that can be altered in order to study the 
potential intelligence contribution of EWSP and its 
effects on survivability. 
FRIENDLY BDR 
DURATION 
48 Hours The discussion has shown that 48 hours is often used 
as a benchmark for helicopter BDR. The value can be 
altered in order to investigate its effects. 
FRIENDLY 
COMBAT 
POTENTIAL 
0.0001 
Dmnl/Hour*Asset 
Equals to a combat outcome of 1 hit enemy asset per 
10,000 hours for each friendly asset. See above 
ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. 
FRIENDLY P-KILL 
GIVEN A HIT 
0.3 Dmnl The discussion has shown Pk/H values to vary greatly in 
different scenarios, 30% is a realistic figure. See 
ENEMY P-KILL GIVEN A HIT. 
HIGH-TECH 
THREAT RATIO 
0.2 Dmnl The value depends on the combat scenario. A high-
/low-tech ratio of 20% is realistic for helicopters in a 
mixed combat scenario, but is low if stand-off assets 
are considered. The value can be altered in order to 
study effects on the outcome.  
INITIAL ACTIVE 
ASSETS 
80 Asset The enemy’s total initial assets are 100, a number 
selected for the ease in expressing changes in percent. 
80% are active and 20 % are inactive.  
INITIAL 
FRIENDLY ASSETS 
120 Asset The value 120 is selected only to differ slightly from 
enemy assets at the start of the conflict (100 Assets).  
INITIAL PASSIVE 
ASSETS 
20 Asset 20% of the enemy’s assets are initially inactive. See 
INITIAL ACTIVE ASSETS.  
INTELLIGENCE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
0.6 Dmnl Assumes that 60% of the required intelligence can be 
gathered by strategic assets within the time determined 
by AVERAGE TIME ACTIVE. That is, the time 
during which enemy assets remain at a specific 
location before redeploying. 
  Continues/… 
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Parameter Value Motivation 
MAXIMUM 
ACTIVITY 
0.4444 
Dmnl/Hour 
The value is selected to give a constant ratio 
(80%/20%) between “Engaging enemy assets” and 
“Passive enemy assets” (unless the loop is disturbed by 
external factors) assuming AVERAGE TIME ACTIVE 
= 9 hours and “campaign intensity”=1 (Dmnl). 
SUPPRESSION 
SCALE POINT 
0.008 Dmnl/Hour Decay point at which the enemy’s reaction to friendly 
capability is considered to be at equilibrium. The 
numeric value given through INITIAL FRIENDLY 
ASSETS = 80 (Asset) times FRIENDLY COMBAT 
POTENTIAL = 0.0001 (Dmnl/Hour*Asset), equals to 
0.008 (Dmnl/Hour). 
 
Table 2-3: Motivation for parameter selection for the Campaign Model. 
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Parameters used in the Mission Model (Figure 74) 
 
 
Parameter Value Motivation 
ESCORT 
RESOURCE LIMIT 
0.00556 
seconds 
The effectiveness of escort assets drops if threats emerge 
more often than one every third minute. Time is needed 
to find a firing position, detect and identify the threat, fire 
upon it, and to catch up with the other helicopters. 
ESCORT TIME TO 
SUPPRESS HALF 
60 seconds Time required by escort assets to detect and identify the 
threat, align to the threat, fire, and for penetrator fly-out. 
EWSP GRACE 
PERIOD 
5 seconds Time available for EWSP to counter incoming threats. 
EWSP TIME TO 
COUNTER POINT 
EIGHT 
3 seconds The EWSP suite can detect, identify, and counter 80% of 
the approaching threats on the average in 3 seconds. 80% 
success rate is the requirement by the US DHS. 
FLIGHT LEG 
DURATION 
900 seconds Support assets attack threats in the 15-minute flight route 
window that precedes the arrival of helicopters. 
FLIGHT TACTICS 
LIMIT 
0.01667 
Lethality/ 
second 
The helicopter is able to successfully utilize flight route 
selection if the threats emerge no more often than one per 
minute. More densely located threats saturate flight 
tactics. 
PEAK NUMBER OF 
THREATS 
0.05 Lethality/ 
second 
Conversion factor that multiplied with the normalized 
“Threat distribution” lookup table gives the sought 
number of threats (0.05x900x4.4=198). 
PENETRATOR 
MISS TIME 
2 seconds Time remaining for missile to hit or miss once EWSP 
GRACE PERIOD has passed. The total penetrator fly-out 
time is assumed to be 5+2=7 seconds. 
POP-UP 
ELIMINATION 
TIME 
90 seconds Pop-up threats should be eliminated within 1.5 minutes 
by escort assets, or they will fire on the helicopter(s). 
POP-UP FLYBY 
TIME 
90 seconds Pop-up threats endanger the helicopter if they are in a 
±45 second window (flight range) around the helicopters. 
STANDOFF TIME 
TO HALF THREAT 
1200 seconds Half of the threats can be eliminated if attacks preceding 
the arrival of helicopters last for 20 minutes. 
TIME TO HALF 
THREATS BY 
TACTICS 
90 seconds Half of the threats are assumed to be bypassed at a 
penalty of 1.5 minutes flight time (helicopters in NOE 
flight). 
THREAT TIME TO 
HIT HALF 
3 seconds Time required by the threat to hit half of its targets. 
 
Table 2-4: Motivation for parameter selection for the Mission Model. 
 
 
